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SecureDrop is evolving: We want to hear from you
- ioseph 4y agoIf you ever need to whistle blow this is the list of organisations who have implemented securedrop https://securedrop.org/directory/ https://securedrop.org/directory/ But if you are going to my understanding is physical documents is still the safest option.
- masteranza 4y agoWhy would anyone trust it if most of the organisations listed have not called for the release of Julian Assange in years?
- alwayslikethis 4y agoPhysical documents requires you either to send it somehow with the hope that it doesn't get noticed, or personally deliver it assuming you are not getting tracked 24/7, which is a real possibility if you have anything of value for these news organizations. Guarantees provided by E2EE, among other things, do not exist in real life.
- eastbound 4y agoIf you deliver physical documents, don’t forget that printers have yellow dots to track the originating printer. Nowadays it’s certainly possible to track the credit card that purchased them.
- O__________O 4y ago> But if you are going to my understanding is physical documents is still the safest option. OpSec wise it’s unclear why physical delivery would be more secure. From mail carriers having non-public methods of identifying anonymous/fake senders, to printer & content steganography, device tracking, biological forensic identification, etc. Why to you is physical delivery a more secure option?
- vorpalhex 4y agoPrinter marks only apply to commercial laser printers, and only some brands. You are probably safe when printing at home. There are still plenty of mailboxes. No need to be anywhere near another human. Leave the phone at home. Walk to the mailbox at night. Drive closer to it but not up to it if need be it. You aren't going to get much except fingerprints from a document. Wear gloves when handling the document if that is a theat. Remember your adversary is probably not all powerful and knowing. They are willing to expend some cost to chase you, and you only need to be more expensive to unmask then that amount. We STILL live in the world where the most common security breach is having no password or a re-used password. Documents are leaky. Metadata kills.
- O__________O 4y agoYou’re assuming leaker is not actively being monitored, mail carriers’ non-public methods of identifying anonymous/fake senders do not overlap OpSec failure of sender, assuming printer & content steganography doesn’t apply, unusual device tracking counter surveillance techniques are not a red flag, leaker understands counter biological forensic identification measures, etc. Point is OpSec is HARD — and telling someone “just physically deliver it” is a recipe for failure.
- vorpalhex 4y agoThe theory that if you ever leak something that you are going to be positively identified by CSI style forensic science and it is basically impossible to leak something without spy agency level methods is, itself, a tool to stop leaks. We know your printer! We track you everywhere! We have your fingerprints! We can pull your DNA from a letter! It is beneficial to the powers that be that ordinary citizens believe they are good at their jobs and omniscient. They are not. Yes, to a great degree, this matters on your adversary. The truth is that most whistleblowers are not Edward Snowden. They are whistleblowing on their employer, who is probably a private company or small government org. The bar to exceed detection does not require you to be James Bond or to understand quantum cryptography. It requires gloves, a cheap printer, and maybe a trip to the thrift store and the post box. If your adversary is the NSA/FBI/KGB/Whoever, well, you know, plan accordingly. But that probably isn't your adversary. Your adversary is probably a mediocre IT security company that has trouble getting their techs to change their passwords and struggles to analyze whatever data they do collect from client endpoints. Don't under-estimate your adversary but also don't over-estimate them either.
- bflesch 4y agophysical stuff contains DNA and fingerpritns physical printouts are watermarked by the printer physical dvd copies sounds like safest option, but they might also have forensic watermarks by the disk drive firmware
- O__________O 4y ago> Interviews will typically last between 45 and 60 minutes and will be conducted on Signal Why would someone use SecureDrop instead of Signal?
- ape4 4y agoApparently you can signup for Signal anonymously but it doesn't look so simple https://www.howtogeek.com/712590/how-to-sign-up-for-signal-or-telegram-anonymously/ https://www.howtogeek.com/712590/how-to-sign-up-for-signal-o...
- O__________O 4y agoFYI: Advice given in that guide is horrible for using Signal anonymously; burner phone OpSec is hard; Google Voice requires phone number for signup; landlines are easy to trace. Core point is that survey requests prior experience using SecureDrop, then uses Signal, email and/or https-form to communicate. Why? Feel like at very least SecureDrop should themselves be explicitly stating why they opted use alternatives instead of their own service.
- flangola7 4y agoGoogle voice only needs a Google account
- alwayslikethis 4y agoGoogle account requires a phone number in all cases, which is a tracking tool.
- flangola7 4y agoSince when do you need a phone number to make a Gmail account? That doesn't make any sense, I've made literally dozens over the years.
- coretx 4y agoThe obvious way for securedrop to go is homomorphic encryption.
- O__________O 4y agoWhy is it obvious that the way for SecureDrop to go is homomorphic encryption? For example, here’s one author’s list of related use cases and reasoning: - https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/20-use-cases-homomorphic-encryption-every-ciso-must-know-jackson- https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/20-use-cases-homomorphic-encr...
- coretx 4y agoPlease don't do self promotion on HN.
- O__________O 4y agoIt’s not, I have no affiliation to author of that post; assumed that was obvious when I said “here’s one author’s” in the prior comment. Please respond to the question — and review HN’s guidelines, specifically: > When disagreeing, please reply to the argument instead of calling names. Please respond to the strongest plausible interpretation of what someone says, not a weaker one that's easier to criticize. Assume good faith. Eschew flamebait. Avoid generic tangents. Omit internet tropes. Please don't post shallow dismissals, especially of other people's work. A good critical comment teaches us something. If you’re curious, found link via simple Google search, since I wanted to quickly check if there was an obvious relevant use case I was not aware of and after reviewing it thought it might be of use in you replying: https://google.com/search?q=homomorphic+encryption+use+cases https://google.com/search?q=homomorphic+encryption+use+cases
- coretx 4y agoIt seems like we both where baited. Apologies. Clicking that link a second time gives me a totally different page.
- antisocialist 4y ago[dead]
- O__________O 4y agoFrom home page, “Nodes Worldwide: 361” to me sounds like it would be extremely easy to control the network. Have there been any published third party security audits of the related code? Lastly, do you have any affiliation to the projects mentioned?
- KomoD 4y ago> Lastly, do you have any affiliation to the projects mentioned? I would take a guess at yes, he mentions "xx messenger" A LOT.
- antisocialist 4y ago[dead]
- O__________O 4y agoThanks, appreciate depth of your response and taken at face value, efforts to insure alternatives exist for secure private exchanges. I will take a look at the audits/auditors.
- egberts1 4y agoQubeOS may be a better solution to being forced to use JavaScript due to metadata-grabbing WASM, but it is depending on OpSec of your desktop. If it is a throwaway laptop, it may be better.
- antisocialist 4y agoI agree. The web app itself can run locally in QubeOS or Docker, and the browser using it as well.