4 ms·
seeming-to vs actual is a real distinction that can be made in some cases. However, I don't think you get to make it unless you can define what 'actual' actual
by kybernetikos 4y ago
seeming-to vs actual is a real distinction that can be made in some cases.
However, I don't think you get to make it unless you can define what 'actual' actually is. Saying that the AI can't interpret but only seem-to-have-interpreted is begging the question unless you can then go on and explain what interpret actually means.
It is precisely what is most interesting about the large language models that complex seeming-tos arise from a simple process done on a large scale. If you want to say that humans have access to a qualitatively different 'actual', then you should be able to explain what that difference is, because without that deep understanding of the phenomenon, it's perfectly reasonable to ask how we know that humans do the actual rather than the seeming-to.
Your number 3 is pretty surprising, given that explaining is one of few areas I'd say it's frequently superhuman in. It can also certainly generate imaginings with more fluidity than I can too.
Until we have a really good understanding of how humans do these things, we shouldn't spend any time pronouncing on how there's a huge difference between a capability as ChatGPT has it and as a human has it.
- mjburgess 4y agoThe actual capacities are listed: caring, imagining, and so on. Animals form mental representations of their environment, which are directly caused by that environment in conjunction with their prior models of it. On top of these states they combine motivational and emotional attitudes to form goals, to intend, to play, and so on. There is far less mystery here than we suppose. Thousands of years of religion has forced this supposition that there's a "mind/body" problem, and characterising the minds of animals is such a difficult thing; it isnt.
- kybernetikos 4y ago> Animals form mental representations of their environment, which are directly caused by that environment in conjunction with their prior models of it. On top of these states they combine motivational and emotional attitudes to form goals, to intend, to play, and so on. And I take it that you're arguing that ChatGPT does not have a mental representation of its environment? Obviously, we could quibble about 'mental', but for all of its limitations and problems, ChatGPT is very little more than a condensed representation of its environment. What about motivation and emotion? I don't think we have a clear enough definition of how these things are instantiated in humans to properly debate here. ChatGPT acts as if it has certain motivations (to be helpful, to avoid controversy), and has been coached to avoid expressions of emotion. If you start from a view point of 'a next-word prediction engine obviously cannot have emotion, plans, or a world model', then of course you'll conclude that ChatGPT does not have these things and cannot. If you start from the view that we don't really know what mechanisms we need to instantiate these things anyway, then you're much more likely to look at the areas that ChatGPT seems to behave similarly to humans and wonder if big chunks of our brain are actually next token prediction engines, just structured by evolution to work in particular ways. This view was not new with ChatGPT of course, predictive coding has been an interesting approach to human cognition for a while now.
- mnsc 4y agoIf you were in a saw-style escape room with chatgpt and you needed to construct 1 kg nitroglycerin from a large sample of various chemicals in order to get out. 1. Could you ask chatgpt (jailbroken ofc because "danger") whether it could safely describe how to do this and trust the reply? 2. Would you then trust chatgpt to "superhumanely" explain how to do this?