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While some people believe that consciousness cannot be reduced to probabilistic pattern recognition, I strongly disagree. In my view, the AIXI model is an excel

While some people believe that consciousness cannot be reduced to probabilistic pattern recognition, I strongly disagree. In my view, the AIXI model is an excellent model of intelligence, as it can mathematically define a notion of Pareto optimal behavior across all possible environments. This model relies on compression at its core, specifically the minimum description length principle. Moreover, large language models (LLMs), like GPT-3, are designed to learn how to predict, and prediction is the dual of compression. As explained in this StackExchange post (https://cs.stackexchange.com/questions/130655/is-prediction-the-same-as-compression#:~:text=Prediction%20can%20be%20used%20to%20compress%2C%20and%20compression,can%20be%20used%20to%20compress%20and%20vice%20versa https://cs.stackexchange.com/questions/130655/is-prediction-...), prediction can be used to compress data, and compression can be used to make predictions. Given that LLMs are trained on vast amounts of data and can predict patterns within that data, I believe that they contain all the necessary components to be considered an intelligent system. Therefore, I firmly believe that consciousness can indeed be reduced to probabilistic pattern recognition, and that LLMs provide a compelling example of this phenomenon in action.

prmph 4y ago
Your viewpoint is one I consistently have to push against. Computation is not necessarily experience. I can't emphasize enough how fundamental understanding this is. It seems some just can't grasp this concept. Would you say a program that echoes to the screen the responses of a hidden human is intelligent? Viewed as a black box, it would certainly seem so. But does it have any internal experience and understanding of anything? Of course this is a trivial experiment, but the point of it is to show, in the most absurdly clear terms, that producing plausible outputs !== being intelligent, much less having a conscious experience. This example also shows that the perceived sophistication of the input-output transformation is immaterial, unless you want to say consciousness requires a certain internal architecture for computation, in which case I would ask: what architecture is that? No matter the sophistication of an algorithm, it's computation lies on a different axis to that of consciousness. You might say human compute because they are conscious, not conscious because they compute. Another way to understand this: Let's say you touch a very hot object. You skin, in conjunction with your brain, senses and computes the temperature of the object. But, there is no essential reason why that should lead to an experience of pain, rather than a sensation similar to color, which generally does not produce pain.
- naasking 4y ago
  > This example also shows that the perceived sophistication of the input-output transformation is immaterial No, it doesn't show that, it merely asserts it. Consciousness could be a logical property of some perceptual algorithm, like ordered outputs is a property of a sorting algorithm. > But, there is no essential reason why that should lead to an experience of pain, rather than a sensation similar to color, which generally does not produce pain. Sure there is, because it's approaching the point of causing damage. Pain happens when sensory precepts approach acceptable tolerance. Pain is like clipping in an audio stream.
  - prmph 4y ago
    > No, it doesn’t show that, it merely asserts it. I’ve given you an example that proves it. > Sure there is, because it's approaching the point of causing damage. There are plenty of damaging processes in the body that produce no pain. But that’s not even the issue. What I’m interested in is how sensations are produced; it’s not just computation
    - naasking 4y ago
      > I’ve given you an example that proves it. Except you didn't. The black box you described does have feelings because the human inside has feelings. The fact that every component of a sentient system doesn't have feelings isn't particularly interesting. > There are plenty of damaging processes in the body that produce no pain. Because they didn't need to for fitness purposes. > What I’m interested in is how sensations are produced; https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2116933119 https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2116933119 > it’s not just computation You don't know that.
      - prmph 4y ago
        > Because they didn't need to for fitness purposes. Huh, damaging process are not relevant for fitness purposes? Wow Your link is full of speculation, and indeed for consciousness, speculation may be all that can be done, since no one can define it, only experience it. > You don't know that. It seems self-evident. If a program computes the temperature of the sun, does it feel the heat?

prmph 4y ago

Your viewpoint is one I consistently have to push against. Computation is not necessarily experience. I can't emphasize enough how fundamental understanding this is. It seems some just can't grasp this concept. Would you say a program that echoes to the screen the responses of a hidden human is intelligent? Viewed as a black box, it would certainly seem so. But does it have any internal experience and understanding of anything? Of course this is a trivial experiment, but the point of it is to show, in the most absurdly clear terms, that producing plausible outputs !== being intelligent, much less having a conscious experience. This example also shows that the perceived sophistication of the input-output transformation is immaterial, unless you want to say consciousness requires a certain internal architecture for computation, in which case I would ask: what architecture is that? No matter the sophistication of an algorithm, it's computation lies on a different axis to that of consciousness. You might say human compute because they are conscious, not conscious because they compute. Another way to understand this: Let's say you touch a very hot object. You skin, in conjunction with your brain, senses and computes the temperature of the object. But, there is no essential reason why that should lead to an experience of pain, rather than a sensation similar to color, which generally does not produce pain.

naasking 4y ago
> This example also shows that the perceived sophistication of the input-output transformation is immaterial No, it doesn't show that, it merely asserts it. Consciousness could be a logical property of some perceptual algorithm, like ordered outputs is a property of a sorting algorithm. > But, there is no essential reason why that should lead to an experience of pain, rather than a sensation similar to color, which generally does not produce pain. Sure there is, because it's approaching the point of causing damage. Pain happens when sensory precepts approach acceptable tolerance. Pain is like clipping in an audio stream.
- prmph 4y ago
  > No, it doesn’t show that, it merely asserts it. I’ve given you an example that proves it. > Sure there is, because it's approaching the point of causing damage. There are plenty of damaging processes in the body that produce no pain. But that’s not even the issue. What I’m interested in is how sensations are produced; it’s not just computation
  - naasking 4y ago
    > I’ve given you an example that proves it. Except you didn't. The black box you described does have feelings because the human inside has feelings. The fact that every component of a sentient system doesn't have feelings isn't particularly interesting. > There are plenty of damaging processes in the body that produce no pain. Because they didn't need to for fitness purposes. > What I’m interested in is how sensations are produced; https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2116933119 https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2116933119 > it’s not just computation You don't know that.
    - prmph 4y ago
      > Because they didn't need to for fitness purposes. Huh, damaging process are not relevant for fitness purposes? Wow Your link is full of speculation, and indeed for consciousness, speculation may be all that can be done, since no one can define it, only experience it. > You don't know that. It seems self-evident. If a program computes the temperature of the sun, does it feel the heat?