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Can confirm this and that it happen in both Bosnia and the Serbia campaigns. I had family members who were involved [0]. The deception methods that were applie

by nikcub 4y ago

Can confirm this and that it happen in both Bosnia and the Serbia campaigns. I had family members who were involved [0]. The deception methods that were applied were truly remarkable, they used decoy tanks and sent people out to imprint fake tank tracks into fields. They also understood IR and would shield real troops while leaving coal to burn in empty pillboxes and bunkers There was also the shoot down of the F-117A by what was effectively a rag-tag group of AA who planned the operation and pulled it off A lot of what was learned in the earlier Bosnia campaign was applied later in '99 - not just the use of decoys and microwaves, but using spotters to track the regular flight paths of incoming fighters and intermittently switching radar off and on (this is how Scott O'Grady was shot down in his F16) Gen. Wesley Clark was a huge advocate of the doctrine that you could win wars with air power alone and never have to sacrifice ground troops - that thinking changed after '99 [0] note that I in no way condone the overall goal of what took place there and those same family members would be the first to tell you it was horrific

idonotknowwhy 4y ago
Where can one read more about this+
- mikrotikker 4y ago
  Operations room did a great video https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=Is3R4ie21Mc https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=Is3R4ie21Mc
mysterydip 4y ago
I heard the downing of the f-117 was due in large part to them flying the same patterns at the same time every night. Was this true? Or was there more involved in the AA hit?
- TEP_Kim_Il_Sung 4y ago
  IIRC it involved sacrificing one AA tank and using another to kill the plane.
- sornaensis 4y ago
  Yes, the same flight plans, routes and timetables, were re-used, so when spotters saw the aircraft take off they had a very good idea of where it would come from. The shoot down also involved the SAM radar operator violating his own SOP by leaving his radar on longer than they normally do, and firing at a non-PID contact, because they _knew_ the aircraft was going to be there. Complacency kills.
  - tablespoon 4y ago
    > non-PID contact What is that, exactly?
    - sundvor 4y ago
      Not having a positive ID, I reckon.
    - jack_riminton 4y ago
      Positively Identified. Western forces have many safeguards in place to only shoot at PID targets because the cost of 'blue-on-blue' is so destructive for morale
  - michaelcampbell 4y ago
    > saw the aircraft take off they had a very good idea of where it would come from. Wait, what? If they saw the aircraft take off, they definitely knew where it came from, no?
- ajsnigrutin 4y ago
  Since it was supposedly "invisible", there was a lot of joking that it was hit by accident saying: "sorry, we didn't see it".
- sundvor 4y ago
  I believe so, but also because they decided to still fly missions on a day where the Prowler EW platform was inoperable. Due to the extreme predictability of the route, along with no countermeasures, and intelligence on the matter, they were able to burn through. This is the article I read about this some time ago; good detail here! They quote complacency as a factor, arrogance would be another good word - in grossly underestimating the sheer determination on the other side. https://theaviationgeekclub.com/an-in-depth-analysis-of-how-serbs-were-able-to-shoot-down-an-f-117-stealth-fighter-during-operation-allied-force/ https://theaviationgeekclub.com/an-in-depth-analysis-of-how-...
bell-cot 4y ago
> Gen. Wesley Clark was a huge advocate of the doctrine that you could win wars with air power alone and never have to sacrifice ground troops - that thinking changed after '99 Delusions about winning wars with only air power are very close to a century old now. ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bomber_Mafia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bomber_Mafia ) But they seem hugely appealing to parts of human psychology - so "proved horribly wrong, yet again" doesn't do much to cure them. That said - Gen. Clark was a career Army officer, not Air Force. And "we don't need an army to win" ideas have, ah, limited appeal to career Army folks. My read is that he was a good officer, stuck under a political leader (Pres. Bill Clinton) extremely reluctant to commit ground forces. Clark knew not to contradict his boss, and did what he could within the imposed constraints.
- belter 4y ago
  Gen Clark had to be reined in by the common sense and prudence of a British general. "I'm not going to start Third World War for you," - https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/aug/02/balkans3 https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/aug/02/balkans3 "...One of Clark's most debated decisions during his SACEUR command was his attempted operation to attack Russian troops at Pristina International Airport, immediately after the end of the Kosovo War in June 1999..." "https://www.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/6hjuss/kosovo_war_and_wesley_clark/ https://www.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/6hjuss/kos..." "Incident at Pristina Airport" - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Incident_at_Pristina_airport https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Incident_at_Pristina_airport
d1sxeyes 4y ago
Winning wars with air power alone is a very dangerous thing to do. It puts success entirely in the hands of the best funded. You can simply simulate the war and arrive at the outcome. So as a member of the “losing” side, how do you respond? You only have one choice to win: escalate. Escalate to terrorism, NBC weapons, etc. Both sides have to bleed in a fair-ish fight to keep wars roughly conventional.
- dsfyu404ed 4y ago
  I don't get what you're getting at. If you wanna bomb someone you don't get to complain when they turn around and engage with whatever means they have.
  - d1sxeyes 4y ago
    I’m not sure you “don’t get to complain”, but essentially you’re reiterating my point, that I believe General Clark is wrong on this point (obviously with the caveat that I’m a guy with a keyboard and a monitor, but never seen a battlefield). I’m from a country where we would be able to launch massive manned and unmanned aerial attacks at an enemy country. And yet I still think that we should be careful to avoid such an asymmetrical use of force. Using aerial attacks as part of a wider strategy, fine. But if the enemy sees absolutely no possibility of winning a war conventionally, as you say “you don’t get to complain”.

by nikcub 4y ago

idonotknowwhy 4y ago

Where can one read more about this+

mikrotikker 4y ago
Operations room did a great video https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=Is3R4ie21Mc https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=Is3R4ie21Mc

mysterydip 4y ago

I heard the downing of the f-117 was due in large part to them flying the same patterns at the same time every night. Was this true? Or was there more involved in the AA hit?

TEP_Kim_Il_Sung 4y ago
IIRC it involved sacrificing one AA tank and using another to kill the plane.
sornaensis 4y ago
Yes, the same flight plans, routes and timetables, were re-used, so when spotters saw the aircraft take off they had a very good idea of where it would come from. The shoot down also involved the SAM radar operator violating his own SOP by leaving his radar on longer than they normally do, and firing at a non-PID contact, because they _knew_ the aircraft was going to be there. Complacency kills.
- tablespoon 4y ago
  > non-PID contact What is that, exactly?
  - sundvor 4y ago
    Not having a positive ID, I reckon.
  - jack_riminton 4y ago
    Positively Identified. Western forces have many safeguards in place to only shoot at PID targets because the cost of 'blue-on-blue' is so destructive for morale
- michaelcampbell 4y ago
  > saw the aircraft take off they had a very good idea of where it would come from. Wait, what? If they saw the aircraft take off, they definitely knew where it came from, no?
ajsnigrutin 4y ago
Since it was supposedly "invisible", there was a lot of joking that it was hit by accident saying: "sorry, we didn't see it".
sundvor 4y ago
I believe so, but also because they decided to still fly missions on a day where the Prowler EW platform was inoperable. Due to the extreme predictability of the route, along with no countermeasures, and intelligence on the matter, they were able to burn through. This is the article I read about this some time ago; good detail here! They quote complacency as a factor, arrogance would be another good word - in grossly underestimating the sheer determination on the other side. https://theaviationgeekclub.com/an-in-depth-analysis-of-how-serbs-were-able-to-shoot-down-an-f-117-stealth-fighter-during-operation-allied-force/ https://theaviationgeekclub.com/an-in-depth-analysis-of-how-...

bell-cot 4y ago

> Gen. Wesley Clark was a huge advocate of the doctrine that you could win wars with air power alone and never have to sacrifice ground troops - that thinking changed after '99 Delusions about winning wars with only air power are very close to a century old now. ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bomber_Mafia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bomber_Mafia ) But they seem hugely appealing to parts of human psychology - so "proved horribly wrong, yet again" doesn't do much to cure them. That said - Gen. Clark was a career Army officer, not Air Force. And "we don't need an army to win" ideas have, ah, limited appeal to career Army folks. My read is that he was a good officer, stuck under a political leader (Pres. Bill Clinton) extremely reluctant to commit ground forces. Clark knew not to contradict his boss, and did what he could within the imposed constraints.

belter 4y ago
Gen Clark had to be reined in by the common sense and prudence of a British general. "I'm not going to start Third World War for you," - https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/aug/02/balkans3 https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/aug/02/balkans3 "...One of Clark's most debated decisions during his SACEUR command was his attempted operation to attack Russian troops at Pristina International Airport, immediately after the end of the Kosovo War in June 1999..." "https://www.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/6hjuss/kosovo_war_and_wesley_clark/ https://www.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/6hjuss/kos..." "Incident at Pristina Airport" - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Incident_at_Pristina_airport https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Incident_at_Pristina_airport

d1sxeyes 4y ago

Winning wars with air power alone is a very dangerous thing to do. It puts success entirely in the hands of the best funded. You can simply simulate the war and arrive at the outcome. So as a member of the “losing” side, how do you respond? You only have one choice to win: escalate. Escalate to terrorism, NBC weapons, etc. Both sides have to bleed in a fair-ish fight to keep wars roughly conventional.

dsfyu404ed 4y ago
I don't get what you're getting at. If you wanna bomb someone you don't get to complain when they turn around and engage with whatever means they have.
- d1sxeyes 4y ago
  I’m not sure you “don’t get to complain”, but essentially you’re reiterating my point, that I believe General Clark is wrong on this point (obviously with the caveat that I’m a guy with a keyboard and a monitor, but never seen a battlefield). I’m from a country where we would be able to launch massive manned and unmanned aerial attacks at an enemy country. And yet I still think that we should be careful to avoid such an asymmetrical use of force. Using aerial attacks as part of a wider strategy, fine. But if the enemy sees absolutely no possibility of winning a war conventionally, as you say “you don’t get to complain”.