4 ms·

There’s no way you can project into the psychology of such a moment with the confidence you exhibit in this comment. Joke? Thoughtless hyperbole? Political ax

There’s no way you can project into the psychology of such a moment with the confidence you exhibit in this comment. Joke? Thoughtless hyperbole? Political ax to grind? Come on.

arethuza 4y ago
I think you are being a bit harsh. It's certainly an interesting counterfactual to consider how the US would react, and SAC in particular, to the exploding of a hydrogen bomb in the North Carolina. Launching a full retaliatory response (and there was only one plan) certainly seems like something that might have happened - probably because they would genuinely believe it was an attack.
stephen_g 4y ago
How much have you read about Curtis LeMay? His life ambition as a General did really seem to be to find any excuse to nuke another country… Quotes of his and anecdotes I’ve read from people who worked around him at the time, it really did seem to the point of being unhinged… So I don’t see it as such a ridiculous idea that such an accident might not have been a convenient excuse to bomb the Soviets…
deleted 4y ago
[deleted]
trgn 4y ago
Why can it not just be hyperbole, a stylistic choice? This is all just internet discussion, with some speculation and exaggeration for color. Why do we need to equivocate in a discussion on events from three generations? Some guy/gal wonders what would have happened, another guy/gal gives a concise clear answer. It's all good.
Spooky23 4y ago
If you read about RAND and Air Force policy at the time in general, and LeMay’s beliefs specifically, it’s a very real likelihood. The dude wasn’t parodied in Dr. Strangelove for nothing. This stuff is published now and terrifying. LeMay was the architect of the firebombing of Japan and the North Korean population that killed as much as 20% of the population. Applying air power to kill until capitulation was the basis of strategy. A common belief among the Air Force leadership was that nuclear weapons were a wasting asset that would be rendered moot once the Soviets were able to build out their arsenal. At the particular point in time, the US had an overwhelming superiority that was shrinking. There was a serious belief the preemptive war was critical while the window of superiority was open. That position was pushed strongly during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Pushback to President Eisenhower’s moves to control planning escalated to the point where Eisenhower demanded compliance or resignation from SAC leaders. Was that all serious or just bluster to scare to Soviets? It could be - fear of an uncontrolled madman might discourage escalation. Fortunately, we didn’t find out.
- arethuza 4y ago
  I believe by 1961 Le May had handed SAC over the General Powers as head of SAC, not exactly a man known for his subtlety: "Restraint? Why are you so concerned with saving their lives? The whole idea is to kill the bastards. At the end of the war if there are two Americans and one Russian left alive, we win!"
  - sillywalk 4y ago
    Afterwards, Professor William Kaufmann from the RAND Corporation, losing his patience, noted: "Well, you'd better make sure that they're a man and a woman." -
- eecc 4y ago
  Was this guy inspiration to Kubrik for his Dr. Strangelove film? If so, which character in particular?
  - moffkalast 4y ago
    Sounds a lot like General Ripper.
    - arethuza 4y ago
      In the excellent (if rather terrifying) The Doomsday Machine: Confessions of a Nuclear War Planner Daniel Ellsberg describes going to see Dr Strangelove and basically concluding that a lot of the movie was pretty realistic - particularly the delegated use of nuclear weapons by a base commander without the approval of the President. This was actually possible for a long time even though publicly it was always said that only the President could authorise the use of nuclear weapons.
      - p_l 4y ago
        Yes. I think as early as Truman or Eisenhower the president would authorise the use with discretion delegated to local commanders, though I think there were some general rules of engagement attached to authorisations.

There’s no way you can project into the psychology of such a moment with the confidence you exhibit in this comment. Joke? Thoughtless hyperbole? Political ax to grind? Come on.

arethuza 4y ago

I think you are being a bit harsh. It's certainly an interesting counterfactual to consider how the US would react, and SAC in particular, to the exploding of a hydrogen bomb in the North Carolina. Launching a full retaliatory response (and there was only one plan) certainly seems like something that might have happened - probably because they would genuinely believe it was an attack.

stephen_g 4y ago

How much have you read about Curtis LeMay? His life ambition as a General did really seem to be to find any excuse to nuke another country… Quotes of his and anecdotes I’ve read from people who worked around him at the time, it really did seem to the point of being unhinged… So I don’t see it as such a ridiculous idea that such an accident might not have been a convenient excuse to bomb the Soviets…

deleted 4y ago

[deleted]

trgn 4y ago

Why can it not just be hyperbole, a stylistic choice? This is all just internet discussion, with some speculation and exaggeration for color. Why do we need to equivocate in a discussion on events from three generations? Some guy/gal wonders what would have happened, another guy/gal gives a concise clear answer. It's all good.

Spooky23 4y ago

If you read about RAND and Air Force policy at the time in general, and LeMay’s beliefs specifically, it’s a very real likelihood. The dude wasn’t parodied in Dr. Strangelove for nothing. This stuff is published now and terrifying. LeMay was the architect of the firebombing of Japan and the North Korean population that killed as much as 20% of the population. Applying air power to kill until capitulation was the basis of strategy. A common belief among the Air Force leadership was that nuclear weapons were a wasting asset that would be rendered moot once the Soviets were able to build out their arsenal. At the particular point in time, the US had an overwhelming superiority that was shrinking. There was a serious belief the preemptive war was critical while the window of superiority was open. That position was pushed strongly during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Pushback to President Eisenhower’s moves to control planning escalated to the point where Eisenhower demanded compliance or resignation from SAC leaders. Was that all serious or just bluster to scare to Soviets? It could be - fear of an uncontrolled madman might discourage escalation. Fortunately, we didn’t find out.

arethuza 4y ago
I believe by 1961 Le May had handed SAC over the General Powers as head of SAC, not exactly a man known for his subtlety: "Restraint? Why are you so concerned with saving their lives? The whole idea is to kill the bastards. At the end of the war if there are two Americans and one Russian left alive, we win!"
- sillywalk 4y ago
  Afterwards, Professor William Kaufmann from the RAND Corporation, losing his patience, noted: "Well, you'd better make sure that they're a man and a woman." -
eecc 4y ago
Was this guy inspiration to Kubrik for his Dr. Strangelove film? If so, which character in particular?
- moffkalast 4y ago
  Sounds a lot like General Ripper.
  - arethuza 4y ago
    In the excellent (if rather terrifying) The Doomsday Machine: Confessions of a Nuclear War Planner Daniel Ellsberg describes going to see Dr Strangelove and basically concluding that a lot of the movie was pretty realistic - particularly the delegated use of nuclear weapons by a base commander without the approval of the President. This was actually possible for a long time even though publicly it was always said that only the President could authorise the use of nuclear weapons.
    - p_l 4y ago
      Yes. I think as early as Truman or Eisenhower the president would authorise the use with discretion delegated to local commanders, though I think there were some general rules of engagement attached to authorisations.