5 ms·

Sounds like someone read Sam Harris' essay on free will.

pdonis 4y ago
Which has been rebutted by a number of philosophers in the field. See, for example, this by Daniel Dennett: https://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/dennett/papers/reflections_on_free_will.pdf https://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/dennett/papers/reflections_on_...
- gamegoblin 4y ago
  Dennett just redefines free will. He says: > The model of decision making I am proposing has the following feature: when we are faced with an important decision, a consideration-generator whose output is to some degree undetermined, produces a series of considerations, some of which may of course be immediately rejected as irrelevant by the agent (consciously or unconsciously). Those considerations that are selected by the agent as having a more than negligible bearing on the decision then figure in a reasoning process, and if the agent is in the main reasonable, those considerations ultimately serve as predictors and explicators of the agent's final decision. Sam Harris would say that having the "consideration-generator whose output is to some degree undetermined" is exactly what he means when he says we don't have free will. If you can consciously choose from a menu of thoughts, but you don't consciously choose the contents of the menu, is that free will in a meaningful sense? Furthermore, the act of selecting from the menu of decisions is itself another decision. This is the recursive "choosing to choose" I've referred to in comments in this thread. How do you choose to choose? How do you choose to choose to choose? At some point, the recursion must stop at some unconscious decision.
  - pdonis 4y ago
    > Dennett just redefines free will. So what? The fact is that the "free will" you appear to want to talk about does not and cannot exist, whereas the "free will" Dennett is talking about does exist and has important real-world consequences. So, to be blunt, why should I care about your preferred definition? What's the point of going on and on about something that doesn't and can't exist? Who cares? There's a good footnote in Dennett's paper that speaks to this point: ''I'm writing a book on magic," I explain, and I'm asked, "Real magic?" By real magic people mean miracles, thaumaturgical, and supernatural powers. "No," I answer: "Conjuring tricks, not real magic." Real magic, in other words, refers to the magic that is not real, while the magic that is real, that can actually be done, is not real magic. (p42S) -Lee Siegel, Net of Magic I'd rather talk about free will that can actually exist, than complain about free will that doesn't and can't exist. > If you can consciously choose from a menu of thoughts, but you don't consciously choose the menu, is that free will in a meaningful sense? It's certainly better than not being able to choose anything--or worse, being forced to suffer the consequences of the bad choices of others. Dennett makes a comment in one of his books on this topic: "There are very real threats to our freedom, but they are not metaphysical." Telling people that they don't have free will, in real terms, amounts to telling them to suck it up while the evil, predatory people in the world, who know perfectly well that they do have free will and have no compunction about exercising it at others' expense, take all their goodies, instead of choosing to fight back. Sorry, not buying it.
    - chronofar 4y ago
      > So what? The fact is that the "free will" you appear to want to talk about does not and cannot exist, whereas the "free will" Dennett is talking about does exist and has important real-world consequences. So, to be blunt, why should I care about your preferred definition? What's the point of going on and on about something that doesn't and can't exist? Who cares? Because it's a poor rhetorical tactic, one used quite often in this and other topics, that confuses the subject rather than adding clarity and mutual understanding. Redefining the subject of a debate in the middle of such a debate is a recipe for talking past one another (which these two have done at length multiple times and never seem to quite understand how much they're talking past one another, or at least never acknowledge it so as to "win" more) rather than coming to a better understanding. Neither one can be wrong or right because neither really acknowledges the other, they're just sort of talking about related (but different) subjects at the same time using the same term in different ways, to the consternation of passer bys who end up joining one camp or the other not realizing they can easily be in both. > Telling people that they don't have free will, in real terms, amounts to telling them to suck it up while the evil, predatory people in the world, who know perfectly well that they do have free will and have no compunction about exercising it at others' expense, take all their goodies, instead of choosing to fight back. That's not what it tells them at all, and indeed this is a common point of confusion that could be alleviated without all the talking past one another. A better synthesis would be: - Acknowledge one does not directly author one's own thoughts (either by way of the vast literature of neuroscience or simply closely observing the nature of thought) - Acknowledge the vast role of forces outside our direct individual control in our understanding of ourselves and others - Acknowledge our ignorance of full causation of any given thought or action and the scoping differences of emergent systems - Acknowledge regardless of the first two and because of the third at an individual and societal level there is very real meaning to responsibility and attribution of action to a locus of control (be that individual or grouping of individuals) Compatibilism (of which Dennett is a proponent) more or less just says the 4th is actually compatible with the 1st. And that's completely reasonable, but we'd save a lot of time in these debates by taking great pains to acknowledge the difference in scope and context as opposed to arguing which one we want to call "free will."
      - 4y ago
  - naasking 4y ago
    > Dennett just redefines free will. I really detest this "rebuttal", because it assumes some authoritative definition of free will exists. It does not. The whole point of the free will debate is come to an understanding of what free will actually is, that makes sense of our language and moral reasoning around choice and responsibility. Guess what? Sam Harris' definition of free will will (incompatibilism) is inconsistent with how most laypeople seem to reason morally, while Dennett's (Compatibilism) is on the money: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/274892120_Why_Compatibilist_Intuitions_are_not_Mistaken_A_Reply_to_Feltz_and_Millan https://www.researchgate.net/publication/274892120_Why_Compa...
  - taneq 4y ago
    Better to have SOME definition than spend eternity going back and forth with "we DO SO have free will" "nuh-uh we don't" "yuh-uh we do!" "NUH-UH WE DON'T" without ever actually defining what we mean by it, which is how 99% of discussions of free will seem to end up. And then someone says "wait what does this term even mean" and gets piled on with "oh so we're just going to quibble about definitions, are we?"

Which has been rebutted by a number of philosophers in the field. See, for example, this by Daniel Dennett: https://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/dennett/papers/reflections_on_free_will.pdf https://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/dennett/papers/reflections_on_...

gamegoblin 4y ago
Dennett just redefines free will. He says: > The model of decision making I am proposing has the following feature: when we are faced with an important decision, a consideration-generator whose output is to some degree undetermined, produces a series of considerations, some of which may of course be immediately rejected as irrelevant by the agent (consciously or unconsciously). Those considerations that are selected by the agent as having a more than negligible bearing on the decision then figure in a reasoning process, and if the agent is in the main reasonable, those considerations ultimately serve as predictors and explicators of the agent's final decision. Sam Harris would say that having the "consideration-generator whose output is to some degree undetermined" is exactly what he means when he says we don't have free will. If you can consciously choose from a menu of thoughts, but you don't consciously choose the contents of the menu, is that free will in a meaningful sense? Furthermore, the act of selecting from the menu of decisions is itself another decision. This is the recursive "choosing to choose" I've referred to in comments in this thread. How do you choose to choose? How do you choose to choose to choose? At some point, the recursion must stop at some unconscious decision.
- pdonis 4y ago
  > Dennett just redefines free will. So what? The fact is that the "free will" you appear to want to talk about does not and cannot exist, whereas the "free will" Dennett is talking about does exist and has important real-world consequences. So, to be blunt, why should I care about your preferred definition? What's the point of going on and on about something that doesn't and can't exist? Who cares? There's a good footnote in Dennett's paper that speaks to this point: ''I'm writing a book on magic," I explain, and I'm asked, "Real magic?" By real magic people mean miracles, thaumaturgical, and supernatural powers. "No," I answer: "Conjuring tricks, not real magic." Real magic, in other words, refers to the magic that is not real, while the magic that is real, that can actually be done, is not real magic. (p42S) -Lee Siegel, Net of Magic I'd rather talk about free will that can actually exist, than complain about free will that doesn't and can't exist. > If you can consciously choose from a menu of thoughts, but you don't consciously choose the menu, is that free will in a meaningful sense? It's certainly better than not being able to choose anything--or worse, being forced to suffer the consequences of the bad choices of others. Dennett makes a comment in one of his books on this topic: "There are very real threats to our freedom, but they are not metaphysical." Telling people that they don't have free will, in real terms, amounts to telling them to suck it up while the evil, predatory people in the world, who know perfectly well that they do have free will and have no compunction about exercising it at others' expense, take all their goodies, instead of choosing to fight back. Sorry, not buying it.
  - chronofar 4y ago
    > So what? The fact is that the "free will" you appear to want to talk about does not and cannot exist, whereas the "free will" Dennett is talking about does exist and has important real-world consequences. So, to be blunt, why should I care about your preferred definition? What's the point of going on and on about something that doesn't and can't exist? Who cares? Because it's a poor rhetorical tactic, one used quite often in this and other topics, that confuses the subject rather than adding clarity and mutual understanding. Redefining the subject of a debate in the middle of such a debate is a recipe for talking past one another (which these two have done at length multiple times and never seem to quite understand how much they're talking past one another, or at least never acknowledge it so as to "win" more) rather than coming to a better understanding. Neither one can be wrong or right because neither really acknowledges the other, they're just sort of talking about related (but different) subjects at the same time using the same term in different ways, to the consternation of passer bys who end up joining one camp or the other not realizing they can easily be in both. > Telling people that they don't have free will, in real terms, amounts to telling them to suck it up while the evil, predatory people in the world, who know perfectly well that they do have free will and have no compunction about exercising it at others' expense, take all their goodies, instead of choosing to fight back. That's not what it tells them at all, and indeed this is a common point of confusion that could be alleviated without all the talking past one another. A better synthesis would be: - Acknowledge one does not directly author one's own thoughts (either by way of the vast literature of neuroscience or simply closely observing the nature of thought) - Acknowledge the vast role of forces outside our direct individual control in our understanding of ourselves and others - Acknowledge our ignorance of full causation of any given thought or action and the scoping differences of emergent systems - Acknowledge regardless of the first two and because of the third at an individual and societal level there is very real meaning to responsibility and attribution of action to a locus of control (be that individual or grouping of individuals) Compatibilism (of which Dennett is a proponent) more or less just says the 4th is actually compatible with the 1st. And that's completely reasonable, but we'd save a lot of time in these debates by taking great pains to acknowledge the difference in scope and context as opposed to arguing which one we want to call "free will."
    - 4y ago
- naasking 4y ago
  > Dennett just redefines free will. I really detest this "rebuttal", because it assumes some authoritative definition of free will exists. It does not. The whole point of the free will debate is come to an understanding of what free will actually is, that makes sense of our language and moral reasoning around choice and responsibility. Guess what? Sam Harris' definition of free will will (incompatibilism) is inconsistent with how most laypeople seem to reason morally, while Dennett's (Compatibilism) is on the money: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/274892120_Why_Compatibilist_Intuitions_are_not_Mistaken_A_Reply_to_Feltz_and_Millan https://www.researchgate.net/publication/274892120_Why_Compa...
- taneq 4y ago
  Better to have SOME definition than spend eternity going back and forth with "we DO SO have free will" "nuh-uh we don't" "yuh-uh we do!" "NUH-UH WE DON'T" without ever actually defining what we mean by it, which is how 99% of discussions of free will seem to end up. And then someone says "wait what does this term even mean" and gets piled on with "oh so we're just going to quibble about definitions, are we?"