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> The system is designed to have a backup, standby system, which unfortunately, runs the exact same code. At Boeing, the backup system runs on a different CPU
by WalterBright 4y ago
> The system is designed to have a backup, standby system, which unfortunately, runs the exact same code.
At Boeing, the backup system runs on a different CPU architecture, with a different program design, a different programming language, and a different team that isn't allowed to talk with the team on the other path.
- mrtksn 4y agoVery interesting, considering what happened with MCAS.
- peterhunt 4y agoThis is super interesting. Is there anywhere I can read more about this?
- sumthinprofound 4y agohttps://militaryembedded.com/avionics/computers/optimizing-reliability-dissimilar-redundant-architectures https://militaryembedded.com/avionics/computers/optimizing-r...
- WalterBright 4y agohttps://www.digitalmars.com/articles/b39.html https://www.digitalmars.com/articles/b39.html https://www.digitalmars.com/articles/b40.html https://www.digitalmars.com/articles/b40.html
- namaria 4y agoThen they go and make a single failure prone sensor capable of overriding pilots' control of flight surfaces.
- WalterBright 4y agoActually, the electric thumb trim switches overrode MCAS. This is why the Lion Air crew managed to restore normal trim 25 times. The Egypt Air did twice.
- namaria 4y ago> restore ... 25 times Yeah that's not restoring.
- WalterBright 4y agoYou can make up your own terminology as you please, but the normal trim position was restored because the thumb switches overrode MCAS commands. The mistake the pilots made was not then turning off the trim system (which also overrides MCAS). The first MCAS incident ended with the pilots restoring trim to normal with the thumb switches a couple times, then turning off the stab trim system, then continuing on and safely arriving at their destination. The media never mentions this.
- namaria 4y agoNo this isn't about semantics. You're trying to tell me a system that brought down 2 airliners isn't that bad because it didn't bring down others. What?
- WalterBright 4y ago> No this isn't about semantics. Inventing your own meanings for words in order to advance an argument is a waste of time for you and me. > You're trying to tell me a system that brought down 2 airliners isn't that bad because it didn't bring down others. I'm saying that pilot error was a contributing cause to the two crashes, and the media narrative that the pilots could not have saved the situation is incorrect. Boeing even sent out an Emergency Airworthiness Directive to all MAX pilots after the first crash, detailing the two step recovery procedure (restore normal trim with the thumb switches, then turn it off). The EA pilots did not do that. There were numerous causes of the accident that all had to combine to result in the crash. One of the causes was the single path design of the MCAS system. All of the causes needed to be addressed.
- namaria 4y ago