The signatures would have to be rooted to a trust cert model (with a way for devs to verify that the "Microsoft" they're pulling a package from is the real "Mic

The signatures would have to be rooted to a trust cert model (with a way for devs to verify that the "Microsoft" they're pulling a package from is the real "Microsoft"). Hypothetically, this could be done: put up a public key at a known domain, sign packages via public key, and if the package manager extends to include a "fetch from URL provided by the package and check signature" tool, we end up rooting trust in packages in trust in domain name ownership; not too shabby. We still need devs to actually bother to do the check and, like, read the domain name to make sure they haven't accepted authorization from "micr0soft.com", but the end result is a distributed signing solution that doesn't require any centralized authority (except, indirectly, the SSL cert issuers and DNS providers of the world).