> the rise German imperial ambitions in the early 20th century (in particular, I'd say, German plans to move in on the Middle East oil zones where Britain and F

> the rise German imperial ambitions in the early 20th century (in particular, I'd say, German plans to move in on the Middle East oil zones where Britain and France had been established for some times) set the stage for World Wars One and Two. This is an interesting statement in how many historical inaccuracies it can engender in such a short amount of text. First off, the great Middle Eastern oil fields were not discovered until the interwar period, and were not seriously exploited until after WWII. Imperial ambitions for natural resources in the region prior to WWI make no sense because no one knows they exist. Secondly, if we're looking in the run-up to WWI, oil is not a critical strategic resource yet. Some navies are beginning to transition from coal- to oil-powered ships, but Germany is not on the vanguard of this transition for obvious reasons. No, Germany is more worried about coal, especially because it's largely stuck with shitty lignite coal as opposed to the Welsh anthracite the British can rely on. Thirdly, the Middle East pre-WWI can be divided into the Ottoman Empire, Persia, and small polities on the Arabian peninsula. The latter's sole relevance to geopolitics is an interest from major mercantile powers that piracy not be seen as a lucrative career opportunity. Persia is basically the grand prize of the Anglo-Russian Great Game (and has the sole major oil field in the region to be discovered before WWI, near the Ottoman border, in 1909), and as a result of Anglo-Russian Entente, was effectively partitioned between the two countries. Fourthly, as you'll notice, the French had no territorial holdings here before the partition of the Ottoman Empire at the end of WWI. The closest it had were some economic advantages in certain ports, and an official kind of suzerainty over some minorities in the empire... along with every power in Europe (the lack of the modifier "major" is intentional). Fifthly, the British were largely aligned with the Germans on Ottoman policy. They both wanted a strong, modernized Ottoman Empire. Especially one that would buy their weapons (the British exported naval armaments to the Ottomans, while the Germans exported land armaments). In particular, all three were also pretty adamant that the Ottomans, and not the Russians, control the straits between the Black and Mediterranean seas. So while enmity between Britain is largely driven by German imperial ambitions, this has less to do with any specific German imperial designs, and more to do with Britain's overriding foreign policy aim being to avoid having any European power capable of marshaling the entire continent (à la Napoleon). After the unification of Germany, Germany becomes the power on the continent most capable of doing that (and thus Britain's natural enemy), but Bismarck is able to use skillful diplomacy to settle itself as a nonexpansionist power, which can mollify Britain. It's after Bismarck's dismissal, and Kaiser Wilhelm's seemingly natural status as a walking diplomatic disaster area, that Britain starts seeking entente with other major European powers to act as a check on German expansionism. The events of WWI do indicate that Britain's fears of German control of the continent were probably correct.