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Interesting article if light on technical detail. I wonder how long until this becomes used for either (a) DRM key extraction (Good!) (b) horrible, semi-perman

Interesting article if light on technical detail. I wonder how long until this becomes used for either (a) DRM key extraction (Good!) (b) horrible, semi-permanent rootkits, (c) for unwitting fde key extraction scheme, or (d) to further push Microsoft's über-DRM-HSM Pluton even further.

cryptonector 4y ago
Most TPM chips are unaffected. Those that are will get new firmware. Virtual TPMs are affected because those are implemented using a TPM simulator based on the TCG code that has this bug. In all cases any compromise should be of the local host, not of other things unless those things are accessed using keys stored on the affected TPM. In any affected cases where the TPM can be replaced then the simplest recovery method starts with replacing the TPM and rebuilding the host then re-running any enrollment protocols that need to be re-run, otherwise flashing a compromised TPM while running on a system that can have been rootkitted is a problem.
- ls612 4y ago
  By virtual TPM you mean the implementation on modern Intel and Ryzen platforms in the cpu correct? If so does that mean that a firmware/bios/microcode update will be able to patch the vulnerability on those machines?
  - d18g 4y ago
    I would not assume so as these are firmware implementations and as such would not use the simulator directly edit: also look at the link you can see clearly that Intel is not effected but AMD is unknown...
  - cryptonector 4y ago
    No, I mean a swtpm running in a hypervisor and presented to a VM as a discrete TPM.
Dalewyn 4y ago
>horrible, semi-permanent rootkits, TPM (read: SecureBoot) or no, the only proper response to a computer exposed to even the possibility of a rootkit that can't be removed is wholesale replacement.
- mjg59 4y ago
  TPMs are used for Measured Boot, not Secure Boot (although the Secure Boot configuration is one of the things that's measured). Secure Boot exists on platforms that don't have TPMs.
hooverd 4y ago
Maybe we'll see the return of "Trusted Third Party" schemes.

cryptonector 4y ago

Most TPM chips are unaffected. Those that are will get new firmware. Virtual TPMs are affected because those are implemented using a TPM simulator based on the TCG code that has this bug. In all cases any compromise should be of the local host, not of other things unless those things are accessed using keys stored on the affected TPM. In any affected cases where the TPM can be replaced then the simplest recovery method starts with replacing the TPM and rebuilding the host then re-running any enrollment protocols that need to be re-run, otherwise flashing a compromised TPM while running on a system that can have been rootkitted is a problem.

ls612 4y ago
By virtual TPM you mean the implementation on modern Intel and Ryzen platforms in the cpu correct? If so does that mean that a firmware/bios/microcode update will be able to patch the vulnerability on those machines?
- d18g 4y ago
  I would not assume so as these are firmware implementations and as such would not use the simulator directly edit: also look at the link you can see clearly that Intel is not effected but AMD is unknown...
- cryptonector 4y ago
  No, I mean a swtpm running in a hypervisor and presented to a VM as a discrete TPM.

Dalewyn 4y ago

>horrible, semi-permanent rootkits, TPM (read: SecureBoot) or no, the only proper response to a computer exposed to even the possibility of a rootkit that can't be removed is wholesale replacement.

mjg59 4y ago
TPMs are used for Measured Boot, not Secure Boot (although the Secure Boot configuration is one of the things that's measured). Secure Boot exists on platforms that don't have TPMs.

hooverd 4y ago

Maybe we'll see the return of "Trusted Third Party" schemes.