3 ms·
> > or otherwise uses my hardware against me > Proving the current state of your system isn't using your hardware against you. It is showing that your system i
by d110af5ccf 4y ago
> > or otherwise uses my hardware against me
> Proving the current state of your system isn't using your hardware against you. It is showing that your system is secure against cheats.
Complete doublespeak. It is using your hardware against you such that you will be denied service if the operating state of your system isn't to the service operator's liking. I want nothing to do with it outside of employer controlled devices being validated by the employer or my own devices being validated in such a manner by me.
> > Neither will I accept opaque anti-cheat kernel modules
> If they aren't opaque they will be instantly bypassed
Makes no difference to me. There aren't going anywhere near my kernel and I strongly recommend that other people take the same stance. The developers of such modules (and more generally just all software developers) are inherently untrustworthy as has been demonstrated on a number of occasions.
> Cheats are antiuser software that can kill an entire game. Software that combats this threat is prouser.
Cheats take advantage of buggy or poorly designed software. Software that combats that is pro-bad-developer. If it commandeers my machine in the process then it is decidedly anti-user. Write better software. Don't share state with clients if it's supposed to be hidden.
- charcircuit 4y ago>It is using your hardware against you such that you will be denied service if the operating state of your system isn't to the service operator's liking. It's up to the game's developer whether they allow you to join. Either you have hardware that can prove something the developer thinks is trustworthy or you just can't prove your system is trustworthy. Nothing is working against you. Either the developer trusts your hardware or they don't. >Cheats take advantage of buggy or poorly designed software. No, they take advantage of a poor security model. If your security model lets random processes read out the location of all of the players is that the game coded poorly or the operating systems fault for letting a cheat read that information? Being able to trust the code that the client in running instead of just the code that the server is running is powerful. It makes developing a secure system easier since it allows you to trust more.
- worthless-trash 4y agoHowever, you can't verify that the client is trustworthy at any time. Any time i can load a kernel module or run the code in a VM its game over.
- charcircuit 4y agoWhich is why secure boot and remote attestation is needed so that the developer can trust that you are not using a non preapproved kernel module not are you using a virtual machine.
- worthless-trash 4y agoRemote attestation doesn't work if i have permission to modify memory. My kernel module wont even show as loaded... If you can modify sytem memory its trivial to bypass any checks the anticheat has. To the point where you simply modify the anti cheat in memory to say 'sure i've done all those checks'.
- charcircuit 4y agoWhich is why you need secure boot to prove that there is no way to modify system memory.
- worthless-trash 4y agoI can have secure boot of virtualized hosts, and still modify system memory from either a kernel exploit or virtualised systems host. Cheaters absolutely would install crappy signed kernel modules to achieve this.
- worthless-trash 4y ago> Cheats take advantage of buggy or poorly designed software. This is not true. If a process can read and write to another processes memory, it doesn't matter how well written it is, its possible to cheat. If you run your computer in a VM, you can do it from outside the OS, so that the OS itself doesn't even know its going on.