> What is needed is less centralization, not more. I don't think depending on more CAs counts as constructive decentralization. Since every CA is ultimately tr

> What is needed is less centralization, not more. I don't think depending on more CAs counts as constructive decentralization. Since every CA is ultimately trusted, the security of our PKI depends on the weakest link in the chain. A single exploited CA is enough to completely invalidate PKI security, whereas separating CAs based on DNS hierarchy means that a compromised CA for .SI would only affect domains under .SI. > To completely fool an attentive user, you would need to both fool their DNS and their pool of trusted certificate (or a single CA). Currently, due to the way domain ownership is verified, a compromised TLD registry leads not only to DNS compromise, but to TLS compromise as well, since domain ownership is verified via DNS by currently trusted CAs (most notably letsencrypt). > We need to have more steps Less steps that form a reliable security chain that can be easily monitored is IMO better for securing infrastructure than having to trust each and every obscure CA. > we could require multiple certs But this would significantly increase deployment complexity. And the domain registry can still lie about domain ownership so it still must be ultimately trusted.