4 ms·

Of course, today's LLMs only appear to have theory of mind at first glance and fall apart under closer scrutiny. But if they can continue to become more and mor

Of course, today's LLMs only appear to have theory of mind at first glance and fall apart under closer scrutiny. But if they can continue to become more and more accurate replicas of the real thing, I don't think it matters at all. There's no way to know for sure that anyone other than yourself experiences consciousness. All you can do is judge for yourself that what they're describing matches closely enough with your own experiences that they're probably experiencing the same thing you are.

robertlagrant 4y ago
> But if they can continue to become more and more accurate replicas of the real thing, I don't think it matters at all. So, I suppose I'd ask: what does "matter" mean here? If you knew that everyone you loved had been destroyed and been replaced by exact replicas, would that matter?
- sgt101 4y ago
  Star trek universe!
- canniballectern 4y ago
  If the replicas were truly exact, I guess not ¯\_(ツ)_/¯
- bigbluedots 4y ago
  That already happens frequently enough at a cellular level.
pdonis 4y ago
> There's no way to know for sure that anyone other than yourself experiences consciousness. All you can do is judge for yourself that what they're describing matches closely enough with your own experiences that they're probably experiencing the same thing you are. That judgment is not just based on the words other people use. It is based on knowing that other people's brains and minds have the same sort of semantic relationships to the rest of the world that yours do. And those relationships can be tested by checking to see if, for example, the other person uses the same words to refer to particular objects in the real world that you do, or if they react to particular real-world events in the same way that you do. You can't even test any of this with an LLM because the LLM simply does not have the same kind of semantic relationships with the rest of the world that you do. It has no such relationships at all.
- mietek 4y ago
  I don’t think you know whether I have a mind or not.
  - pdonis 4y ago
    If you object to the term "mind", just leave it out and read "brain and mind" as just "brain". I'm a physicalist so I don't think the mind is something separate from the brain anyway, so it's all the same to me.
    - mietek 4y ago
      I don’t object to “mind”, but it’s famously unprovable whether other beings we presume to be conscious actually experience internal mental states. See also: qualia, p-zombies, the hard problem of consciousness.
      - pdonis 4y ago
        > it’s famously unprovable whether other beings we presume to be conscious actually experience internal mental states It's also famously unprovable that there is not an invisible dragon in my garage that cannot be detected by any means whatever, to use Carl Sagan's example. That doesn't mean such an idea is worth discussing or including in your thought processes.
    - canniballectern 4y ago
      If a jellyfish was able to have a conversation with you where it credibly described what it's like to be conscious, would you reject it because it doesn't have a brain and therefore cannot have a mind in the same sense as you?
      - pdonis 4y ago
        Show me such a jellyfish and I'll give you an answer.
- 4y ago
sgt101 4y ago
I think it does matter because it legitimizes a view of humans (and animals) that undervalues them. The causality of meaning arising from patterns of language rather than patterns of language arising from meaning follows the same inversion as society being more valuable than the humans in it. Bad things have happened when that belief becomes dominant.
yamrzou 4y ago
> There's no way to know for sure that anyone other than yourself experiences consciousness. - Do you see how the fish are coming to the surface and swimming around as they please? That's what fish really enjoy. - You're not a fish, replied Hui Tzu, so how can you say you know what fish really enjoy? - You are not me, said Zhuangzi, so how can you know I don't know what fish enjoy.

robertlagrant 4y ago

> But if they can continue to become more and more accurate replicas of the real thing, I don't think it matters at all. So, I suppose I'd ask: what does "matter" mean here? If you knew that everyone you loved had been destroyed and been replaced by exact replicas, would that matter?

sgt101 4y ago
Star trek universe!
canniballectern 4y ago
If the replicas were truly exact, I guess not ¯\_(ツ)_/¯
bigbluedots 4y ago
That already happens frequently enough at a cellular level.

pdonis 4y ago

> There's no way to know for sure that anyone other than yourself experiences consciousness. All you can do is judge for yourself that what they're describing matches closely enough with your own experiences that they're probably experiencing the same thing you are. That judgment is not just based on the words other people use. It is based on knowing that other people's brains and minds have the same sort of semantic relationships to the rest of the world that yours do. And those relationships can be tested by checking to see if, for example, the other person uses the same words to refer to particular objects in the real world that you do, or if they react to particular real-world events in the same way that you do. You can't even test any of this with an LLM because the LLM simply does not have the same kind of semantic relationships with the rest of the world that you do. It has no such relationships at all.

mietek 4y ago
I don’t think you know whether I have a mind or not.
- pdonis 4y ago
  If you object to the term "mind", just leave it out and read "brain and mind" as just "brain". I'm a physicalist so I don't think the mind is something separate from the brain anyway, so it's all the same to me.
  - mietek 4y ago
    I don’t object to “mind”, but it’s famously unprovable whether other beings we presume to be conscious actually experience internal mental states. See also: qualia, p-zombies, the hard problem of consciousness.
    - pdonis 4y ago
      > it’s famously unprovable whether other beings we presume to be conscious actually experience internal mental states It's also famously unprovable that there is not an invisible dragon in my garage that cannot be detected by any means whatever, to use Carl Sagan's example. That doesn't mean such an idea is worth discussing or including in your thought processes.
  - canniballectern 4y ago
    If a jellyfish was able to have a conversation with you where it credibly described what it's like to be conscious, would you reject it because it doesn't have a brain and therefore cannot have a mind in the same sense as you?
    - pdonis 4y ago
      Show me such a jellyfish and I'll give you an answer.
4y ago

sgt101 4y ago

I think it does matter because it legitimizes a view of humans (and animals) that undervalues them. The causality of meaning arising from patterns of language rather than patterns of language arising from meaning follows the same inversion as society being more valuable than the humans in it. Bad things have happened when that belief becomes dominant.

yamrzou 4y ago

> There's no way to know for sure that anyone other than yourself experiences consciousness. - Do you see how the fish are coming to the surface and swimming around as they please? That's what fish really enjoy. - You're not a fish, replied Hui Tzu, so how can you say you know what fish really enjoy? - You are not me, said Zhuangzi, so how can you know I don't know what fish enjoy.