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That view seems pessimistic without any strong argument, other than critiquing people for not yet understanding something we all agree we don’t understand yet.

• epgui 4y ago
  It's only a thing if you can define it, but there is no agreed upon definition of what collection of things comprise consciousness. We have all the pieces, and we know we have all the pieces (note: this doesn't mean we don't have a lot more to learn, both can be true). There is little controversy over how it all roughly works together. The only real controversy is semantics: what do we mean when we say "consciousness". In programmerland, one might say something like "the abstraction you're using is counter-productive", for whatever reason, when looking at some junior hire's code. It's very much the same here: trying to understand consciousness is asking the wrong question. It's like asking "Why is there a God?": it's an unproductive question because it's a question that can't be answered. The abstraction in the question simply doesn't map 1:1 to abstractions in the world in which we live. If we want to understand our world, we'll maximize our odds of success if we focus on studying the abstractions of this world. I wouldn't describe myself as a pessimist at all, and I'm not sure why you thought my comment was pessimistic... But this opinion of mine (because that's what it is, it's an opinion, not an argument) is a professional opinion. This isn't my field of expertise, but I do have expertise in very adjacent fields.
  • Nevermark 4y ago
    A phenomena can be defined by a pattern, even if it’s not well defined in a technical sense. And a pattern is a thing. Consciousness is an everyday experience that appears to be reliably shared by billions of entities who communicate about it to each other. And have done so for at least millennia. To use a colloquialism: It’s a thing
    • bbwbsb 4y ago
      There are types without values. That the type is itself a value does not mean that it has values itself. False is a type with no values. Consciousness is not a value. Replace type with concept and value with thing, and we get a rebuttal using the same language. You can also switch the terms, depending on how 'a thing' is interpreted. If you are more familiar with set theory, replace type with proposition, value with element. The critical difference is between reference and referent. Further if large numbers of people holding something is true for considerable duration is sufficient for something to 'be a thing', we'd also have an argument for 'the consciousness of the human heart' being a thing, which I don't think anyone would argue in good faith these days. There are probably better examples, but note that the duration of time and frequency of experience are parameters with no obvious values indicating at which point the underlying 'thing' should be accepted as undeniably 'a thing'. The whole point of requiring it to be technically defined is that all this confusion just goes away and it becomes possible to ask more meaningful and less ambiguous questions about it. That said, I will concede that the argument I have made does not say that consciousness is definitely not 'a thing', just that it is defensible to say that it is not a thing, given that it is held that either it does not represent a proposition, or that the proposition it represents is not true. (note I'm using the term proposition with some handwaving).
      • epgui 4y ago
        This commenter understands the importance of definition.
      • Nevermark 4y ago
        Nothing is fully defined formally. The most fundamental aspects of reality, and mathematics, are still not founded completely on formal definitions, without resorting to circular reasoning, and attempts to prove things assuming the things that are being proved. Existence isn't well defined. Yet Descartes' famous informal claim "I think, therefore I am" is still a compelling statement that each of us can use to verify we do exist. Despite many unanswered questions. Likewise, "I am aware of myself, my own thoughts, my interactions with a world around me" is a compelling statement supporting consciousness. The fact that we can all verify our own consciousness the same way, and discuss those experiences with each other, makes it even more compelling. Despite lots of unanswered questions. -- Your counter examples are also weak. Most subjective beliefs about hearts having consciousness are not nearly as credible as informal arguments for existence and consciousness. Conscious hearts are not virtually universally experienced. Informal reasoning about why a heart, a blood pumping organ, would correlate with consciousness are not generally accepted informal arguments. People whose hearts are replaced with artificial or donated organs don't reliably report a loss of consciousness.
  • goatlover 4y ago
    > but there is no agreed upon definition of what collection of things comprise consciousness Colors, sounds, tastes, smells, feels, emotions that makeup perception, imagination, inner dialog or visualization, dreams, hallucinations, illusions. Or qualia if you want to reference the philosophy of mind literature, where the debate and various positions are well defined and extensively argued.
    • epgui 4y ago
      > Colors, sounds, tastes, smells, feels, emotions that makeup perception, imagination, inner dialog or visualization, dreams, hallucinations, illusions. All of which are things we can explain without any magic. The literature on qualia pretty much has the same problem as the literature on consciousness.
      • goatlover 4y ago
        Who said anything about "magic"? That's straw-manning the literature on qualia. I'd like to hear your explanations for our sensations, because I'm not aware of any that actually explains them.
        • epgui 4y ago
          Pick up any introductory textbook on functional neuroanatomy. I recommend Blumenfeld!