4 ms·

It's absolutely possible. No idea about a proof of concept, but I don't even think it matters, honestly. It's cute that the OS might play some tricks to hide t

It's absolutely possible. No idea about a proof of concept, but I don't even think it matters, honestly. It's cute that the OS might play some tricks to hide them from you, but at the end of the day, that's all it is doing, is hiding. Security by obscurity. You're just betting you hid them really really well and that no one will be able to find them. With zero preparation in the event someone does. If you have root, you have access to the files, period. Someone determined enough could search, read and write to the disk directly, bypassing the filesystem. unveil is defense in depth, but it shouldn't be treated as a final line of defense which too many obsd fans seem to want to do.

ori_b 4y ago
How? you don't have access to the devices. They're not in your namespace. Again, proof of concept please.
- Zurrrrr 4y ago
  lol, ok. You really think root can't access the devices? lol. So you just want to have blind faith in what is basically security via obscurity with extra steps. That's fine, but it's not an approach to be taken seriously or advocated.
  - ori_b 4y ago
    [flagged]
    - Zurrrrr 4y ago
      I'm not spouting crap at all, you just really have your head buried in the sand. YOu've drunk more of the OBSD koolaid then even mac zealots drink of the mac kooolaid. I won't be replying again as I don't see how this is wroth my time when you can't even support anything you've said.
      - ori_b 4y ago
        [flagged]
      - witheld 4y ago
        You don’t understand namespaces, there are no mechanisms, or root specific mechanisms, you could use to elevate a namespace. You don’t get any kind of god powers like kernel memory access, if you don’t have access to the system call you can’t debug. Like I don’t understand how to explain to you that SELinux locks down system calls in an identical way conceptually.
        Zurrrrr 4y ago
        And I don't think you understand just how many syscalls big third party applications are going to require.
        witheld 4y ago
        They aren’t (and do not) require any privleged system calls, whatsoever. If you can actually exploit a system call, neither a MAC based approach or a pledge will help.
        Zurrrrr 4y ago
        > They aren’t (and do not) require any privleged system calls, whatsoever. You're making a distinction about 'privileged' system calls, why, exactly? You really think something like Oracle won't require access to a ton of syscalls to work correctly? > If you can actually exploit a system call, neither a MAC based approach or a pledge will help. MAC will, pledge won't. For example with SELinux:https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filte...
        ori_b 4y ago
        Did you realize your link points to a more fragile version of pledge? Linux has added a direct pledge+unveil clone to improve the situation: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/torvalds/linux/master/Documentation/security/landlock.rst https://raw.githubusercontent.com/torvalds/linux/master/Docu...
    - dang 4y ago
      Please don't respond to a bad comment by breaking the site guidelines yourself. That only makes things worse. Also, can you please not perpetuate flamewars on HN generally? It's not what this site is for, and destroys what it is for. I've banned the other account and I'm not banning yours because as far as I can tell you didn't break the rules as badly and you haven't been making a habit of it—but if you'd please review https://news.ycombinator.com/newsguidelines.html https://news.ycombinator.com/newsguidelines.html and not do this kind of thing in the future, we'd appreciate it.

ori_b 4y ago

How? you don't have access to the devices. They're not in your namespace. Again, proof of concept please.

Zurrrrr 4y ago
lol, ok. You really think root can't access the devices? lol. So you just want to have blind faith in what is basically security via obscurity with extra steps. That's fine, but it's not an approach to be taken seriously or advocated.
- ori_b 4y ago
  [flagged]
  - Zurrrrr 4y ago
    I'm not spouting crap at all, you just really have your head buried in the sand. YOu've drunk more of the OBSD koolaid then even mac zealots drink of the mac kooolaid. I won't be replying again as I don't see how this is wroth my time when you can't even support anything you've said.
    - ori_b 4y ago
      [flagged]
    - witheld 4y ago
      You don’t understand namespaces, there are no mechanisms, or root specific mechanisms, you could use to elevate a namespace. You don’t get any kind of god powers like kernel memory access, if you don’t have access to the system call you can’t debug. Like I don’t understand how to explain to you that SELinux locks down system calls in an identical way conceptually.
      - Zurrrrr 4y ago
        And I don't think you understand just how many syscalls big third party applications are going to require.
        witheld 4y ago
        They aren’t (and do not) require any privleged system calls, whatsoever. If you can actually exploit a system call, neither a MAC based approach or a pledge will help.
        Zurrrrr 4y ago
        > They aren’t (and do not) require any privleged system calls, whatsoever. You're making a distinction about 'privileged' system calls, why, exactly? You really think something like Oracle won't require access to a ton of syscalls to work correctly? > If you can actually exploit a system call, neither a MAC based approach or a pledge will help. MAC will, pledge won't. For example with SELinux:https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filte...
        ori_b 4y ago
        Did you realize your link points to a more fragile version of pledge? Linux has added a direct pledge+unveil clone to improve the situation: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/torvalds/linux/master/Documentation/security/landlock.rst https://raw.githubusercontent.com/torvalds/linux/master/Docu...
  - dang 4y ago
    Please don't respond to a bad comment by breaking the site guidelines yourself. That only makes things worse. Also, can you please not perpetuate flamewars on HN generally? It's not what this site is for, and destroys what it is for. I've banned the other account and I'm not banning yours because as far as I can tell you didn't break the rules as badly and you haven't been making a habit of it—but if you'd please review https://news.ycombinator.com/newsguidelines.html https://news.ycombinator.com/newsguidelines.html and not do this kind of thing in the future, we'd appreciate it.