4 ms·

Wouldn’t the optimal strategy be to invest in the type rating _and_ increase the pilots salary by 40k/yr? You wouldn’t refuse to invest in new equipment that ma

by lovich 4y ago

Wouldn’t the optimal strategy be to invest in the type rating _and_ increase the pilots salary by 40k/yr? You wouldn’t refuse to invest in new equipment that makes your employees more efficient just because they might learn a skill using it, why should explicit training not be evaluated the same way?

mlyle 4y ago
> why should explicit training not be evaluated the same way? You spend $100k on the type rating + increase their pay to $n per year. Someone else poaches them for $n+1 per year and saves the $100k. Employers who poach instead of paying for training win in a market like this. The only way to prevent this is to make employees bear the cost of the training / investment in their skillset-- either explicitly (Go take out a loan and get a type rating!) or implicitly (Pay us back if you leave before N time). The latter can be more employee friendly, because it removes some of the risk from the employee's point of view.
- lovich 4y ago
  Switching jobs suck, increase their pay by $n/yr to where they dont consider moving. If this is a massively high cost then its a very in demand skill set which is going to cost you no matter what. Half the reason Americans switch jobs so quickly after getting trained is because the company wants to increase the employee's compensation by $0/yr. When an employee knows they are more valuable getting paid $0/yr extra lets them know they are guaranteed to be leaving money on the table, vs increasing their salary by some amount which let's them know they are getting some sort of value out of their new skills. Its not like the training is free of effort or time investment on the employee's part either. US companies try to be so cut throat with their employee's and make sure they don't leave a dollar they could have extracted out of them. I don't get why they are surprised that when they've put zero effort into the relationship for decades, that the employees treat them the same. They need to put in some up front effort or collateral to prove there's loyalty there and behavior like, I will invest in a skill that takes time for you as an employee to learn, and is only worth it to you because it will let you command a higher salary, but I am not going to give you a higher salary, is the type of behavior that incentives jumping ship and makes the strategy of "poachers" viable. Also as an aside, I hate the term poaching. I'm entering into business relationships with other businesses when I change employment. When managers or companies use the term poaching its a little too on the nose with how they view me as their property.
  - mlyle 4y ago
    > Switching jobs suck, increase their pay by $n/yr to where they dont consider moving. The employer that doesn't incur the large cost can afford to pay the employee much more and still come out ahead versus hiring an employee who still needs the rating. The Nash eq outcome is that no one pays for type ratings and externalizes the cost completely to prospective employees. > They need to put in some up front effort or collateral to prove there's loyalty there and behavior like, I will invest in a skill that takes time for you as an employee to learn, and is only worth it to you because it will let you command a higher salary This doesn't work for the business jet case. If you have a Gulfstream V that you want to fly, you need to either hire someone with a GV type rating or immediately get the new guy the GV rating. Hence, you tend to put in the offer letter a requirement to repay.
    - michaelmrose 4y ago
      > externalizes the cost completely to prospective employees. This assumes that such a system would actually produce enough people willing to bear the cost instead of underproducing resulting in reverting to prior strategies in order to continue existing with the primary successful strategy being successful long term relationships with workers including paying them the new market rate after training is complete to make "pouching" non trivial.
      - mlyle 4y ago
        I don't understand why people don't understand what I'm saying. > including paying them the new market rate after training is complete This structure doesn't work. If a pilot is worth $100k to a firm that pays for training, surely he is worth more to a firm that won't have to pay that expense. There is no "market rate" that you can select that doesn't incentivize employers to try and "just grab trained employees" from other employers. It's a classic case of the free rider problem.
        michaelmrose 4y ago
        Just grab trained employees is a strategy that only works because most employers are shit. You think you have an airtight mathematical argument. People aren't numbers. Everyone is both looking to grab other firms already trained employees and train their own. Exclusively using the former strategy is only a useful strategy in markets full of shitty employers. Functional good employers will lose no more on average to poaching than they gain from it.

by lovich 4y ago

mlyle 4y ago

> why should explicit training not be evaluated the same way? You spend $100k on the type rating + increase their pay to $n per year. Someone else poaches them for $n+1 per year and saves the $100k. Employers who poach instead of paying for training win in a market like this. The only way to prevent this is to make employees bear the cost of the training / investment in their skillset-- either explicitly (Go take out a loan and get a type rating!) or implicitly (Pay us back if you leave before N time). The latter can be more employee friendly, because it removes some of the risk from the employee's point of view.

lovich 4y ago
Switching jobs suck, increase their pay by $n/yr to where they dont consider moving. If this is a massively high cost then its a very in demand skill set which is going to cost you no matter what. Half the reason Americans switch jobs so quickly after getting trained is because the company wants to increase the employee's compensation by $0/yr. When an employee knows they are more valuable getting paid $0/yr extra lets them know they are guaranteed to be leaving money on the table, vs increasing their salary by some amount which let's them know they are getting some sort of value out of their new skills. Its not like the training is free of effort or time investment on the employee's part either. US companies try to be so cut throat with their employee's and make sure they don't leave a dollar they could have extracted out of them. I don't get why they are surprised that when they've put zero effort into the relationship for decades, that the employees treat them the same. They need to put in some up front effort or collateral to prove there's loyalty there and behavior like, I will invest in a skill that takes time for you as an employee to learn, and is only worth it to you because it will let you command a higher salary, but I am not going to give you a higher salary, is the type of behavior that incentives jumping ship and makes the strategy of "poachers" viable. Also as an aside, I hate the term poaching. I'm entering into business relationships with other businesses when I change employment. When managers or companies use the term poaching its a little too on the nose with how they view me as their property.
- mlyle 4y ago
  > Switching jobs suck, increase their pay by $n/yr to where they dont consider moving. The employer that doesn't incur the large cost can afford to pay the employee much more and still come out ahead versus hiring an employee who still needs the rating. The Nash eq outcome is that no one pays for type ratings and externalizes the cost completely to prospective employees. > They need to put in some up front effort or collateral to prove there's loyalty there and behavior like, I will invest in a skill that takes time for you as an employee to learn, and is only worth it to you because it will let you command a higher salary This doesn't work for the business jet case. If you have a Gulfstream V that you want to fly, you need to either hire someone with a GV type rating or immediately get the new guy the GV rating. Hence, you tend to put in the offer letter a requirement to repay.
  - michaelmrose 4y ago
    > externalizes the cost completely to prospective employees. This assumes that such a system would actually produce enough people willing to bear the cost instead of underproducing resulting in reverting to prior strategies in order to continue existing with the primary successful strategy being successful long term relationships with workers including paying them the new market rate after training is complete to make "pouching" non trivial.
    - mlyle 4y ago
      I don't understand why people don't understand what I'm saying. > including paying them the new market rate after training is complete This structure doesn't work. If a pilot is worth $100k to a firm that pays for training, surely he is worth more to a firm that won't have to pay that expense. There is no "market rate" that you can select that doesn't incentivize employers to try and "just grab trained employees" from other employers. It's a classic case of the free rider problem.
      - michaelmrose 4y ago
        Just grab trained employees is a strategy that only works because most employers are shit. You think you have an airtight mathematical argument. People aren't numbers. Everyone is both looking to grab other firms already trained employees and train their own. Exclusively using the former strategy is only a useful strategy in markets full of shitty employers. Functional good employers will lose no more on average to poaching than they gain from it.