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You did, actually; you said that OpenBSD just "really really really hopes" that an attacker won't get root, and I pointed out that that was nonsense and that th
by yjftsjthsd-h 4y ago
You did, actually; you said that OpenBSD just "really really really hopes" that an attacker won't get root, and I pointed out that that was nonsense and that they are in fact taking measures to ensure it.
Besides, by that logic, your systems are totally insecure because you're just really really really hoping the attacker doesn't get an unconfined process.
- Zurrrrr 4y agoSigh. No, I didn't. Saying OpenBSD 'really really really hopes' an attacker doesn't get root is still 100% correct. They are still prioritizing removing bugs ahead of time instead of providing stronger tools to prepare for a scenario where someone does exploit a bug they didn't get to. > Besides, by that logic, your systems are totally insecure because you're just really really really hoping the attacker doesn't get an unconfined process. Which is where things like SELinux come in, which is my whole point.....
- yjftsjthsd-h 4y ago> They are still prioritizing removing bugs ahead of time instead of providing stronger tools to prepare for a scenario where someone does exploit a bug they didn't get to. They're absolutely dealing with that situation as well. So let's say for instance that the default OpenBSD httpd turns out to have some bug that allows an attacker to execute any arbitrary code of their choosing on the server. That's a problem, but it's hardly the end of the world. First, the server is using pledge+unveil, so it can't actually do all that much other than serving web pages. Second, even if the attacker can work within those restrictions, they're running as a completely unprivileged user, because OpenBSD is actually a great fan of defense in depth. > Which is where things like SELinux come in, which is my whole point..... If we're assuming an attacker can run things as root, then obviously we have to assume that they can run things in an unconfined context as well, at which point you've just basically added a second word for root and nothing helps.
- anthk 4y agoAlso, pledge would SIGABRT that's process under a milisecond upon trying a non-allowed syscall. So, as I said, good luck trying to call something outside pledge. Being root? You wish if you can even run something alonside the process. Because even the subprocesses from a pledged process are pledged too.
- Zurrrrr 4y agoIf someone has remote root pledge is basically irrelevant.
- anthk 4y agoGetting remote root is not easy as you'd think under OpenBSD.
- Zurrrrr 4y agoJesus christ, once again, the point is it doesn't matter. There is nothing in place if someone does. Good security is preparing for different possibilities, not just hoping one never happens because it seems unlikely. You're just proving what I said above 100% correct, that the OBSD approach is to just really hope that no one ever gets remote root. Tell you what, getting root on a properly configured MAC system is 100% impossible, so I'll choose that over a system where the developers just really really hope something bad won't happen every day of the week.