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> The US is executing the same broad strategy against both China and Russia - surrounding them with US-friendly states who then get military support. It seems t

> The US is executing the same broad strategy against both China and Russia - surrounding them with US-friendly states who then get military support. It seems to be working extremely well against Russia since they can barely get Russian troops into the Donbass safely. Following this then it would make sense for both China and Russia to feel threatened and react accordingly. I would expect the US to react even harder if any of their "enemies" would setup a missile base in Mexico or Canada.

pestatije 4y ago
Not harder, but there was a reaction for sure https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cuban_Missile_Crisis https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cuban_Missile_Crisis
anonymouskimmer 4y ago
> I would expect the US to react even harder if any of their "enemies" would setup a missile base in Mexico or Canada. The U.S. and Russia both made security guarantees to remove nuclear missiles from Ukraine following the breakup of the USSR. The closest-to-Russia NATO member with forward-deployed US nuclear weapons is Turkey, and it's been a NATO member since 1952. https://www.newsweek.com/nato-us-nuclear-weapons-europe-sites-1449697 https://www.newsweek.com/nato-us-nuclear-weapons-europe-site... The cold war never got hot with US nuclear missile subs in Russian waters, and vice versa with Russian nuclear missile subs in US water.
- pastacacioepepe 4y ago
  NATO missile defences are present in the eastern block (Poland, Czech Republic, etc) and AFAIK those can be repurposed to launch offensive missiles as well. If having offensive missiles in a country takes 2 steps, where the first is gaining military access to said country and the second is to install offensive missiles, certainly the first step is the harder to accomplish. Additionally, when it comes to geopolitical power things are much more complex than you make them to be. I suggest reading this publication[0] to understand better what's going on. A few points: > Moscow claims that missile defenses represent an American perception of threats from Russian nuclear missiles. Therefore these defenses aim to neutralize them in potential conflict. Either Russian missiles would be attacked by a conventional air and space first strike, possibly involving these networks in Europe, or else these missile defenses would frustrate a retaliatory second strike leaving Russia defenseless. > While these missile defenses in and of themselves are no threat, they represent the first stage of a planned or potential U.S. buildup of a missile network in Europe that could then neutralize Russia's first and/or second strike capabilities as cited above and shift the burden of war to Europe. > If missile defenses were stationed at these bases, it would create a pretext for stationing offensive missiles there. This would force Moscow to assume the worst case scenario and could cause Russia to attempt to shoot them down leading to a conflict with America. > These defenses and whatever may follow them rupture the fabric of strategic stability where neither side has the freedom of action or margin of superiority that might encourage it to think it could employ coercive diplomacy or military force with impunity. That strategic stability equation is of critical importance to Russia because otherwise Washington might be tempted to think it could strike at Russia with relative impunity. > Finally, there is a fifth, and always unstated but critical aspect here. These defenses entrench the United States in Europe's military defense and foreclose any prospect of Moscow's being able to intimidate or reestablish its hegemony over Eastern and Central Europe, and even possibly the CIS. If missile defenses exist in Europe, Russian missile threats are greatly diminished if not negated. Because empire and the creation of a fearsome domestic enemy are the justifications for and inextricable corollary of internal autocracy, the end of empire allegedly entails Russia's irrevocable decline as a great power and, (the crucial point) generates tremendous pressure for domestic reform. .0: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/352-missile-defenses-eastern-europe-who-threatens-whom https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/352-missile-defense...

pestatije 4y ago

Not harder, but there was a reaction for sure https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cuban_Missile_Crisis https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cuban_Missile_Crisis

anonymouskimmer 4y ago

> I would expect the US to react even harder if any of their "enemies" would setup a missile base in Mexico or Canada. The U.S. and Russia both made security guarantees to remove nuclear missiles from Ukraine following the breakup of the USSR. The closest-to-Russia NATO member with forward-deployed US nuclear weapons is Turkey, and it's been a NATO member since 1952. https://www.newsweek.com/nato-us-nuclear-weapons-europe-sites-1449697 https://www.newsweek.com/nato-us-nuclear-weapons-europe-site... The cold war never got hot with US nuclear missile subs in Russian waters, and vice versa with Russian nuclear missile subs in US water.

pastacacioepepe 4y ago
NATO missile defences are present in the eastern block (Poland, Czech Republic, etc) and AFAIK those can be repurposed to launch offensive missiles as well. If having offensive missiles in a country takes 2 steps, where the first is gaining military access to said country and the second is to install offensive missiles, certainly the first step is the harder to accomplish. Additionally, when it comes to geopolitical power things are much more complex than you make them to be. I suggest reading this publication[0] to understand better what's going on. A few points: > Moscow claims that missile defenses represent an American perception of threats from Russian nuclear missiles. Therefore these defenses aim to neutralize them in potential conflict. Either Russian missiles would be attacked by a conventional air and space first strike, possibly involving these networks in Europe, or else these missile defenses would frustrate a retaliatory second strike leaving Russia defenseless. > While these missile defenses in and of themselves are no threat, they represent the first stage of a planned or potential U.S. buildup of a missile network in Europe that could then neutralize Russia's first and/or second strike capabilities as cited above and shift the burden of war to Europe. > If missile defenses were stationed at these bases, it would create a pretext for stationing offensive missiles there. This would force Moscow to assume the worst case scenario and could cause Russia to attempt to shoot them down leading to a conflict with America. > These defenses and whatever may follow them rupture the fabric of strategic stability where neither side has the freedom of action or margin of superiority that might encourage it to think it could employ coercive diplomacy or military force with impunity. That strategic stability equation is of critical importance to Russia because otherwise Washington might be tempted to think it could strike at Russia with relative impunity. > Finally, there is a fifth, and always unstated but critical aspect here. These defenses entrench the United States in Europe's military defense and foreclose any prospect of Moscow's being able to intimidate or reestablish its hegemony over Eastern and Central Europe, and even possibly the CIS. If missile defenses exist in Europe, Russian missile threats are greatly diminished if not negated. Because empire and the creation of a fearsome domestic enemy are the justifications for and inextricable corollary of internal autocracy, the end of empire allegedly entails Russia's irrevocable decline as a great power and, (the crucial point) generates tremendous pressure for domestic reform. .0: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/352-missile-defenses-eastern-europe-who-threatens-whom https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/352-missile-defense...