Definitions are not magical bindings that would guarantee the adequacy of a representation but the fixed points assumed to aid communication, science is not a '

Definitions are not magical bindings that would guarantee the adequacy of a representation but the fixed points assumed to aid communication, science is not a 'search' for definitions, it uses definitions to communicate what it has discovered. The mathematical structure of phenomenology is kind of a weird specific task, because it's traditionally equated to the structure of the world or representation in general. This is because in theory 'consciousness' means very little when abstracted from the theory of its implementation, on the other hand if we try to preserve the relation of consciousness with the implementation we already have to choose between several. I think the best candidate for the existence of some of most rudimentary sentience is the gamma oscillations that function as coordinator functions of different neural populations, so the math to represent this would be take that as a basis.