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This is an interesting case. From a civil liberties, card-carrying ACLU member standpoint, I'm all for the "anti" side of this - keep the gov't out. On the oth
by Karunamon 15y ago
This is an interesting case. From a civil liberties, card-carrying ACLU member standpoint, I'm all for the "anti" side of this - keep the gov't out.
On the other hand, there's a decent case made that establishing this kind of precedent would basically mean that if criminals are smart enough to use PGP, then that data can never be used against them. Since you can be compelled to turn over a physical key via due process, why can you not also be compelled to turn over a digital one?
Most of the privacy arguments vanish as well since they don't want the password (which could give them access to other things they're not supposed to have), but they just want the data.
I'll be watching this one closely.
- shasta 15y agoYes, it's very reasonable. The main problem with the decision is just that it magnifies the other inequities of legal system.
- marshray 15y agowhy can you not also be compelled to turn over a digital one? Because you may have forgotten it. It's likely you would not have had access to the hardware in the many months these things drag out. I know I've forgotten some complex passwords in a day or two. Also, there may be an argument to be made that by demonstrating your knowledge of the password you are being forced to confess to ownership of whatever content is unlocked. Although the lock-and-key metaphor seems very attractive, it not necessarily the case that "decryption" equals "authentication". Encryption is easy, authentication is the harder problem! There have been encryption products sold and used that did not provide effective authentication, i.e., someone who didn't know the key could tamper with the contents of the disk so that it decrypted to something else.
- icebraining 15y agoOn the other hand, there's a decent case made that establishing this kind of precedent would basically mean that if criminals are smart enough to use PGP, then that data can never be used against them. So now smart criminals will move to Truecrypt hidden volumes and claim there isn't any hidden volume. So now what do you do? Jail someone who might be telling the truth, or let him go? This doesn't solve anything. Encryption is way past it.
- kinghajj 15y agoMy understanding of existing case law regarding safes is that you can be compelled to give up a key, as it is just physical property to which the state has right to request, but can not be compelled to give a combination, as that is just memory and would violate the fifth amendment. Just because cryptographers use the term "key" doesn't mean the should be treated as real keys. It seems obvious that a key/paraphrase is perfectly analogous to a safe combination.
- IgorPartola 15y agoYou don't have to give up a key. They would be asking you to decrypt the drive. Whether that requires you to enter a passphrase or turn on the webcam and do a jig, it doesn't matter. They have no interest in your key/password/secret 4 digit code. They want the contents of the drive. Now they could be playing at a disadvantage, but the point is that the 5th amendment does not enter into here. If the police have a warrant for papers in your safe, they simply ask you to open the safe, by whatever means. This is no different when they have a warrant for files (papers, information) on your encrypted drive (safe) and are asking you to open it by whatever means.
- sdkmvx 15y ago> This is no different when they have a warrant for files (papers, information) on your encrypted drive (safe) and are asking you to open it by whatever means. This seems acceptable if they have a warrant for the contents of your safe. If they had a warrant for "evidence" and no knowledge or reason to believe that it was in the safe, could they open it/force you to open it simply because you own the safe. Similarly, if you had a hard drive, could they force decryption without knowing how the contents relate to the case. Another issue that comes to mind is what happens if a hard drive containing truly random data is found, but the state thinks it contains encrypted data. Could someone be held in contempt for not releasing the (nonexistant) keys. This is probably related to the problem of destroyed keys.
- jpol 15y agoCriminal contempt would have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and the elements of proving the defendant's failure to provide the encryption key would include (1) showing that the key exists and (2) showing that they key is in the defendant's possession.
- scottdw2 15y agoThey savy criminal argument doesn't pass constitutional muster. You could say "allowing criminals to not testify against themselves could frustrate law enforcement because a savy criminal could just commit everything to memory." The 5th ammendment clearly says "too bad, those are the rules."
- Karunamon 15y agoExcept no I couldn't because that's clearly unreasonable. Let's try to avoid any reduction to the absurd, here.
- scottdw2 15y agoIt's not a "reduction to the absurd". It brings up the point that there is no "essential law enforcement" interest that overrides the right to avoid self incrimination. No matter how badly someone wants to convict you, you have a right to not give testimony against your self against your will.
- nitrogen 15y agoSince you can be compelled to turn over a physical key via due process, why can you not also be compelled to turn over a digital one? I know this is rare, but in my opinion it's best to reason about the digital world by explicitly ignoring any analogies to the real world. Rep. Watt said during the SOPA committee hearings that we need parallels in the virtual world to the physical world. I couldn't disagree more.