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I don't know what "zerotrust" is supposed to mean. Maybe they're stretching the meaning of zero knowledge constructions. "Zero knowledge" should mean "the servi
by tinglymintyfrsh 4y ago
I don't know what "zerotrust" is supposed to mean. Maybe they're stretching the meaning of zero knowledge constructions. "Zero knowledge" should mean "the service provider never keeps logs, data, metadata, or secrets in the clear that can be retrieved without user intervention, preferably not knowing anything about any particular user." MEGA is partially this.
"Passwordless" isn't terrible if it means "use a physical device or TPM-stored secret instead of a password". It shouldn't replace 2FA by having 2 actual factors.
- pclmulqdq 4y agoFrom a more cynical point of view, "zero-trust" tends to mean something along the lines of: "trust a TPM on the user side... and all of my server logic and my cloud provider." From a less cynical point of view it means "hold all the client's keys in their TPM and only authenticate on the server side, but don't decrypt (or otherwise pass keys around)"
- matthewaveryusa 4y agozero trust at its core means authentication and authorization at each service, for each request. at a high level it means not trusting a connection from another service in the same network just because it’s on the same network. rooting trust to tpms is orthogonal but certainly the right way to root trust. The space where I think zero trust is the most interesting are vpns like tailscale/wireguard/microsegmentation that flip the status quo around and say the network is the identity/authoritzed group
- pclmulqdq 4y agoWait, but I thought everyone was doing that anyway prior to the "zero trust" thing. The difference was who you trusted to hold user (and concern-specific) keys - before zero trust, it was your server, and afterward, it's the user. Authentication and authorization for internal services is kind of basic.
- PeterisP 4y ago> I thought everyone was doing that anyway prior to the "zero trust" thing. Nope, lots and lots of organizations who have a zillion of internal services which they know to be insecure but are kept that way because they "are accessible only on the protected network".
- _8j50 4y ago> It shouldn't replace 2FA by having 2 actual factors. So long as you have two factors of auth, I am fine with it. > I don't know what "zerotrust" is supposed to mean My point exactly. What happens in most orgs is they pick out a few apps that are really important, implement MFA, collect some logs and put an edr on the servers and voila you have zero-trust. However, the authentication and security behind the trust you are establishing itself has implicit trust and lacks many layers of defenses so you're just polishing turd and calling it zero-trust. Now, if every freaking device and user in your trusted compute base is authenticated before traversing a security boundary then all is well -- but wait, what does that really mean? Authenticated? So if I am a member of "domain users" and "authenticated users" in AD and I can just RDP to your fancy zero-trust labeled apps, is that really zero trust? If indirect and non-explicit permission grants such as with nested or broad group/role memberships grant people permissions then is that zero trust? You see what I mean by this? Execs want to see zero-trust so all this b.s. gets pushed down and zerotrust ends up causing an increase in risk and exposure!