> Hartmann either does not understand encryption, or client-based content scanning. There's a good chance Hartmann doesn't understand either :-( I think that i

> Hartmann either does not understand encryption, or client-based content scanning. There's a good chance Hartmann doesn't understand either :-( I think that is debatable and depends on your viewpoint. If you only look at the technical process of end-to-end encryption it is, indeed, not weakend by client-side scanning since that happens prior to the encryption. If you, however look at it from the perspective of the use case (sending information privately without information leakage) it is weakened. Client-side scanning only makes sense if, in case of a match, some authority is informed. This is by definition information leakage. On a first glance it looks like a ok compromise in the case of CSAM but if the technology is in place it can only go downhill from there and the next step is usually terrorism followed by capital crimes. The later two categories can be abused depending on the definition which heavily differs depending on which European country we are talking about. Also if the technology is forced in place by the European market, there is very little that stops other less liberal countries to use the same technology against whatever they don't like. So it's the usual slippery slope argument with the additional caveat that a lot of child protection agencies are not convinced that it would make an important difference and that the resources should be allocated elsewhere.