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When I talk with people about this, there are some people like yourself just don't get what the big fuss is. For me, I see the challenge as being trying to dir

When I talk with people about this, there are some people like yourself just don't get what the big fuss is. For me, I see the challenge as being trying to direct their eyes (metaphorically) to see for the first time that there's something that's a key part of the world that they'd previously missed, that has no explanation on the materialist view. > they will accept what they call "micro evolution", but somehow thing that "macro evolution" is impossible > ... > It seems like people imagine toy physicalist model of a brain and can't see how blueness can ever appear. Human imagination, by and large, can't really think well about big numbers This isn't a problem of scale. There is nothing on the physicalist's story, either at the smallest end or the biggest that carries a whiff of being anything relevant. What is it you had in mind as being the seed from which big things may grow at scale? That is, the 'micro evolution' of this discussion. > The examples I brought up you are willing to concede might be fully explained on materialist grounds, but hold out that experiences themselves are categorically different. The things I have in mind as needing explaining aren't fully or even partially explainable on materialist grounds. What I was pointing out is that whether you're a materialist, idealist, or dualist, you're going to agree to the claim that there is a correlation between the mental and the physical. E.g., we present an image of just the right sort, and now someone thinks they're seeing curved lines when in fact the lines are straight. That is all I said -- just a correlation, nothing more. > Why can't the feeling of fear simply be neural state of where, say, heart rate is elevated, adrenaline levels are high, accompanied by activation of piloerection muscles? What evidence is there that it requires anything more than this to be experienced as fear? This sounds similar to identity theory, a view with a strong pedigree, and a view that I think is one of the materialist's best options here. The problem I have is that it completely misses the actual thing I care about. You can talk about heart rates, adrenaline levels, activation of piloerection muscles, etc, but none of these things contain in them even the seed of the thing I really care about: an explanation for the phenomenology. What is this phenomenology? I know I can experience blueness under such and such a condition, but what is this 'blueness' thing itself? In all your talk about these things, there is no mention of the most important part, the phenomenology/experience. It's completely missing! > The resulting state is perceived as a pleasing shade of blue This is what I want to know more about -- 'perceived'. We both agree about the correlation facts: which physical changes result in which experiences/perceptions/phenomenology. But what I want to know about is how does physical stuff have any kind of perception at all? Phenomenology like smells, tastes, feeling happy, pain -- these things are not found in purely physical descriptions of the world, not at the smallest level nor at the largest. They are nowhere. All your talk is talk about muscles, neurons, hearts, etc, and I don't see even the shadow of phenomenology there. I want to know about 'blueness' itself, and all you've given me is neurons and cones and so forth -- just the story about the correlation.

bondarchuk 4y ago
>When I talk with people about this, there are some people like yourself just don't get what the big fuss is. For me, I see the challenge as being trying to direct their eyes (metaphorically) to see for the first time that there's something that's a key part of the world that they'd previously missed, that has no explanation on the materialist view. For those of us who have also gone the naive materialism > some kind of non-materialism route, but then took another step into well-supported materialism or unavoidable rejection of all non-materialism, this is a tedious way of arguing. You run the risk of dismissing some good arguments for materialism without really considering them, because you think you can just reply "but you haven't really explained the blue-ness of blue" to everything, expecting that people will agree with you once they finally really consider the elusive blueness of blue. But the best arguments for materialism aren't of the type "the mind is material and here's how", but more like "even if we don't know how the mind is material, it must be so for xyz reason", i.e. non-constructive proofs.
- Winsaucerer 4y ago
  One person's modus ponens is another person's modus tollens. I move from the certainty that there is something here that needs explaining ('blueness') that cannot be here if materialism is true, to the conclusion that materialism is false. You perhaps move from the certainty that materialism is true (or some other premise) to the conclusion that this thing ('blueness') doesn't exist or must have an explanation. In a good faith discussion, there are at least two parties, each trying to convince the other that they are wrong. Since the discussion is in good faith, each should also be open to the possibility they've missed something they hadn't considered before (perhaps some information they lacked, or a connection between ideas that they'd previously missed). Thus far I've been trying to argue against materialism. When it comes instead to the topic of you convincing me that materialism is true, I find it hard to see any possible path for that to happen without first identifying this thing ('blueness'), and then either showing me where it is in the materialist picture, or explaining it away. As an idealist, when it comes to talk about the physical world, I explain it away -- I deny that there is any genuine mind-independent physical world. Part of that 'explaining away' includes an explanation of our experiences as of a physical world, and an explanation for why our talk about physical things still makes sense. For my part, without exaggeration, it seems to me as if physicalism talks about everything except the largest and most important thing the room. And so I think that I can't really be blamed for retorting "you haven't really explained the blue-ness of blue" if you haven't. I need to be able to see how materialism can make sense of it if I'm to consider changing my view. Without it, I just can't see a bridge from where I am to there.

bondarchuk 4y ago

>When I talk with people about this, there are some people like yourself just don't get what the big fuss is. For me, I see the challenge as being trying to direct their eyes (metaphorically) to see for the first time that there's something that's a key part of the world that they'd previously missed, that has no explanation on the materialist view. For those of us who have also gone the naive materialism > some kind of non-materialism route, but then took another step into well-supported materialism or unavoidable rejection of all non-materialism, this is a tedious way of arguing. You run the risk of dismissing some good arguments for materialism without really considering them, because you think you can just reply "but you haven't really explained the blue-ness of blue" to everything, expecting that people will agree with you once they finally really consider the elusive blueness of blue. But the best arguments for materialism aren't of the type "the mind is material and here's how", but more like "even if we don't know how the mind is material, it must be so for xyz reason", i.e. non-constructive proofs.

Winsaucerer 4y ago
One person's modus ponens is another person's modus tollens. I move from the certainty that there is something here that needs explaining ('blueness') that cannot be here if materialism is true, to the conclusion that materialism is false. You perhaps move from the certainty that materialism is true (or some other premise) to the conclusion that this thing ('blueness') doesn't exist or must have an explanation. In a good faith discussion, there are at least two parties, each trying to convince the other that they are wrong. Since the discussion is in good faith, each should also be open to the possibility they've missed something they hadn't considered before (perhaps some information they lacked, or a connection between ideas that they'd previously missed). Thus far I've been trying to argue against materialism. When it comes instead to the topic of you convincing me that materialism is true, I find it hard to see any possible path for that to happen without first identifying this thing ('blueness'), and then either showing me where it is in the materialist picture, or explaining it away. As an idealist, when it comes to talk about the physical world, I explain it away -- I deny that there is any genuine mind-independent physical world. Part of that 'explaining away' includes an explanation of our experiences as of a physical world, and an explanation for why our talk about physical things still makes sense. For my part, without exaggeration, it seems to me as if physicalism talks about everything except the largest and most important thing the room. And so I think that I can't really be blamed for retorting "you haven't really explained the blue-ness of blue" if you haven't. I need to be able to see how materialism can make sense of it if I'm to consider changing my view. Without it, I just can't see a bridge from where I am to there.