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> Ultimately a company storing files is almost certainly going to require its staff to look through directories, log files, database tables. Why? (Or at least,
by Silhouette 15y ago
> Ultimately a company storing files is almost certainly going to require its staff to look through directories, log files, database tables.
Why? (Or at least, why should they see anything private in raw form?)
> And it is certainly going to require staff to have the ability, even if they never have to use it.
Why?
> By giving them your files you are trusting them not to screw you over.
By giving themselves the technical ability to examine private user data, they are making a strong (or indeed legally compelling, in some cases) argument for not using their service to store anything private at all. That's a death sentence for most cloud services.
We don't accept companies storing passwords in plain text. We don't accept companies transmitting credit card data in the clear, and PCI DSS requires quite strict controls on access to such data even when it's stored internally on the company network. Businesses dealing with sensitive data such as health records are subject to all kinds of regulations on the privacy of that data. Professionals dealing with privileged communications such as between lawyers and clients don't get a pass. Off-site backup services give all kinds of strong guarantees about the security and privacy of the data entrusted to them.
Why should we give a pass to anyone else, because they can't figure out how to set up a security system where only the end user can access the unencrypted version of their own data?
- corin_ 15y ago> We don't accept companies storing passwords in plain text. We don't accept companies transmitting credit card data in the clear This is in case somebody gains unauthorised access to the data, not in case staff can't be trusted. For example, paying by credit card over the phone you hand over your phone number to whoever is taking your order, but if they were to enter it into a system that system then has to comply with regulations. As to plain text passwords, again this is in case of the data being stolen. It's all very well saying "Google shouldn't store plain text passwords", but if Google as a company wanted to read my email, they could a.) just replace the encrypted password in my database entry with one that they can use or b.) place code in their login system that would log the plain text password secretly or c.) Go straight into where my emails are being stored and access them there. How do you get around this and make it impossible for them to access your data?
- Silhouette 15y ago> How do you get around this and make it impossible for them to access your data? The same way everyone else does: encrypt the data using a secret known only to the customer, isolate internal systems that have access to the decrypted data so that no one person can ever access that data on their own authority, and ensure that whatever procedure does permit access with the requisite authority creates a robust audit trail. If security really matters, the whole system and its logs should be regularly audited by an independent party, too. You have to have some sort of trust, because obviously if everyone in the company is crooked then nothing but encrypting everything client-side using auditable code is bulletproof. But you can certainly engineer systems so that access requires multiple people's consent and gets securely logged, which would eliminate casual snooping and provide robust evidence for legal action in the event of collective abuse.
- SomeCallMeTim 15y agoA friend of mine is working on that auditable client-side system you mention: https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs
- scott_s 15y agonothing but encrypting everything client-side using auditable code is bulletproof That sounds like Colin Percival's (cperciva) startup: http://www.tarsnap.com/ http://www.tarsnap.com/
- SoftwareMaven 15y agoAnd then somebody loses their private key material and they look to you to fix their problem. Client-side encryption with end-user key management is not yet practical for the average end user. Until it is (I'm hopeful we'll get there), the average service will require some sort of administrative back door that is controlled by process and people.
- gizzlon 15y ago"The same way everyone else does: encrypt the data using a secret known only to the customer, isolate internal systems .., and .. creates a robust audit trail." Who? Who does that? If you give your data to someone, chances are they might look at it. If you store files, use email or surf the web at work, chances are the IT guys can look at it. Of course, they should not, and they probably have better things to do etc etc, but believing this will never happen just seems naive.
- absconditus 15y agoHave you ever had to support a CRUD application?