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> And vengeance clearly is a motive in a lot of punishment, or the pushback against treating prisoners nicer or shortening sentences where the evidence shows bo

> And vengeance clearly is a motive in a lot of punishment, or the pushback against treating prisoners nicer or shortening sentences where the evidence shows both works just fine would focus on the evidence rather than the emotions relating to whether prisoners deserve to be treated a certain way. That too can be chalked up to deterrence. If prison were not unpleasant, why would it be a deterrent? Edit: unpleasantness has limits of course. > I'm not remotely compelled by the notion that Frankfurts arguments against PAP makes any difference whatsoever here, because the point is that a strict determinism makes the very concept of moral responsibility meaningless, in that if one accepts determinism then no entity had any ability to deliver another outcome, and the person holding the gun had no more control over the outcome than the gun or the bullet. This isn't the point of the Frankfurt cases. The point was that they are still responsible if they wanted to make that choice, regardless of whether or not they effectively had no other choice in terms of outcomes. That's exactly the case under Compatibilism. > What then makes the person and not the gun or bullet, or any other entity that was a part of the cause and effect chain more morally responsible? The simple fact that the person can learn to do better and make a different choice in the same circumstances in the future, where the bullet and the gun cannot. This is why mental competence is a factor in moral responsibility. Systems with minds that process moral content can and should be held morally responsible.

vidarh 4y ago
> That too can be chalked up to deterrence. If prison were not unpleasant, why would it be a deterrent? Edit: unpleasantness has limits of course. You missed this part: > where the evidence shows both works just fine The evidence is clear that prisons can be far nicer without affecting the deterrence. > This isn't the point of the Frankfurt cases. The point was that they are still responsible if they wanted to make that choice, regardless of whether or not they effectively had no other choice in terms of outcomes. That's exactly the case under Compatibilism. And I'm saying I don't find this compelling at all. It's an utterly idiotic argument in the face of determinism, because them wanting to make the choice in a deterministic interpretation is itself beyond their ability to control. > The simple fact that the person can learn to do better and make a different choice in the same circumstances in the future, where the bullet and the gun cannot. This is why mental competence is a factor in moral responsibility. Systems with minds that process moral content can and should be held morally responsible. In a deterministic interpretation they are learning only in the same way a computer updating a weight in a decision graph or neural network does, so replace the bullet with a program firing a weapon then, which by your description are morally responsible.
- naasking 4y ago
  > And I'm saying I don't find this compelling at all. It's an utterly idiotic argument in the face of determinism, because them wanting to make the choice in a deterministic interpretation is itself beyond their ability to control. But that's irrelevant. There is no "them" beyond the entity that determinism constructed, and the entity that determinism constructed wanted to make that choice, therefore that entity should be held responsible so it learns right from wrong and that it can do better in the future. It's really hard to understand exactly what the issue is. It seems you agree with all of the following: 1. The entity with a functional mind is the proximate cause of the outcome in a long chain of deterministic causes. 2. The entity's mind contains moral content and so understands the moral ramifications of its choice. 3. The entity wanted to make that choice and was not coerced by another entity. 4. Moral blame for wrongdoing and praise for ethical choices shapes future behaviour of entities. Yet you somehow disagree that this process of moral feedback matches how humans apply moral responsibility, and so step 3 matches what we've been calling a "freely willed choice". > In a deterministic interpretation they are learning only in the same way a computer updating a weight in a decision graph or neural network does Yes. > so replace the bullet with a program firing a weapon then, which by your description are morally responsible. If the program is mentally competent just like a human, ie. capable of learning and making decisions considering moral factors like we do, then yes, holding it responsible makes perfect sense. Bullets aren't that. Exactly what holding a firing program responsible means can be different than how we hold humans responsible, but the process by which we assign responsibility is the same.

vidarh 4y ago

> That too can be chalked up to deterrence. If prison were not unpleasant, why would it be a deterrent? Edit: unpleasantness has limits of course. You missed this part: > where the evidence shows both works just fine The evidence is clear that prisons can be far nicer without affecting the deterrence. > This isn't the point of the Frankfurt cases. The point was that they are still responsible if they wanted to make that choice, regardless of whether or not they effectively had no other choice in terms of outcomes. That's exactly the case under Compatibilism. And I'm saying I don't find this compelling at all. It's an utterly idiotic argument in the face of determinism, because them wanting to make the choice in a deterministic interpretation is itself beyond their ability to control. > The simple fact that the person can learn to do better and make a different choice in the same circumstances in the future, where the bullet and the gun cannot. This is why mental competence is a factor in moral responsibility. Systems with minds that process moral content can and should be held morally responsible. In a deterministic interpretation they are learning only in the same way a computer updating a weight in a decision graph or neural network does, so replace the bullet with a program firing a weapon then, which by your description are morally responsible.

naasking 4y ago
> And I'm saying I don't find this compelling at all. It's an utterly idiotic argument in the face of determinism, because them wanting to make the choice in a deterministic interpretation is itself beyond their ability to control. But that's irrelevant. There is no "them" beyond the entity that determinism constructed, and the entity that determinism constructed wanted to make that choice, therefore that entity should be held responsible so it learns right from wrong and that it can do better in the future. It's really hard to understand exactly what the issue is. It seems you agree with all of the following: 1. The entity with a functional mind is the proximate cause of the outcome in a long chain of deterministic causes. 2. The entity's mind contains moral content and so understands the moral ramifications of its choice. 3. The entity wanted to make that choice and was not coerced by another entity. 4. Moral blame for wrongdoing and praise for ethical choices shapes future behaviour of entities. Yet you somehow disagree that this process of moral feedback matches how humans apply moral responsibility, and so step 3 matches what we've been calling a "freely willed choice". > In a deterministic interpretation they are learning only in the same way a computer updating a weight in a decision graph or neural network does Yes. > so replace the bullet with a program firing a weapon then, which by your description are morally responsible. If the program is mentally competent just like a human, ie. capable of learning and making decisions considering moral factors like we do, then yes, holding it responsible makes perfect sense. Bullets aren't that. Exactly what holding a firing program responsible means can be different than how we hold humans responsible, but the process by which we assign responsibility is the same.