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>I would posit that it is clear. It's simply a whole bunch of toasters put together (that is, a long list of if-then statements). If you're trying to argue that

>I would posit that it is clear. It's simply a whole bunch of toasters put together (that is, a long list of if-then statements). If you're trying to argue that consciousness is merely a bunch of if-then statements, then yes, ChatGPT might be conscious. But then it's going to be much harder to argue that a toaster isn't conscious, which I thought we both agreed with. The combination of multitudes of if-else statements forms a macro structure. It is this emergent macro structure that we call consciousness. As stated before the exact interconnect of this macro structure can't be fully articulated yet. >This seems a bit dismissive, and although I myself am a substance dualist (which is generally seen as a metaphysical position), most materialists aren't mechanistic in their interpretation of consciousness My arguments are based on likelihood derived from logic and evidence meaning While we don't fully know if a soul fits in this framework, we certainly do not yet have the capability to derive it's existence/likelihood from evidence or first principles. Thus there's really nothing to talk about as it's an argument outside of known logic. What is the point of arguing about topics we don't know about? There is no point. I'm being dismissive because there is literally nothing left to talk about for either of us. Logic and evidence is also the only shared principles that seem consistent across individuals so best keep discussions in that realm fully.

dvt 4y ago
> The combination of multitudes of if-else statements forms a macro structure. It is this emergent macro structure that we call consciousness. As stated before the exact interconnect of this macro structure can't be fully articulated yet. It can be, and it's called the theory of computation. It's been extensively studied for the past century and a half, and, all-in-all, it's not even particularly strong. For example, most real numbers aren't even computable, Godel showed that consistent theories can't even prove their own consistency, and so on. In my view, our mind does not seem to compute things (though some, like Dennett and Putnam, would disagree). The claim that our mind computes things is a pretty strong one (and if correct, I think we'd all probably be much better at math). Penrose argues that whatever the mind does, it's (at least in part) a fundamentally unsound operation; this to me sounds way more correct than the idea that our mind operates algorithmically.
- kilgnad 4y ago
  >It can be, and it's called the theory of computation. It's the most likely outcome given what we know of the physical world. > Godel showed that consistent theories can't even prove their own consistency, and so on. Godel showed a flaw within logic itself. But it's all we got. If you're operating outside of logic then we don't have a consistent logical framework to use for generating conclusions. Without this, like I said, the conversation is pretty much over. There is nothing left to say.

dvt 4y ago

> The combination of multitudes of if-else statements forms a macro structure. It is this emergent macro structure that we call consciousness. As stated before the exact interconnect of this macro structure can't be fully articulated yet. It can be, and it's called the theory of computation. It's been extensively studied for the past century and a half, and, all-in-all, it's not even particularly strong. For example, most real numbers aren't even computable, Godel showed that consistent theories can't even prove their own consistency, and so on. In my view, our mind does not seem to compute things (though some, like Dennett and Putnam, would disagree). The claim that our mind computes things is a pretty strong one (and if correct, I think we'd all probably be much better at math). Penrose argues that whatever the mind does, it's (at least in part) a fundamentally unsound operation; this to me sounds way more correct than the idea that our mind operates algorithmically.

kilgnad 4y ago
>It can be, and it's called the theory of computation. It's the most likely outcome given what we know of the physical world. > Godel showed that consistent theories can't even prove their own consistency, and so on. Godel showed a flaw within logic itself. But it's all we got. If you're operating outside of logic then we don't have a consistent logical framework to use for generating conclusions. Without this, like I said, the conversation is pretty much over. There is nothing left to say.