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Well we do see atoms, and we see them directly -- in the sense that atoms are a direct cause of our perceptions. However what "seeing atoms" means at a "given

Well we do see atoms, and we see them directly -- in the sense that atoms are a direct cause of our perceptions. However what "seeing atoms" means at a "given resolution" differs. There's a long history of this paranoid game: we think the stick is bent! We were wrong! We didnt see the stick at all ! (false). Ah, but damn: how is it now we know we were wrong? How is it now that, when we took the stick out of the water, we know it isnt bent? Every sceptical example ever posed has this feature: it presumes that it is possible to be right. That is quite daming to the whole project of scepticism; it is, essentially, incoherent. Without the possibility of knowing the stick is bent, our mistake was never even a mistake. The very worry of being mistaken is a worry which presumes that truth & knowledege are the ordinary background of our experience.

foolrush 4y ago
> in the sense that atoms are a direct cause of our perceptions. I do not believe this is correct in any manner, and reduces the role of cognition. Jastrow’s work focuses on this departure between one context and higher order cognition.
- mjburgess 4y ago
  the concepts we develop through sensory-motor interaction with our environment structure our perception so-as-to-present a certain "level of abstraction" over the environment But just as `sum([2, 4, 6])` presents `12`, it does so via directly summating `2`, `4`, `6`. That our perception is aggregating and abstracting does not mean that it isnt caused directly by those things which it aggregates and abstracts. Here, "seeing" is the `sum`, `[2, 4, 6]` are the atoms, and `12` is the perception. A case in point: a frog can detect a single photo. Is there any sense here in which a frog's qualitative sensation of a "flicker" is not directly caused by a photon? And likewise, that redness of the apple is just an abstract presentation of photons of light scattering of the atoms of its surface. The causal chain here is direct. Light does not "go via" purgatory first, we see, directly, the objects of the world.

foolrush 4y ago

> in the sense that atoms are a direct cause of our perceptions. I do not believe this is correct in any manner, and reduces the role of cognition. Jastrow’s work focuses on this departure between one context and higher order cognition.

mjburgess 4y ago
the concepts we develop through sensory-motor interaction with our environment structure our perception so-as-to-present a certain "level of abstraction" over the environment But just as `sum([2, 4, 6])` presents `12`, it does so via directly summating `2`, `4`, `6`. That our perception is aggregating and abstracting does not mean that it isnt caused directly by those things which it aggregates and abstracts. Here, "seeing" is the `sum`, `[2, 4, 6]` are the atoms, and `12` is the perception. A case in point: a frog can detect a single photo. Is there any sense here in which a frog's qualitative sensation of a "flicker" is not directly caused by a photon? And likewise, that redness of the apple is just an abstract presentation of photons of light scattering of the atoms of its surface. The causal chain here is direct. Light does not "go via" purgatory first, we see, directly, the objects of the world.