5 ms·

Your viewpoint is one I consistently have to push against. Computation is not necessarily experience. I can't emphasize enough how fundamental understanding th

by prmph 4y ago

Your viewpoint is one I consistently have to push against. Computation is not necessarily experience. I can't emphasize enough how fundamental understanding this is. It seems some just can't grasp this concept. Would you say a program that echoes to the screen the responses of a hidden human is intelligent? Viewed as a black box, it would certainly seem so. But does it have any internal experience and understanding of anything? Of course this is a trivial experiment, but the point of it is to show, in the most absurdly clear terms, that producing plausible outputs !== being intelligent, much less having a conscious experience. This example also shows that the perceived sophistication of the input-output transformation is immaterial, unless you want to say consciousness requires a certain internal architecture for computation, in which case I would ask: what architecture is that? No matter the sophistication of an algorithm, it's computation lies on a different axis to that of consciousness. You might say human compute because they are conscious, not conscious because they compute. Another way to understand this: Let's say you touch a very hot object. You skin, in conjunction with your brain, senses and computes the temperature of the object. But, there is no essential reason why that should lead to an experience of pain, rather than a sensation similar to color, which generally does not produce pain.

naasking 4y ago
> This example also shows that the perceived sophistication of the input-output transformation is immaterial No, it doesn't show that, it merely asserts it. Consciousness could be a logical property of some perceptual algorithm, like ordered outputs is a property of a sorting algorithm. > But, there is no essential reason why that should lead to an experience of pain, rather than a sensation similar to color, which generally does not produce pain. Sure there is, because it's approaching the point of causing damage. Pain happens when sensory precepts approach acceptable tolerance. Pain is like clipping in an audio stream.
- prmph 4y ago
  > No, it doesn’t show that, it merely asserts it. I’ve given you an example that proves it. > Sure there is, because it's approaching the point of causing damage. There are plenty of damaging processes in the body that produce no pain. But that’s not even the issue. What I’m interested in is how sensations are produced; it’s not just computation
  - naasking 4y ago
    > I’ve given you an example that proves it. Except you didn't. The black box you described does have feelings because the human inside has feelings. The fact that every component of a sentient system doesn't have feelings isn't particularly interesting. > There are plenty of damaging processes in the body that produce no pain. Because they didn't need to for fitness purposes. > What I’m interested in is how sensations are produced; https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2116933119 https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2116933119 > it’s not just computation You don't know that.
    - prmph 4y ago
      > Because they didn't need to for fitness purposes. Huh, damaging process are not relevant for fitness purposes? Wow Your link is full of speculation, and indeed for consciousness, speculation may be all that can be done, since no one can define it, only experience it. > You don't know that. It seems self-evident. If a program computes the temperature of the sun, does it feel the heat?
      - naasking 4y ago
        > Huh, damaging process are not relevant for fitness purposes? Wow Cancer or heart disease in your 50s does not impact your reproductive fitness, for instance. Way to attach a strawman. > It seems self-evident. If a program computes the temperature of the sun, does it feel the heat? The sun isn't computing a temperature, it's computing a nuclear fusion reaction. Also, "feeling" isn't a quality of individual particles to the best of our knowledge, but it is a quality of some aggregate of particles we call a human. So if your question is whether a faithful simulation of a human would feel the heat from a faithful simulation of the sun, then yes, that's very plausible.
        prmph 4y ago
        > Cancer or heart disease in your 50s does not impact your reproductive fitness, for instance. Way to attach a strawman But there are plenty of cancers that can and do occur in ones reproductive years, that start without pain. > The sun isn't computing a temperature, it's computing a nuclear fusion reaction. I wasn’t comparing the program to the sun. I was comparing it to the human skin. > Also, "feeling" isn't a quality of individual particles to the best of our knowledge, but it is a quality of some aggregate of particles we call a human. Hmmm, now you are referring to particles and aggregates. Wonder what the source of that claim is. At least you agree computation (a process) is not the important thing, but particles (matter). > So if your question is whether a faithful simulation of a human would feel the heat from a faithful simulation of the sun, then yes, that's very plausible. Wow, now you're making a circular argument. Whats a “faithful” simulation of a human? How would we know it is “faithful”? What form would that even take? Let’s say ChatGPT becomes “sufficiently” advanced, and is hooked up to a sensor that records the temperature of the sun. Would it feel the heat? The whole idea is preposterous.
plutonorm 4y ago
"It seems some just can't grasp this concept.". Your confidence reveals your lack of knowledge. No one has a scooby what consciousness is or how to measure it. It could be that every atom has a modicum of conscious experience. It could be that consciousness is an emergent phenomena (although I think this claim is unlikely as it seems to me to be making a category error). It could be that it's actually Midi-chlorians. I repeat nobody knows. There are as many theories as there are people who have thought deeply about the problem. You coming along all confident with your debunking mindset and your scientism are just showing everyone who has any understanding that you do not know what you are talking about.
- prmph 4y ago
  To me, it is those claiming that computation equals consciousness who are displaying hubris. Think about it, if we accept the theory that computation equals consciousness, then then is little to investigate further. Just calculate something, and voila, consciousness exists. It is this closing down of inquiry that I push against. My assertion is that consciousness is deeper, it cannot be reduced to computation. How would you even prove otherwise? If it arises from computation, what is conscious? Is it the algorithm? Is it the electric circuits? It is the physical machine? It is interesting to note my consciousness is bound up what a notion of what my body is. I can identify the limits of my body and make a distinction between it and my environment. What determines the conscious boundary of a entity performing calculations? On the other hand, there are many strong arguments against consciousness arising from mere computation, some of which I have enumerated.

by prmph 4y ago

naasking 4y ago

> This example also shows that the perceived sophistication of the input-output transformation is immaterial No, it doesn't show that, it merely asserts it. Consciousness could be a logical property of some perceptual algorithm, like ordered outputs is a property of a sorting algorithm. > But, there is no essential reason why that should lead to an experience of pain, rather than a sensation similar to color, which generally does not produce pain. Sure there is, because it's approaching the point of causing damage. Pain happens when sensory precepts approach acceptable tolerance. Pain is like clipping in an audio stream.

prmph 4y ago
> No, it doesn’t show that, it merely asserts it. I’ve given you an example that proves it. > Sure there is, because it's approaching the point of causing damage. There are plenty of damaging processes in the body that produce no pain. But that’s not even the issue. What I’m interested in is how sensations are produced; it’s not just computation
- naasking 4y ago
  > I’ve given you an example that proves it. Except you didn't. The black box you described does have feelings because the human inside has feelings. The fact that every component of a sentient system doesn't have feelings isn't particularly interesting. > There are plenty of damaging processes in the body that produce no pain. Because they didn't need to for fitness purposes. > What I’m interested in is how sensations are produced; https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2116933119 https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2116933119 > it’s not just computation You don't know that.
  - prmph 4y ago
    > Because they didn't need to for fitness purposes. Huh, damaging process are not relevant for fitness purposes? Wow Your link is full of speculation, and indeed for consciousness, speculation may be all that can be done, since no one can define it, only experience it. > You don't know that. It seems self-evident. If a program computes the temperature of the sun, does it feel the heat?
    - naasking 4y ago
      > Huh, damaging process are not relevant for fitness purposes? Wow Cancer or heart disease in your 50s does not impact your reproductive fitness, for instance. Way to attach a strawman. > It seems self-evident. If a program computes the temperature of the sun, does it feel the heat? The sun isn't computing a temperature, it's computing a nuclear fusion reaction. Also, "feeling" isn't a quality of individual particles to the best of our knowledge, but it is a quality of some aggregate of particles we call a human. So if your question is whether a faithful simulation of a human would feel the heat from a faithful simulation of the sun, then yes, that's very plausible.
      - prmph 4y ago
        > Cancer or heart disease in your 50s does not impact your reproductive fitness, for instance. Way to attach a strawman But there are plenty of cancers that can and do occur in ones reproductive years, that start without pain. > The sun isn't computing a temperature, it's computing a nuclear fusion reaction. I wasn’t comparing the program to the sun. I was comparing it to the human skin. > Also, "feeling" isn't a quality of individual particles to the best of our knowledge, but it is a quality of some aggregate of particles we call a human. Hmmm, now you are referring to particles and aggregates. Wonder what the source of that claim is. At least you agree computation (a process) is not the important thing, but particles (matter). > So if your question is whether a faithful simulation of a human would feel the heat from a faithful simulation of the sun, then yes, that's very plausible. Wow, now you're making a circular argument. Whats a “faithful” simulation of a human? How would we know it is “faithful”? What form would that even take? Let’s say ChatGPT becomes “sufficiently” advanced, and is hooked up to a sensor that records the temperature of the sun. Would it feel the heat? The whole idea is preposterous.

plutonorm 4y ago

"It seems some just can't grasp this concept.". Your confidence reveals your lack of knowledge. No one has a scooby what consciousness is or how to measure it. It could be that every atom has a modicum of conscious experience. It could be that consciousness is an emergent phenomena (although I think this claim is unlikely as it seems to me to be making a category error). It could be that it's actually Midi-chlorians. I repeat nobody knows. There are as many theories as there are people who have thought deeply about the problem. You coming along all confident with your debunking mindset and your scientism are just showing everyone who has any understanding that you do not know what you are talking about.

prmph 4y ago
To me, it is those claiming that computation equals consciousness who are displaying hubris. Think about it, if we accept the theory that computation equals consciousness, then then is little to investigate further. Just calculate something, and voila, consciousness exists. It is this closing down of inquiry that I push against. My assertion is that consciousness is deeper, it cannot be reduced to computation. How would you even prove otherwise? If it arises from computation, what is conscious? Is it the algorithm? Is it the electric circuits? It is the physical machine? It is interesting to note my consciousness is bound up what a notion of what my body is. I can identify the limits of my body and make a distinction between it and my environment. What determines the conscious boundary of a entity performing calculations? On the other hand, there are many strong arguments against consciousness arising from mere computation, some of which I have enumerated.