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Any technologies exist that let you have multiple encrypted OS's on multiple keys? For example, 1 key could boot up one OS and another key could boot up a diffe

Any technologies exist that let you have multiple encrypted OS's on multiple keys? For example, 1 key could boot up one OS and another key could boot up a different OS. Seems like it'd be difficult to prove that you booted one or the other...

ge0rg 15y ago
Yes. The term for that is plausible deniability. It is implemented (probably among others) in truecrypt: http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/?s=plausible-deniability http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/?s=plausible-deniability
- sp332 15y ago
  Plausible deniability is a much larger concept than that. Also if they know you're using Truecrypt, the "deniability" of the existence of a 2nd (or 3rd or 4th) OS goes down significantly.
  - ge0rg 15y ago
    It does indeed. However, what are they going to do? Torture you until you give them the "other" password? How can they distinguish whether you just cleaned your hard drive or if you gave them the wrong key?
    - bdg 15y ago
      The solution is of-course a honey-pot OS to boot.
  - gte910h 15y ago
    No it's doesn't. Truecrypt ALSO does full disk encryption...which is a very very good security precaution corporations everywhere are implementing.
  - drostie 15y ago
    I'm not so sure. TrueCrypt is first and foremost an encryption program. The fact that you have it might suggest that you encrypted something somewhere, but it doesn't directly suggest that you took the time to use its advanced "hidden volume" capabilities. So even if the police can say "hey, this looks encrypted, and you've got nothing else which looks similar, decrypt it for us," they are still stuck on "hey, we didn't find the evidence we were looking for -- maybe you have a hidden volume?". You say "I don't" and the judge says "GRR ARG DECRYPT IT NOW" and you say "I can't, it doesn't exist, I really am innocent, please get the scary men away from me."
  - baddox 15y ago
    The deniability doesn't diminish at all. You can even testify in court that the drive is encrypted using TrueCrypt and that TrueCrypt has plausible deniability. The whole point of TrueCrypt's plausible deniability is even when you know about the feature, you simply can't mathematically prove whether or not it's being used.
    - dedward 15y ago
      not directly, but their faq pretty clear about a bunch of secondary ( out of band, internet updates duplicated, etc) correlations that could lead to good evidence that the second system exists. pulling that off is noeasy task.
deleted 15y ago
[deleted]
talmand 15y ago
I can see the legal issues that would be forthcoming if you refused to share the key to allow for access or agree to type it in yourself. Obstruction and all that. I'm wondering what the legal ramifications might be if you set a secondary key that would wipe the drive in the most secure method possible and then provide that key. Or even the alternate boot sequence as suggested.
- mc32 15y ago
  >I'm wondering what the legal ramifications might be if you set a secondary key that would wipe the drive Destruction of evidence. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spoliation_of_evidence http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spoliation_of_evidence
  - talmand 15y ago
    Oh, I get that, I'm not saying it's a way to avoid the ramifications, I'm just wondering what they are. I have to say that I somewhat agree with the ruling because there are similar situations with physical objects, not true one-to-one but they are there. I'm just wondering how the courts would react to the destruction of digital evidence that was not directly initiated by the defendant, but indirectly by preparing for the possibility.
- Simucal 15y ago
  These "wipe the drive" decoy password scenarios would never work in real life unless their forensics team was really inept. There would be copies made and the drive that has the encrypted volume would likely be accessed with a "Write Blocker" forensic device, or in a virtual environment, etc. This technique would only tip your hand that the volume contents changed after entering the password.
  - slowpoke 15y ago
    A technical solution to this might be a form of encryption the requires a writable disk to actually decrypt anything. I don't know if that is possible, but it would effectively prevent these safeguards to work. And remember, you don't need to wipe the entire drive. Changing a few random bits in the decryption key would already forever turn the drive contents into unreadable garbage.
dhechols 15y ago
I foresee Truecrypt-ception. An encrypted OS within an encrypted OS within an encrypted OS. They'll never find my porn/plans to take over the world/illegal software/hacked secret government cables NOW!!!
amalcon 15y ago
The technology for this does exist, but it's pretty annoying to use in practice. You need to use the "decoy" OS regularly -- preferably most of the time. After all, it's implausible that you haven't used your web browser in six months, etc, and your adversary would notice this. The problem there is that the "hidden" OS is (by definition) undetectable from within the "decoy" OS. Therefore, you risk accidentally overwriting it. Some encryption software has workarounds for this, but that typically leaves you exposed while it's in use. Whole-disk encryption is great for protecting credit card numbers, embarrassing information, and trade secrets from someone who should happen to steal your laptop. If you actually have anything so secret that you're worried about being coerced into decrypting it, I don't know how to help you.

ge0rg 15y ago

Yes. The term for that is plausible deniability. It is implemented (probably among others) in truecrypt: http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/?s=plausible-deniability http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/?s=plausible-deniability

sp332 15y ago
Plausible deniability is a much larger concept than that. Also if they know you're using Truecrypt, the "deniability" of the existence of a 2nd (or 3rd or 4th) OS goes down significantly.
- ge0rg 15y ago
  It does indeed. However, what are they going to do? Torture you until you give them the "other" password? How can they distinguish whether you just cleaned your hard drive or if you gave them the wrong key?
  - bdg 15y ago
    The solution is of-course a honey-pot OS to boot.
- gte910h 15y ago
  No it's doesn't. Truecrypt ALSO does full disk encryption...which is a very very good security precaution corporations everywhere are implementing.
- drostie 15y ago
  I'm not so sure. TrueCrypt is first and foremost an encryption program. The fact that you have it might suggest that you encrypted something somewhere, but it doesn't directly suggest that you took the time to use its advanced "hidden volume" capabilities. So even if the police can say "hey, this looks encrypted, and you've got nothing else which looks similar, decrypt it for us," they are still stuck on "hey, we didn't find the evidence we were looking for -- maybe you have a hidden volume?". You say "I don't" and the judge says "GRR ARG DECRYPT IT NOW" and you say "I can't, it doesn't exist, I really am innocent, please get the scary men away from me."
- baddox 15y ago
  The deniability doesn't diminish at all. You can even testify in court that the drive is encrypted using TrueCrypt and that TrueCrypt has plausible deniability. The whole point of TrueCrypt's plausible deniability is even when you know about the feature, you simply can't mathematically prove whether or not it's being used.
  - dedward 15y ago
    not directly, but their faq pretty clear about a bunch of secondary ( out of band, internet updates duplicated, etc) correlations that could lead to good evidence that the second system exists. pulling that off is noeasy task.

deleted 15y ago

[deleted]

talmand 15y ago

I can see the legal issues that would be forthcoming if you refused to share the key to allow for access or agree to type it in yourself. Obstruction and all that. I'm wondering what the legal ramifications might be if you set a secondary key that would wipe the drive in the most secure method possible and then provide that key. Or even the alternate boot sequence as suggested.

mc32 15y ago
>I'm wondering what the legal ramifications might be if you set a secondary key that would wipe the drive Destruction of evidence. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spoliation_of_evidence http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spoliation_of_evidence
- talmand 15y ago
  Oh, I get that, I'm not saying it's a way to avoid the ramifications, I'm just wondering what they are. I have to say that I somewhat agree with the ruling because there are similar situations with physical objects, not true one-to-one but they are there. I'm just wondering how the courts would react to the destruction of digital evidence that was not directly initiated by the defendant, but indirectly by preparing for the possibility.
Simucal 15y ago
These "wipe the drive" decoy password scenarios would never work in real life unless their forensics team was really inept. There would be copies made and the drive that has the encrypted volume would likely be accessed with a "Write Blocker" forensic device, or in a virtual environment, etc. This technique would only tip your hand that the volume contents changed after entering the password.
- slowpoke 15y ago
  A technical solution to this might be a form of encryption the requires a writable disk to actually decrypt anything. I don't know if that is possible, but it would effectively prevent these safeguards to work. And remember, you don't need to wipe the entire drive. Changing a few random bits in the decryption key would already forever turn the drive contents into unreadable garbage.

dhechols 15y ago

I foresee Truecrypt-ception. An encrypted OS within an encrypted OS within an encrypted OS. They'll never find my porn/plans to take over the world/illegal software/hacked secret government cables NOW!!!

amalcon 15y ago

The technology for this does exist, but it's pretty annoying to use in practice. You need to use the "decoy" OS regularly -- preferably most of the time. After all, it's implausible that you haven't used your web browser in six months, etc, and your adversary would notice this. The problem there is that the "hidden" OS is (by definition) undetectable from within the "decoy" OS. Therefore, you risk accidentally overwriting it. Some encryption software has workarounds for this, but that typically leaves you exposed while it's in use. Whole-disk encryption is great for protecting credit card numbers, embarrassing information, and trade secrets from someone who should happen to steal your laptop. If you actually have anything so secret that you're worried about being coerced into decrypting it, I don't know how to help you.