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>Are you suggesting that dissociation involves something outside the body? No. I'm saying that a singular body does not imply or require a singular "self", whi

>Are you suggesting that dissociation involves something outside the body? No. I'm saying that a singular body does not imply or require a singular "self", which can be demonstrated via dissociation. >That doesn't mean that there is more than one you, but that you suffer a condition that fragments your brain work. If each fragment can have a discrete and unique experience of reality, then why can't each one can be thought of as a separate 'you'? >That happens in serious mental illness, also in altered states Maybe it's not about "suffering a condition" or mental illness at all, and more commonplace than we may realize. We pathologize far too much. The experiences we believe are the result of "altered states" may actually be quite common. >We still know little of the brain working, but it seems to be a massively parallel computing process, with the perception being the glue that composes our reality and keeping us "sane" and focused. Without delving into the debate around brain-as-a-computer, I think I get the general idea of what you're saying and I somewhat agree. However, my argument is that even this overarching perception itself is not necessarily singular. We seem to mostly collect and normalize these discrete perceptions (or parallel processes) into what seems like a single stream, but delving deeper reveals that this composition is not nearly as seamless & continuous as one may believe.

narag 4y ago
However, my argument is that even this overarching perception itself is not necessarily singular. We agree completely on that. I love when I catch some falling object on the fly and it feels instantaneous, asynchronous, as if someone else was doing it, specially when it's done through a series of very fast bounces. Or playing piano with both hands, each doing its part. It's possible to feel both or none. But anyway, my objection is not to defend a monolithic self, but against more than one self. Actually, original subconscious theory seems less tollerant of a parallel, multithreaded mind: "if something can be done without the complete control of the ego, it must be because there is another consistent, self-contained structure in there with its own will" while accepting that the mind is not necessarily centralized could explain the same observations.

narag 4y ago

However, my argument is that even this overarching perception itself is not necessarily singular. We agree completely on that. I love when I catch some falling object on the fly and it feels instantaneous, asynchronous, as if someone else was doing it, specially when it's done through a series of very fast bounces. Or playing piano with both hands, each doing its part. It's possible to feel both or none. But anyway, my objection is not to defend a monolithic self, but against more than one self. Actually, original subconscious theory seems less tollerant of a parallel, multithreaded mind: "if something can be done without the complete control of the ego, it must be because there is another consistent, self-contained structure in there with its own will" while accepting that the mind is not necessarily centralized could explain the same observations.