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> If you agree that the process that led to an action was deterministic, then it's entirely unreasonable to use punishments as vengeance, for example. I disagr

> If you agree that the process that led to an action was deterministic, then it's entirely unreasonable to use punishments as vengeance, for example. I disagree, punishment could still be justified if it were effective at deterring or altering future behavior, particularly if it were more effective than any other alternative. You can make a straightforward utilitarian calculation for this, for example. In any case, the matter of justice is separate from the question of free will. Once you have free will, you still require further assumptions to argue for punitive or restorative justice.

vidarh 4y ago
You say you disagree, but what you describe is not what I meant. My point is exactly to argue that if people could not have acted differently, punishing people for the sake of causing them suffering in retribution rather than for another purpose such as rehabilitation or deterrence is no morally different than enacting the same on someone who had not carried out a crime. > In any case, the matter of justice is separate from the question of free will. Once you have free will, you still require further assumptions to argue for punitive or restorative justice. It is partially separate. I agree that if free will (in the non-compatibilist sense) was possible, it does not automatically justify vengeance. But it's linked in that if free will does not exist, then it is meaningless to assign responsibility in any less abstract sense than we might talk of a piece of code being "responsible" for a crash. Someone might be "responsible" in the sense of being the most proximate cause, but given they could not have chosen differently, inflicting harm on them for the choices they could not have made differently is no morally different than inflicting harm on any other random person who only did the only things they could. To me, then, given I find free will nothing more than an illusion, the near total lack of focus on rehabilitation and minimising harm to prisoners makes our "justice" systems some of the largest organised brutal and immoral criminal enterprises. Most judges have done vastly more immoral harm than anyone they've ever convicted, for example. Of course they could not have chosen differently either, so I don't think punishing them for it would be any better. But changing the system would be (and yes, I do believe that this too is not a free choice, nothing more than cause and effect playing out, giving us an illusion of making decisions we can not make differently)
- naasking 4y ago
  > You say you disagree, but what you describe is not what I meant. My point is exactly to argue that if people could not have acted differently, punishing people for the sake of causing them suffering in retribution rather than for another purpose such as rehabilitation or deterrence is no morally different than enacting the same on someone who had not carried out a crime. If it wasn't clear, I was disagreeing that "punishment as vengeance" is the primary motive for punitive justice, while pointing out some grounds typically used to justify it (deterrence mainly). I think reducing punitive justice to vengeance is largely a strawman. Furthermore, I'll just note that Fankfurt refuted the principle of alternate possibilities decades ago, so I don't find this particular quality you ascribe to free will meaningful.
  - sokoloff 4y ago
    I think you read "punishment as vengeance" quite differently from how I read it. I read "as" as "for the purpose of". With that reading, "Punishment as vengeance" would be undesirable if people's actions were pre-determined. "Punishment as deterrence" would still be desirable (via whatever mechanism allowed for a deterrence effect to exist in a world where actions were pre-determined).
    - vidarh 4y ago
      Yes, this is exactly it.
  - vidarh 4y ago
    > If it wasn't clear, I was disagreeing that "punishment as vengeance" is the primary motive for punitive justice, while pointing out some grounds typically used to justify it (deterrence mainly). I think reducing punitive justice to vengeance is largely a strawman. I did not say it was the primary motive for punitive justice. I said using punishments for vengeance would be unreasonable. And vengeance clearly is a motive in a lot of punishment, or the pushback against treating prisoners nicer or shortening sentences where the evidence shows both works just fine would focus on the evidence rather than the emotions relating to whether prisoners deserve to be treated a certain way. > Furthermore, I'll just note that Fankfurt refuted the principle of alternate possibilities decades ago, so I don't find this particular quality you ascribe to free will meaningful. I'm not remotely compelled by the notion that Frankfurts arguments against PAP makes any difference whatsoever here, because the point is that a strict determinism makes the very concept of moral responsibility meaningless, in that if one accepts determinism then no entity had any ability to deliver another outcome, and the person holding the gun had no more control over the outcome than the gun or the bullet. What then makes the person and not the gun or bullet, or any other entity that was a part of the cause and effect chain more morally responsible? Moral responsibility to me rests with a minimum the possibility of choice as a starting point, and I reject that there's any evidence to suggest such a possibility exists. Finding someone responsible in the abstract sense and for the sake of considering whether a deterrent or rehabilitation is necessary for the sake of wider society is fine, with the caveat that many entities and events can have a causal responsibility of various degrees and if we genuinely care about this we'd more often look past the individual that is the proximate sentient cause and to e.g. addressing underlying contributing societal conditions. This, to me, is another piece of evidence that the concern is often vengeance rather than deterrence. Seeking to assign a moral responsibility for the sake of blame or vengeance, on the other hand, would to me in itself be immoral. Doesn't mean I'm immune to assigning responsibility - we're wired to do so and the illusion of free will is strong and it's hard to see past it.

vidarh 4y ago

You say you disagree, but what you describe is not what I meant. My point is exactly to argue that if people could not have acted differently, punishing people for the sake of causing them suffering in retribution rather than for another purpose such as rehabilitation or deterrence is no morally different than enacting the same on someone who had not carried out a crime. > In any case, the matter of justice is separate from the question of free will. Once you have free will, you still require further assumptions to argue for punitive or restorative justice. It is partially separate. I agree that if free will (in the non-compatibilist sense) was possible, it does not automatically justify vengeance. But it's linked in that if free will does not exist, then it is meaningless to assign responsibility in any less abstract sense than we might talk of a piece of code being "responsible" for a crash. Someone might be "responsible" in the sense of being the most proximate cause, but given they could not have chosen differently, inflicting harm on them for the choices they could not have made differently is no morally different than inflicting harm on any other random person who only did the only things they could. To me, then, given I find free will nothing more than an illusion, the near total lack of focus on rehabilitation and minimising harm to prisoners makes our "justice" systems some of the largest organised brutal and immoral criminal enterprises. Most judges have done vastly more immoral harm than anyone they've ever convicted, for example. Of course they could not have chosen differently either, so I don't think punishing them for it would be any better. But changing the system would be (and yes, I do believe that this too is not a free choice, nothing more than cause and effect playing out, giving us an illusion of making decisions we can not make differently)

naasking 4y ago
> You say you disagree, but what you describe is not what I meant. My point is exactly to argue that if people could not have acted differently, punishing people for the sake of causing them suffering in retribution rather than for another purpose such as rehabilitation or deterrence is no morally different than enacting the same on someone who had not carried out a crime. If it wasn't clear, I was disagreeing that "punishment as vengeance" is the primary motive for punitive justice, while pointing out some grounds typically used to justify it (deterrence mainly). I think reducing punitive justice to vengeance is largely a strawman. Furthermore, I'll just note that Fankfurt refuted the principle of alternate possibilities decades ago, so I don't find this particular quality you ascribe to free will meaningful.
- sokoloff 4y ago
  I think you read "punishment as vengeance" quite differently from how I read it. I read "as" as "for the purpose of". With that reading, "Punishment as vengeance" would be undesirable if people's actions were pre-determined. "Punishment as deterrence" would still be desirable (via whatever mechanism allowed for a deterrence effect to exist in a world where actions were pre-determined).
  - vidarh 4y ago
    Yes, this is exactly it.
- vidarh 4y ago
  > If it wasn't clear, I was disagreeing that "punishment as vengeance" is the primary motive for punitive justice, while pointing out some grounds typically used to justify it (deterrence mainly). I think reducing punitive justice to vengeance is largely a strawman. I did not say it was the primary motive for punitive justice. I said using punishments for vengeance would be unreasonable. And vengeance clearly is a motive in a lot of punishment, or the pushback against treating prisoners nicer or shortening sentences where the evidence shows both works just fine would focus on the evidence rather than the emotions relating to whether prisoners deserve to be treated a certain way. > Furthermore, I'll just note that Fankfurt refuted the principle of alternate possibilities decades ago, so I don't find this particular quality you ascribe to free will meaningful. I'm not remotely compelled by the notion that Frankfurts arguments against PAP makes any difference whatsoever here, because the point is that a strict determinism makes the very concept of moral responsibility meaningless, in that if one accepts determinism then no entity had any ability to deliver another outcome, and the person holding the gun had no more control over the outcome than the gun or the bullet. What then makes the person and not the gun or bullet, or any other entity that was a part of the cause and effect chain more morally responsible? Moral responsibility to me rests with a minimum the possibility of choice as a starting point, and I reject that there's any evidence to suggest such a possibility exists. Finding someone responsible in the abstract sense and for the sake of considering whether a deterrent or rehabilitation is necessary for the sake of wider society is fine, with the caveat that many entities and events can have a causal responsibility of various degrees and if we genuinely care about this we'd more often look past the individual that is the proximate sentient cause and to e.g. addressing underlying contributing societal conditions. This, to me, is another piece of evidence that the concern is often vengeance rather than deterrence. Seeking to assign a moral responsibility for the sake of blame or vengeance, on the other hand, would to me in itself be immoral. Doesn't mean I'm immune to assigning responsibility - we're wired to do so and the illusion of free will is strong and it's hard to see past it.