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I have no objection to being downvoted, but since this was an attempt at a rational argument as part of a discussion rather than trolling, I would appreciate an

I have no objection to being downvoted, but since this was an attempt at a rational argument as part of a discussion rather than trolling, I would appreciate an explanation of what you think I got wrong.

roel_v 15y ago
For the record, it wasn't me who downvoted. Re: the group effort of invention, I don't see the relevance. One can invent as 'work for hire' in the same way that workers in a pottery factory don't become owners of the pots. The second part, that Rearden Steel was an improvement of 'regular' steel, is not a valid comparison either. 'Steel' is a broad word for purified iron, the methods for doing so being diverse. Rearden Steel was (I'm not sure this was stated explicitly, but can imo be reasonably be derived from the circumstance that were described) a specific alloy, made with a specific production process. That is much more specific than 'steel', and here it turns into a discussion on how specific an invention needs to be for it to be able to be 'intellectual property'. I don't think we're at the stage yet where it makes sense to discuss that - my problem is with the crowd who wants to abolish IP all together, or at least have laws that make any enforcement of it impossible or make the cost/benefit tradeoff of enforcement greater than 1. I now regret using 'natural rights' without qualifying it because I used it in a broad sense, not specifically in the Aristotelian or any other more 'defined' natural rights definition - just as catch-all term for 'axiomatic rights'. (at least for the purposed of my post - I myself still subscribe to an Objectivist foundation of 'natural rights'). Either way, I don't think it's material to the post; nonetheless I can't help myself but saying that I don't see why when a right was first recognized as a natural right reflects on it actually being a 'natural right'. Before the Enlightenment, there was little to no need for IP rights - it wasn't needed in canonical law because canonical law restricted content so the form of that never turned into an issue; and in common law there were marginally few situations where it was an issue. Finally, Disney never took a verbatim copy of a work and sold it to cinemas; that's not a valid argument for not having IP rights at all. This line of reasoning is imo straw man reasoning. Yes, creators are influenced, in some cases more than others, by existing works or social contexts. That doesn't make the concept of IP invalid. It's merely an (obvious) observation that leads to the conclusion that there need to be boundaries to when something is 'intellectual property'. As I wrote in a post above, I don't care much for that discussion, as it's way beyond the fundamental issue here. I guess our positions aren't that far from each others'; no, IP rights aren't exactly the same as tangible property rights, but there are large amounts of overlap, especially in the philosophical justifications for it (e.g. large parts of Locke's theories on property can (and imo should) be applied to IP rights). Enforcement of IP rights is lacking, as evidenced by the large amounts of pirated content available online. Legal measures without due process may not be the right solution, but previous measures (e.g. the DMCA, which was vilified as much as SOPA back in the 90's! I guess there aren't that many people left who remember those 'discussions') have proven to be ineffective. Website operators shouldn't bear all the responsibility of enforcing IP rights, but they need to make a real effort, especially in cases where their business stands to profit from infringement (Megaupload, but potentially others, too).
- timwiseman 15y ago
  Thank you for the thoughtful response. As you say, I think our fundamental positions are not that far apart, but our ways of reaching there are quite different and we seem to disagree on scope. Just to be perfectly clear, I do support (and indeed rely on) the concept of Intellectual Property, but I believe it needs to be limited in both duration and scope. Now, to address a couple of your more specific points. Steel is an alloy of iron, not just purified form (although some early forms involved mostly removing impurities and creating the alloy with other impurities naturally present), and while the term steel is somewhat generic I could say something like "440 Stainless Steel" and refer to a very specific composition. I point out that Rearden relied on it because I believe (it has been a while since I read Atlas Shrugged) Rearden metal used steel as a base. Even if that detail is wrong, it certainly relied on the millenia of metalurgical knowlede developed before Rearden, for which he paid between nothing and very little since only the very most recent developments are patented. The fact he led a team rather than developping it on his own weakens the clean philosophical argument that it was "earned by the sweat of his brow". He worked with others. Yes, he paid them and has every legal right to claim it as his (actually even that's muddy because he did it through his corporation and it is not entirely clear that he was a 100% owner with no one else having any equity at all). But while that doesn't muddy the legal water, it does muddy the philosophical claim. When a right was recognized does not change its status certainly, but it does act as evidence against a claim that it is an axiomatic right. One would expect that an axiomatic right would have at least some traces of origins in antiquity and that it would have arisen (even if it took a while) independently in many cultures. This is not true of copyright or patents. Those were extremely modern, created by a legislature and for a very specific purpose. Euclid would likely be shocked by the idea that someone would need his permission to copy his Elements (which he borrowed liberally from others to create). Oddly some of the European Moral Rights, such as the right to be acknowledged as the author, come closer to being axiomatic than actual copyright, even though they aren't recognized in the US in a full form. Euclid probably would have been outraged if the copy you made of his Elements didn't acknowledge him as the writer, but he wouldn't have questioned you making the copy. As for Disney, again I am not arguing against IP rights, I am all for them. The fact that most of Disney's best movies are openly derivative is an argument for IP rights that are limited in time and scope. That is what I am arguing for, and that is a position which benefits Disney greatly.

roel_v 15y ago

For the record, it wasn't me who downvoted. Re: the group effort of invention, I don't see the relevance. One can invent as 'work for hire' in the same way that workers in a pottery factory don't become owners of the pots. The second part, that Rearden Steel was an improvement of 'regular' steel, is not a valid comparison either. 'Steel' is a broad word for purified iron, the methods for doing so being diverse. Rearden Steel was (I'm not sure this was stated explicitly, but can imo be reasonably be derived from the circumstance that were described) a specific alloy, made with a specific production process. That is much more specific than 'steel', and here it turns into a discussion on how specific an invention needs to be for it to be able to be 'intellectual property'. I don't think we're at the stage yet where it makes sense to discuss that - my problem is with the crowd who wants to abolish IP all together, or at least have laws that make any enforcement of it impossible or make the cost/benefit tradeoff of enforcement greater than 1. I now regret using 'natural rights' without qualifying it because I used it in a broad sense, not specifically in the Aristotelian or any other more 'defined' natural rights definition - just as catch-all term for 'axiomatic rights'. (at least for the purposed of my post - I myself still subscribe to an Objectivist foundation of 'natural rights'). Either way, I don't think it's material to the post; nonetheless I can't help myself but saying that I don't see why when a right was first recognized as a natural right reflects on it actually being a 'natural right'. Before the Enlightenment, there was little to no need for IP rights - it wasn't needed in canonical law because canonical law restricted content so the form of that never turned into an issue; and in common law there were marginally few situations where it was an issue. Finally, Disney never took a verbatim copy of a work and sold it to cinemas; that's not a valid argument for not having IP rights at all. This line of reasoning is imo straw man reasoning. Yes, creators are influenced, in some cases more than others, by existing works or social contexts. That doesn't make the concept of IP invalid. It's merely an (obvious) observation that leads to the conclusion that there need to be boundaries to when something is 'intellectual property'. As I wrote in a post above, I don't care much for that discussion, as it's way beyond the fundamental issue here. I guess our positions aren't that far from each others'; no, IP rights aren't exactly the same as tangible property rights, but there are large amounts of overlap, especially in the philosophical justifications for it (e.g. large parts of Locke's theories on property can (and imo should) be applied to IP rights). Enforcement of IP rights is lacking, as evidenced by the large amounts of pirated content available online. Legal measures without due process may not be the right solution, but previous measures (e.g. the DMCA, which was vilified as much as SOPA back in the 90's! I guess there aren't that many people left who remember those 'discussions') have proven to be ineffective. Website operators shouldn't bear all the responsibility of enforcing IP rights, but they need to make a real effort, especially in cases where their business stands to profit from infringement (Megaupload, but potentially others, too).

timwiseman 15y ago
Thank you for the thoughtful response. As you say, I think our fundamental positions are not that far apart, but our ways of reaching there are quite different and we seem to disagree on scope. Just to be perfectly clear, I do support (and indeed rely on) the concept of Intellectual Property, but I believe it needs to be limited in both duration and scope. Now, to address a couple of your more specific points. Steel is an alloy of iron, not just purified form (although some early forms involved mostly removing impurities and creating the alloy with other impurities naturally present), and while the term steel is somewhat generic I could say something like "440 Stainless Steel" and refer to a very specific composition. I point out that Rearden relied on it because I believe (it has been a while since I read Atlas Shrugged) Rearden metal used steel as a base. Even if that detail is wrong, it certainly relied on the millenia of metalurgical knowlede developed before Rearden, for which he paid between nothing and very little since only the very most recent developments are patented. The fact he led a team rather than developping it on his own weakens the clean philosophical argument that it was "earned by the sweat of his brow". He worked with others. Yes, he paid them and has every legal right to claim it as his (actually even that's muddy because he did it through his corporation and it is not entirely clear that he was a 100% owner with no one else having any equity at all). But while that doesn't muddy the legal water, it does muddy the philosophical claim. When a right was recognized does not change its status certainly, but it does act as evidence against a claim that it is an axiomatic right. One would expect that an axiomatic right would have at least some traces of origins in antiquity and that it would have arisen (even if it took a while) independently in many cultures. This is not true of copyright or patents. Those were extremely modern, created by a legislature and for a very specific purpose. Euclid would likely be shocked by the idea that someone would need his permission to copy his Elements (which he borrowed liberally from others to create). Oddly some of the European Moral Rights, such as the right to be acknowledged as the author, come closer to being axiomatic than actual copyright, even though they aren't recognized in the US in a full form. Euclid probably would have been outraged if the copy you made of his Elements didn't acknowledge him as the writer, but he wouldn't have questioned you making the copy. As for Disney, again I am not arguing against IP rights, I am all for them. The fact that most of Disney's best movies are openly derivative is an argument for IP rights that are limited in time and scope. That is what I am arguing for, and that is a position which benefits Disney greatly.