2 ms·

> No, it doesn’t show that, it merely asserts it. I’ve given you an example that proves it. > Sure there is, because it's approaching the point of causing dam

• naasking 4y ago
  > I’ve given you an example that proves it. Except you didn't. The black box you described does have feelings because the human inside has feelings. The fact that every component of a sentient system doesn't have feelings isn't particularly interesting. > There are plenty of damaging processes in the body that produce no pain. Because they didn't need to for fitness purposes. > What I’m interested in is how sensations are produced; https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2116933119 https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2116933119 > it’s not just computation You don't know that.
  • prmph 4y ago
    > Because they didn't need to for fitness purposes. Huh, damaging process are not relevant for fitness purposes? Wow Your link is full of speculation, and indeed for consciousness, speculation may be all that can be done, since no one can define it, only experience it. > You don't know that. It seems self-evident. If a program computes the temperature of the sun, does it feel the heat?
    • naasking 4y ago
      > Huh, damaging process are not relevant for fitness purposes? Wow Cancer or heart disease in your 50s does not impact your reproductive fitness, for instance. Way to attach a strawman. > It seems self-evident. If a program computes the temperature of the sun, does it feel the heat? The sun isn't computing a temperature, it's computing a nuclear fusion reaction. Also, "feeling" isn't a quality of individual particles to the best of our knowledge, but it is a quality of some aggregate of particles we call a human. So if your question is whether a faithful simulation of a human would feel the heat from a faithful simulation of the sun, then yes, that's very plausible.
      • prmph 4y ago
        > Cancer or heart disease in your 50s does not impact your reproductive fitness, for instance. Way to attach a strawman But there are plenty of cancers that can and do occur in ones reproductive years, that start without pain. > The sun isn't computing a temperature, it's computing a nuclear fusion reaction. I wasn’t comparing the program to the sun. I was comparing it to the human skin. > Also, "feeling" isn't a quality of individual particles to the best of our knowledge, but it is a quality of some aggregate of particles we call a human. Hmmm, now you are referring to particles and aggregates. Wonder what the source of that claim is. At least you agree computation (a process) is not the important thing, but particles (matter). > So if your question is whether a faithful simulation of a human would feel the heat from a faithful simulation of the sun, then yes, that's very plausible. Wow, now you're making a circular argument. Whats a “faithful” simulation of a human? How would we know it is “faithful”? What form would that even take? Let’s say ChatGPT becomes “sufficiently” advanced, and is hooked up to a sensor that records the temperature of the sun. Would it feel the heat? The whole idea is preposterous.
        • naasking 4y ago
          > But there are plenty of cancers that can and do occur in ones reproductive years, that start without pain. So? The incidence of these cancers is insufficient to impact reproductive fitness in our species. At no point did I claim that all damaging processes must produce pain, I only claimed that all pain originates from evolutionary pressures indicating high chance of damage that does impact fitness. That also does not mean that presence of pain is always directly indicative of damage, because biology is messy and precision has a cost to fitness. > At least you agree computation (a process) is not the important thing, but particles (matter). Nope, not what I'm saying at all. The particles are a computation in a simulation, so the information content of the computation is what matters. > Wow, now you're making a circular argument. Whats a “faithful” simulation of a human? How would we know it is “faithful”? What form would that even take? A faithful simulation is clearly a simulation that contains all of the information content of a human and replicates the mathematical relationships that govern the operation of a human's mind. Since a human is a bounded volume, it contains finite information per the Bekenstein Bound, and is thus amenable to simulation, unless you are asserting some kind of non-physical dualism. It seems clear that you don't yet grasp the argument being made so maybe you should reserve judgment, like calling the argument "circular", until you do properly grasp it. > Let’s say ChatGPT becomes “sufficiently” advanced, and is hooked up to a sensor that records the temperature of the sun. Would it feel the heat? It wouldn't feel heat in the same way that humans feel heat because its sensor and information processing is not mathematically equivalent to human information processing and sensory systems. That does not mean it wouldn't feel something like its own version of heat. A whole lot of vagueness hides behind your "sufficiently advanced". If ChatGPT v10.0 did reproduce the mathematical relationships underlying human information processing and sensory systems, then yes, it would feel heat in precisely the same way as humans do.