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It was a humiliating failure, not a success. The trend against those other architectures was already clear: as processor complexity went up, the costs of buildi
by acdha 4y ago
It was a humiliating failure, not a success. The trend against those other architectures was already clear: as processor complexity went up, the costs of building them skyrocketed and most of those companies had no plan for the kind of volume you’d need to support them. Don’t forget that applied on both the hardware and software sides: a competitive compiler and optimized libraries were important.
This is why Itanium got traction: everyone knew that you needed volume to stay in the game. IBM had a strategy to get that with Apple & Motorola (PowerPC started in 1991), but HP did not have anything like that for PA-RISC. DEC might have gotten there if they’d had a more aggressive partner for the lower-end Alpha strategy but the merger killed any chance of that.
Since x86 was rising so fast, it might not be clear why Intel got involved. That goes back to the licensing rights: they couldn’t prevent companies like AMD from competing directly with them. Itanium was the attempt to close off that line of competition legally and they were willing to attack their own product margins to do it.
- ghaff 4y agoI never got anyone from Intel to actually admit to the licensing angle but it was pretty widely speculated about at the time.
- acdha 4y agoGood point. I don’t have any inside information but it was certainly common to characterize it as a long reaction to things like losing that 386 lawsuit.
- ghaff 4y agoYeah. Whether or not everyone was smart enough to never actually write down such a thing in an email or memo, you know there were execs who were keenly aware of this and, even if not the deciding factor, presumably helped influence the decision.