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Anyone know how this is squared with US v. Knotts? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._Knotts http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._Knotts >U
by jessriedel 15y ago
Anyone know how this is squared with US v. Knotts? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._Knotts http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._Knotts
>United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 was a 1983 United States Supreme Court case regarding the use of electronic surveillance devices. The device in question is described as a beeper and can only be tracked from a short distance. The court unanimously held that the use of such devices did not invade a legitimate expectation of privacy, and was therefore allowed, without a warrant, under the Fourth Amendment.
Is it just a distance thing? Or length of time of the surveillance?
Here's the full opinion:
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=460&invol=276 http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us...
- tylermenezes 15y agoIt seems to me that since it can only be read from a short distance, you would be unable to track it in areas where police wouldn't be able to go without a warrant; it's closer to trailing a suspect than anything.
- _delirium 15y agoThe majority (Scalia, Roberts, Thomas, Kennedy, Sotomayor) distinguished Knotts on the basis that in that case there was no trespass onto an owner's property to install the device: "The beeper had been placed in the container before it came into Knotts’ possession, with the consent of the then-owner. Knotts did not challenge that installation, and we specifically declined to consider its effect on the Fourth Amendment analysis." The four remaining justices (Alito, Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan) would've made a stronger holding, instituting a new general principle that pervasive, long-term monitoring requires a warrant, regardless of the method: they summarized Knotts as "relatively short-term monitoring of a person’s movements on public streets" as opposed to this case's "use of longer term GPS monitoring". (The're a need to come up with some kind of dividing line, because short-term tailing of people on public streets has long been considered something police can do on mere suspicion, without a warrant.) Sotomayor's concurrence indicated a potential willingness to join those latter four in an appropriate case, but she didn't feel it was necessary to deciding this case, since it was enough for this case to just hold that the physical installation required a warrant.
- jessriedel 15y agoGreat, thanks very much for that. It seems mind-boggling for me that the mere fact that the device was installed by the then-owner would be enough to make this OK without a warrant. It seems no different than leaving a sticky tracking device on a public street where you know the suspect is going walk, so that he unknowingly picks it up on his shoe and can be monitored...pretty much forever. EDIT: Wait, on second thought, are you sure? The main opinion says > The first case, Knotts, upheld against Fourth Amendment challenge the use of a “beeper” that had been placed in a container of chloroform, allowing law enforcement to monitor the location of the container. 460 U. S., at 278. We said that there had been no infringement of Knotts’ reasonable expectation of privacy since the information obtained—the location of the automobile carrying the container on public roads, and the location of the off-loaded container in open fields near Knotts’ cabin—had been voluntarily conveyed to the public.6 Id., at 281–282. But as we have discussed, the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test. The holding in Knotts addressed only the former, since the latter was not at issue. The beeper had been placed in the container before it came into Knotts’ possession, with the consent of the then-owner. 460 U. S., at 278. Knotts did not challenge that installation, and we specifically de- clined to consider its effect on the Fourth Amendment analysis. Id., at 279, n. Knotts would be relevant, perhaps, if the Government were making the argument that what would otherwise be an unconstitutional search is not such where it produces only public information. The Government does not make that argument, and we know of no case that would support it. To me, that says that Knotts is distinguised because all the data that the police used was available publicly, i.e. that Knotts did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy (which, presumably, Jones did in the recent case).
- _delirium 15y agoI read that part differently. They're asking if the Government is arguing that, since the search produces only public information here, like in Knotts, that would mean that it's automatically constitutional under Knotts; and they conclude that no, that can't override the trespass involved in installation.
- Jtsummers 15y agoJust a guess but I suspect it's both the distance and how it was placed in the vehicle. The police did not put it in themselves, they placed it in a container that was loaded into the vehicle by the seller/suspect.
- gipsies 15y agoThe article briefly touches this. > One of the Obama administration’s main arguments in support of warrantless GPS tracking was the high court’s 1983 decision in United States v. Knotts, in which the justices said it was OK for the government to use beepers known as “bird dogs” to track a suspect’s vehicle without a warrant. In that case, the police had the consent of that truck’s owner, which was not the case in the opinion decided Monday, Scalia wrote. So they had "the consent of that truck’s owner". I'd like to know what they specifically meant with this though.