3 ms·

A "same dynamic and general shape" argument is a pretty different animal than what I'm addressing. I agree that tech often acts as a power multiplier, but I th

A "same dynamic and general shape" argument is a pretty different animal than what I'm addressing. I agree that tech often acts as a power multiplier, but I think that's because it is typically deployed by those who have power and want more. That doesn't mean that contra-power uses are impossible, which is the claim that I think is pretty suspicious.

maxbond 4y ago
I think you'll find I said it that it enhances existing power structures, and suggested some alternative power structures it could enhance to act contrary to a given power structure, rather than saying it was "impossible." I also acknowledged that it does sometimes buck this general observation.
dredmorbius 4y ago
I'll draw attention to the final paragraph I quote from Perrow: How did they do it? The major companies asserted “increasing central control over the creative process”[352] through deliberate creation and extensive promotion of new groups, long-range contracts for groups, and reduced autonomy for producers. In addition, legal and illegal promotion costs (drug payola to disc jockeys, for example) rose in the competitive race and now exceeded the resources of small independents. Finally, the majors “have also moved to regain a controlling position in record distribution by buying chains of retail stores.”[353] The diversity is still greater than it had been in the past, and may remain high, but it is ominous that the majors have all the segments covered. As an executive said, “Columbia Records will have a major entry into whatever new area is broached by the vagaries of public tastes.” But for a concentrated industry, the “vagaries of public tastes” are not economical; it is preferable to stabilize and consolidate them. This would be possible through further control over the creative process and marketing. That is: - Market concentration, when disrupted, eventually re-emerged. - The result was that "'vagaries of public tastes' are not economical", and that media power prefers to direct rather than follow these. - That numerous mechanisms for subverting public preference and market mechanisms emerged. Those with power virtually always want more, particularly when viewed through that favourite economist lens, expressed preferences. But there are market structures in which those powers are capable of expressing that desire, most especially in monpolised media, and those in which they are not ... usually small-scale businesses with low barriers to entry and high mobility costs. Classic exemplars are personal and on-site services (plumbing, electrical, hair and nail salons, much healthcare), commodities which are not easily light-weighted, such as milk, concrete, and structural stone, high-touch services, and the like. Understanding that there are economic segments which do repeatedly manifest with highly-centralised monopolies, such as recorded music, broadcast media, and software and online services, is a useful and powerful mental model, in my experience. In the case of real estate, the underlying commodity (land) is not portable, but it correlates strongly to other non-portable phenomena (employment, residence, education, general services, recreation & entertainment, education), and frequently extracts much of the surplus value of those attributes for itself, without having meaningfully contributed to their provisioning or existence in the first place.

maxbond 4y ago

I think you'll find I said it that it enhances existing power structures, and suggested some alternative power structures it could enhance to act contrary to a given power structure, rather than saying it was "impossible." I also acknowledged that it does sometimes buck this general observation.

dredmorbius 4y ago

I'll draw attention to the final paragraph I quote from Perrow: How did they do it? The major companies asserted “increasing central control over the creative process”[352] through deliberate creation and extensive promotion of new groups, long-range contracts for groups, and reduced autonomy for producers. In addition, legal and illegal promotion costs (drug payola to disc jockeys, for example) rose in the competitive race and now exceeded the resources of small independents. Finally, the majors “have also moved to regain a controlling position in record distribution by buying chains of retail stores.”[353] The diversity is still greater than it had been in the past, and may remain high, but it is ominous that the majors have all the segments covered. As an executive said, “Columbia Records will have a major entry into whatever new area is broached by the vagaries of public tastes.” But for a concentrated industry, the “vagaries of public tastes” are not economical; it is preferable to stabilize and consolidate them. This would be possible through further control over the creative process and marketing. That is: - Market concentration, when disrupted, eventually re-emerged. - The result was that "'vagaries of public tastes' are not economical", and that media power prefers to direct rather than follow these. - That numerous mechanisms for subverting public preference and market mechanisms emerged. Those with power virtually always want more, particularly when viewed through that favourite economist lens, expressed preferences. But there are market structures in which those powers are capable of expressing that desire, most especially in monpolised media, and those in which they are not ... usually small-scale businesses with low barriers to entry and high mobility costs. Classic exemplars are personal and on-site services (plumbing, electrical, hair and nail salons, much healthcare), commodities which are not easily light-weighted, such as milk, concrete, and structural stone, high-touch services, and the like. Understanding that there are economic segments which do repeatedly manifest with highly-centralised monopolies, such as recorded music, broadcast media, and software and online services, is a useful and powerful mental model, in my experience. In the case of real estate, the underlying commodity (land) is not portable, but it correlates strongly to other non-portable phenomena (employment, residence, education, general services, recreation & entertainment, education), and frequently extracts much of the surplus value of those attributes for itself, without having meaningfully contributed to their provisioning or existence in the first place.