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> You say you disagree, but what you describe is not what I meant. My point is exactly to argue that if people could not have acted differently, punishing peopl

> You say you disagree, but what you describe is not what I meant. My point is exactly to argue that if people could not have acted differently, punishing people for the sake of causing them suffering in retribution rather than for another purpose such as rehabilitation or deterrence is no morally different than enacting the same on someone who had not carried out a crime. If it wasn't clear, I was disagreeing that "punishment as vengeance" is the primary motive for punitive justice, while pointing out some grounds typically used to justify it (deterrence mainly). I think reducing punitive justice to vengeance is largely a strawman. Furthermore, I'll just note that Fankfurt refuted the principle of alternate possibilities decades ago, so I don't find this particular quality you ascribe to free will meaningful.

sokoloff 4y ago
I think you read "punishment as vengeance" quite differently from how I read it. I read "as" as "for the purpose of". With that reading, "Punishment as vengeance" would be undesirable if people's actions were pre-determined. "Punishment as deterrence" would still be desirable (via whatever mechanism allowed for a deterrence effect to exist in a world where actions were pre-determined).
- vidarh 4y ago
  Yes, this is exactly it.
vidarh 4y ago
> If it wasn't clear, I was disagreeing that "punishment as vengeance" is the primary motive for punitive justice, while pointing out some grounds typically used to justify it (deterrence mainly). I think reducing punitive justice to vengeance is largely a strawman. I did not say it was the primary motive for punitive justice. I said using punishments for vengeance would be unreasonable. And vengeance clearly is a motive in a lot of punishment, or the pushback against treating prisoners nicer or shortening sentences where the evidence shows both works just fine would focus on the evidence rather than the emotions relating to whether prisoners deserve to be treated a certain way. > Furthermore, I'll just note that Fankfurt refuted the principle of alternate possibilities decades ago, so I don't find this particular quality you ascribe to free will meaningful. I'm not remotely compelled by the notion that Frankfurts arguments against PAP makes any difference whatsoever here, because the point is that a strict determinism makes the very concept of moral responsibility meaningless, in that if one accepts determinism then no entity had any ability to deliver another outcome, and the person holding the gun had no more control over the outcome than the gun or the bullet. What then makes the person and not the gun or bullet, or any other entity that was a part of the cause and effect chain more morally responsible? Moral responsibility to me rests with a minimum the possibility of choice as a starting point, and I reject that there's any evidence to suggest such a possibility exists. Finding someone responsible in the abstract sense and for the sake of considering whether a deterrent or rehabilitation is necessary for the sake of wider society is fine, with the caveat that many entities and events can have a causal responsibility of various degrees and if we genuinely care about this we'd more often look past the individual that is the proximate sentient cause and to e.g. addressing underlying contributing societal conditions. This, to me, is another piece of evidence that the concern is often vengeance rather than deterrence. Seeking to assign a moral responsibility for the sake of blame or vengeance, on the other hand, would to me in itself be immoral. Doesn't mean I'm immune to assigning responsibility - we're wired to do so and the illusion of free will is strong and it's hard to see past it.
- naasking 4y ago
  > And vengeance clearly is a motive in a lot of punishment, or the pushback against treating prisoners nicer or shortening sentences where the evidence shows both works just fine would focus on the evidence rather than the emotions relating to whether prisoners deserve to be treated a certain way. That too can be chalked up to deterrence. If prison were not unpleasant, why would it be a deterrent? Edit: unpleasantness has limits of course. > I'm not remotely compelled by the notion that Frankfurts arguments against PAP makes any difference whatsoever here, because the point is that a strict determinism makes the very concept of moral responsibility meaningless, in that if one accepts determinism then no entity had any ability to deliver another outcome, and the person holding the gun had no more control over the outcome than the gun or the bullet. This isn't the point of the Frankfurt cases. The point was that they are still responsible if they wanted to make that choice, regardless of whether or not they effectively had no other choice in terms of outcomes. That's exactly the case under Compatibilism. > What then makes the person and not the gun or bullet, or any other entity that was a part of the cause and effect chain more morally responsible? The simple fact that the person can learn to do better and make a different choice in the same circumstances in the future, where the bullet and the gun cannot. This is why mental competence is a factor in moral responsibility. Systems with minds that process moral content can and should be held morally responsible.
  - vidarh 4y ago
    > That too can be chalked up to deterrence. If prison were not unpleasant, why would it be a deterrent? Edit: unpleasantness has limits of course. You missed this part: > where the evidence shows both works just fine The evidence is clear that prisons can be far nicer without affecting the deterrence. > This isn't the point of the Frankfurt cases. The point was that they are still responsible if they wanted to make that choice, regardless of whether or not they effectively had no other choice in terms of outcomes. That's exactly the case under Compatibilism. And I'm saying I don't find this compelling at all. It's an utterly idiotic argument in the face of determinism, because them wanting to make the choice in a deterministic interpretation is itself beyond their ability to control. > The simple fact that the person can learn to do better and make a different choice in the same circumstances in the future, where the bullet and the gun cannot. This is why mental competence is a factor in moral responsibility. Systems with minds that process moral content can and should be held morally responsible. In a deterministic interpretation they are learning only in the same way a computer updating a weight in a decision graph or neural network does, so replace the bullet with a program firing a weapon then, which by your description are morally responsible.

sokoloff 4y ago

I think you read "punishment as vengeance" quite differently from how I read it. I read "as" as "for the purpose of". With that reading, "Punishment as vengeance" would be undesirable if people's actions were pre-determined. "Punishment as deterrence" would still be desirable (via whatever mechanism allowed for a deterrence effect to exist in a world where actions were pre-determined).

vidarh 4y ago
Yes, this is exactly it.

vidarh 4y ago

> If it wasn't clear, I was disagreeing that "punishment as vengeance" is the primary motive for punitive justice, while pointing out some grounds typically used to justify it (deterrence mainly). I think reducing punitive justice to vengeance is largely a strawman. I did not say it was the primary motive for punitive justice. I said using punishments for vengeance would be unreasonable. And vengeance clearly is a motive in a lot of punishment, or the pushback against treating prisoners nicer or shortening sentences where the evidence shows both works just fine would focus on the evidence rather than the emotions relating to whether prisoners deserve to be treated a certain way. > Furthermore, I'll just note that Fankfurt refuted the principle of alternate possibilities decades ago, so I don't find this particular quality you ascribe to free will meaningful. I'm not remotely compelled by the notion that Frankfurts arguments against PAP makes any difference whatsoever here, because the point is that a strict determinism makes the very concept of moral responsibility meaningless, in that if one accepts determinism then no entity had any ability to deliver another outcome, and the person holding the gun had no more control over the outcome than the gun or the bullet. What then makes the person and not the gun or bullet, or any other entity that was a part of the cause and effect chain more morally responsible? Moral responsibility to me rests with a minimum the possibility of choice as a starting point, and I reject that there's any evidence to suggest such a possibility exists. Finding someone responsible in the abstract sense and for the sake of considering whether a deterrent or rehabilitation is necessary for the sake of wider society is fine, with the caveat that many entities and events can have a causal responsibility of various degrees and if we genuinely care about this we'd more often look past the individual that is the proximate sentient cause and to e.g. addressing underlying contributing societal conditions. This, to me, is another piece of evidence that the concern is often vengeance rather than deterrence. Seeking to assign a moral responsibility for the sake of blame or vengeance, on the other hand, would to me in itself be immoral. Doesn't mean I'm immune to assigning responsibility - we're wired to do so and the illusion of free will is strong and it's hard to see past it.

naasking 4y ago
> And vengeance clearly is a motive in a lot of punishment, or the pushback against treating prisoners nicer or shortening sentences where the evidence shows both works just fine would focus on the evidence rather than the emotions relating to whether prisoners deserve to be treated a certain way. That too can be chalked up to deterrence. If prison were not unpleasant, why would it be a deterrent? Edit: unpleasantness has limits of course. > I'm not remotely compelled by the notion that Frankfurts arguments against PAP makes any difference whatsoever here, because the point is that a strict determinism makes the very concept of moral responsibility meaningless, in that if one accepts determinism then no entity had any ability to deliver another outcome, and the person holding the gun had no more control over the outcome than the gun or the bullet. This isn't the point of the Frankfurt cases. The point was that they are still responsible if they wanted to make that choice, regardless of whether or not they effectively had no other choice in terms of outcomes. That's exactly the case under Compatibilism. > What then makes the person and not the gun or bullet, or any other entity that was a part of the cause and effect chain more morally responsible? The simple fact that the person can learn to do better and make a different choice in the same circumstances in the future, where the bullet and the gun cannot. This is why mental competence is a factor in moral responsibility. Systems with minds that process moral content can and should be held morally responsible.
- vidarh 4y ago
  > That too can be chalked up to deterrence. If prison were not unpleasant, why would it be a deterrent? Edit: unpleasantness has limits of course. You missed this part: > where the evidence shows both works just fine The evidence is clear that prisons can be far nicer without affecting the deterrence. > This isn't the point of the Frankfurt cases. The point was that they are still responsible if they wanted to make that choice, regardless of whether or not they effectively had no other choice in terms of outcomes. That's exactly the case under Compatibilism. And I'm saying I don't find this compelling at all. It's an utterly idiotic argument in the face of determinism, because them wanting to make the choice in a deterministic interpretation is itself beyond their ability to control. > The simple fact that the person can learn to do better and make a different choice in the same circumstances in the future, where the bullet and the gun cannot. This is why mental competence is a factor in moral responsibility. Systems with minds that process moral content can and should be held morally responsible. In a deterministic interpretation they are learning only in the same way a computer updating a weight in a decision graph or neural network does, so replace the bullet with a program firing a weapon then, which by your description are morally responsible.