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A few things to unpack here: - People still do things and decide things, they are just not the conscious author of those actions and decisions - This makes no

A few things to unpack here: - People still do things and decide things, they are just not the conscious author of those actions and decisions - This makes no claims about determinism, the universe could still have e.g. quantum randomness and nothing would change about this statement, as we have no conscious control over that randomness. - This also makes no claims about the morality of punishment/reward. My statement is an "is" statement, and, as I agree with Hume, you can't go from an "is" statement to an "ought" statement.

Viliam1234 4y ago
> you can't go from an "is" statement to an "ought" statement. It's funny when you apply this idea to itself. There may be no path from "is" to "ought", but that doesn't imply we shouldn't make it.
xerxesaa 4y ago
Sounds like someone read Sam Harris' essay on free will.
- pdonis 4y ago
  Which has been rebutted by a number of philosophers in the field. See, for example, this by Daniel Dennett: https://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/dennett/papers/reflections_on_free_will.pdf https://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/dennett/papers/reflections_on_...
  - gamegoblin 4y ago
    Dennett just redefines free will. He says: > The model of decision making I am proposing has the following feature: when we are faced with an important decision, a consideration-generator whose output is to some degree undetermined, produces a series of considerations, some of which may of course be immediately rejected as irrelevant by the agent (consciously or unconsciously). Those considerations that are selected by the agent as having a more than negligible bearing on the decision then figure in a reasoning process, and if the agent is in the main reasonable, those considerations ultimately serve as predictors and explicators of the agent's final decision. Sam Harris would say that having the "consideration-generator whose output is to some degree undetermined" is exactly what he means when he says we don't have free will. If you can consciously choose from a menu of thoughts, but you don't consciously choose the contents of the menu, is that free will in a meaningful sense? Furthermore, the act of selecting from the menu of decisions is itself another decision. This is the recursive "choosing to choose" I've referred to in comments in this thread. How do you choose to choose? How do you choose to choose to choose? At some point, the recursion must stop at some unconscious decision.
    - pdonis 4y ago
      > Dennett just redefines free will. So what? The fact is that the "free will" you appear to want to talk about does not and cannot exist, whereas the "free will" Dennett is talking about does exist and has important real-world consequences. So, to be blunt, why should I care about your preferred definition? What's the point of going on and on about something that doesn't and can't exist? Who cares? There's a good footnote in Dennett's paper that speaks to this point: ''I'm writing a book on magic," I explain, and I'm asked, "Real magic?" By real magic people mean miracles, thaumaturgical, and supernatural powers. "No," I answer: "Conjuring tricks, not real magic." Real magic, in other words, refers to the magic that is not real, while the magic that is real, that can actually be done, is not real magic. (p42S) -Lee Siegel, Net of Magic I'd rather talk about free will that can actually exist, than complain about free will that doesn't and can't exist. > If you can consciously choose from a menu of thoughts, but you don't consciously choose the menu, is that free will in a meaningful sense? It's certainly better than not being able to choose anything--or worse, being forced to suffer the consequences of the bad choices of others. Dennett makes a comment in one of his books on this topic: "There are very real threats to our freedom, but they are not metaphysical." Telling people that they don't have free will, in real terms, amounts to telling them to suck it up while the evil, predatory people in the world, who know perfectly well that they do have free will and have no compunction about exercising it at others' expense, take all their goodies, instead of choosing to fight back. Sorry, not buying it.
      - chronofar 4y ago
        > So what? The fact is that the "free will" you appear to want to talk about does not and cannot exist, whereas the "free will" Dennett is talking about does exist and has important real-world consequences. So, to be blunt, why should I care about your preferred definition? What's the point of going on and on about something that doesn't and can't exist? Who cares? Because it's a poor rhetorical tactic, one used quite often in this and other topics, that confuses the subject rather than adding clarity and mutual understanding. Redefining the subject of a debate in the middle of such a debate is a recipe for talking past one another (which these two have done at length multiple times and never seem to quite understand how much they're talking past one another, or at least never acknowledge it so as to "win" more) rather than coming to a better understanding. Neither one can be wrong or right because neither really acknowledges the other, they're just sort of talking about related (but different) subjects at the same time using the same term in different ways, to the consternation of passer bys who end up joining one camp or the other not realizing they can easily be in both. > Telling people that they don't have free will, in real terms, amounts to telling them to suck it up while the evil, predatory people in the world, who know perfectly well that they do have free will and have no compunction about exercising it at others' expense, take all their goodies, instead of choosing to fight back. That's not what it tells them at all, and indeed this is a common point of confusion that could be alleviated without all the talking past one another. A better synthesis would be: - Acknowledge one does not directly author one's own thoughts (either by way of the vast literature of neuroscience or simply closely observing the nature of thought) - Acknowledge the vast role of forces outside our direct individual control in our understanding of ourselves and others - Acknowledge our ignorance of full causation of any given thought or action and the scoping differences of emergent systems - Acknowledge regardless of the first two and because of the third at an individual and societal level there is very real meaning to responsibility and attribution of action to a locus of control (be that individual or grouping of individuals) Compatibilism (of which Dennett is a proponent) more or less just says the 4th is actually compatible with the 1st. And that's completely reasonable, but we'd save a lot of time in these debates by taking great pains to acknowledge the difference in scope and context as opposed to arguing which one we want to call "free will."
pdonis 4y ago
> People still do things and decide things, they are just not the conscious author of those actions and decisions Nothing you have said supports this claim. It's perfectly possible for you, the way you are today, to be largely the result of processes you didn't choose and didn't control, and also for you to do things and decide things that you are the conscious author of.
- gamegoblin 4y ago
  If you reflect closely enough on your own thinking process, you will realize that every thought you consciously observe seemingly comes from nowhere. You don't get choose your thoughts. Consider I give you the task "think of a color". You choose blue. How did you choose blue? Did you consider the color lavender? If there are some colors you considered, how did you choose what to consider? And why wasn't lavender one of them? Did you choose not to consider lavender? In reality, I give you the task "think of a color" and some thoughts of colors come into your consciousness via some unconscious process. I think "red, blue, orange, red, oh wait I already thought of red, green, purple, red, why do I keep thinking of red, yellow, hmmmm ok I pick blue I guess." I wasn't deciding which thoughts were going to come into my conscious view. They just appeared. When I had those thoughts of internal monologue about thinking of red so much, I wasn't choosing to have those thoughts either. I was just observing them as they appeared in consciousness. When I settled on blue, I knew I wanted to avoid red because I had thought about it so much. But when did I choose to have that want? I didn't. It just appeared.
  - pdonis 4y ago
    > If you reflect closely enough on your own thinking process, you will realize that every thought you consciously observe seemingly comes from nowhere. You don't get choose your thoughts. Perhaps this matches your experience. It doesn't match mine. Some of my thoughts might work like this, but not all of them. More generally, the fact that none of us get to choose everything about our lives or our mental processes (which as a general claim I agree with, even if I disagree about a specific case as above) does not justify the claim that we choose nothing. You are simply focusing on particular cases and then making invalid generalizations from them.
naasking 4y ago
> as I agree with Hume, you can't go from an "is" statement to an "ought" statement. Nitpick: that's not what Hume said. He did not say that one cannot derive "ought" from "is", he merely pointed out that philosophers had this curious habit of starting arguments making reasonable factual "is" statements, and suddenly transitioning into "ought" statements as if the factual statements entailed these "oughts", but that this was a non-sequitur without justification.

Viliam1234 4y ago

> you can't go from an "is" statement to an "ought" statement. It's funny when you apply this idea to itself. There may be no path from "is" to "ought", but that doesn't imply we shouldn't make it.

xerxesaa 4y ago

Sounds like someone read Sam Harris' essay on free will.

pdonis 4y ago
Which has been rebutted by a number of philosophers in the field. See, for example, this by Daniel Dennett: https://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/dennett/papers/reflections_on_free_will.pdf https://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/dennett/papers/reflections_on_...
- gamegoblin 4y ago
  Dennett just redefines free will. He says: > The model of decision making I am proposing has the following feature: when we are faced with an important decision, a consideration-generator whose output is to some degree undetermined, produces a series of considerations, some of which may of course be immediately rejected as irrelevant by the agent (consciously or unconsciously). Those considerations that are selected by the agent as having a more than negligible bearing on the decision then figure in a reasoning process, and if the agent is in the main reasonable, those considerations ultimately serve as predictors and explicators of the agent's final decision. Sam Harris would say that having the "consideration-generator whose output is to some degree undetermined" is exactly what he means when he says we don't have free will. If you can consciously choose from a menu of thoughts, but you don't consciously choose the contents of the menu, is that free will in a meaningful sense? Furthermore, the act of selecting from the menu of decisions is itself another decision. This is the recursive "choosing to choose" I've referred to in comments in this thread. How do you choose to choose? How do you choose to choose to choose? At some point, the recursion must stop at some unconscious decision.
  - pdonis 4y ago
    > Dennett just redefines free will. So what? The fact is that the "free will" you appear to want to talk about does not and cannot exist, whereas the "free will" Dennett is talking about does exist and has important real-world consequences. So, to be blunt, why should I care about your preferred definition? What's the point of going on and on about something that doesn't and can't exist? Who cares? There's a good footnote in Dennett's paper that speaks to this point: ''I'm writing a book on magic," I explain, and I'm asked, "Real magic?" By real magic people mean miracles, thaumaturgical, and supernatural powers. "No," I answer: "Conjuring tricks, not real magic." Real magic, in other words, refers to the magic that is not real, while the magic that is real, that can actually be done, is not real magic. (p42S) -Lee Siegel, Net of Magic I'd rather talk about free will that can actually exist, than complain about free will that doesn't and can't exist. > If you can consciously choose from a menu of thoughts, but you don't consciously choose the menu, is that free will in a meaningful sense? It's certainly better than not being able to choose anything--or worse, being forced to suffer the consequences of the bad choices of others. Dennett makes a comment in one of his books on this topic: "There are very real threats to our freedom, but they are not metaphysical." Telling people that they don't have free will, in real terms, amounts to telling them to suck it up while the evil, predatory people in the world, who know perfectly well that they do have free will and have no compunction about exercising it at others' expense, take all their goodies, instead of choosing to fight back. Sorry, not buying it.
    - chronofar 4y ago
      > So what? The fact is that the "free will" you appear to want to talk about does not and cannot exist, whereas the "free will" Dennett is talking about does exist and has important real-world consequences. So, to be blunt, why should I care about your preferred definition? What's the point of going on and on about something that doesn't and can't exist? Who cares? Because it's a poor rhetorical tactic, one used quite often in this and other topics, that confuses the subject rather than adding clarity and mutual understanding. Redefining the subject of a debate in the middle of such a debate is a recipe for talking past one another (which these two have done at length multiple times and never seem to quite understand how much they're talking past one another, or at least never acknowledge it so as to "win" more) rather than coming to a better understanding. Neither one can be wrong or right because neither really acknowledges the other, they're just sort of talking about related (but different) subjects at the same time using the same term in different ways, to the consternation of passer bys who end up joining one camp or the other not realizing they can easily be in both. > Telling people that they don't have free will, in real terms, amounts to telling them to suck it up while the evil, predatory people in the world, who know perfectly well that they do have free will and have no compunction about exercising it at others' expense, take all their goodies, instead of choosing to fight back. That's not what it tells them at all, and indeed this is a common point of confusion that could be alleviated without all the talking past one another. A better synthesis would be: - Acknowledge one does not directly author one's own thoughts (either by way of the vast literature of neuroscience or simply closely observing the nature of thought) - Acknowledge the vast role of forces outside our direct individual control in our understanding of ourselves and others - Acknowledge our ignorance of full causation of any given thought or action and the scoping differences of emergent systems - Acknowledge regardless of the first two and because of the third at an individual and societal level there is very real meaning to responsibility and attribution of action to a locus of control (be that individual or grouping of individuals) Compatibilism (of which Dennett is a proponent) more or less just says the 4th is actually compatible with the 1st. And that's completely reasonable, but we'd save a lot of time in these debates by taking great pains to acknowledge the difference in scope and context as opposed to arguing which one we want to call "free will."

pdonis 4y ago

> People still do things and decide things, they are just not the conscious author of those actions and decisions Nothing you have said supports this claim. It's perfectly possible for you, the way you are today, to be largely the result of processes you didn't choose and didn't control, and also for you to do things and decide things that you are the conscious author of.

gamegoblin 4y ago
If you reflect closely enough on your own thinking process, you will realize that every thought you consciously observe seemingly comes from nowhere. You don't get choose your thoughts. Consider I give you the task "think of a color". You choose blue. How did you choose blue? Did you consider the color lavender? If there are some colors you considered, how did you choose what to consider? And why wasn't lavender one of them? Did you choose not to consider lavender? In reality, I give you the task "think of a color" and some thoughts of colors come into your consciousness via some unconscious process. I think "red, blue, orange, red, oh wait I already thought of red, green, purple, red, why do I keep thinking of red, yellow, hmmmm ok I pick blue I guess." I wasn't deciding which thoughts were going to come into my conscious view. They just appeared. When I had those thoughts of internal monologue about thinking of red so much, I wasn't choosing to have those thoughts either. I was just observing them as they appeared in consciousness. When I settled on blue, I knew I wanted to avoid red because I had thought about it so much. But when did I choose to have that want? I didn't. It just appeared.
- pdonis 4y ago
  > If you reflect closely enough on your own thinking process, you will realize that every thought you consciously observe seemingly comes from nowhere. You don't get choose your thoughts. Perhaps this matches your experience. It doesn't match mine. Some of my thoughts might work like this, but not all of them. More generally, the fact that none of us get to choose everything about our lives or our mental processes (which as a general claim I agree with, even if I disagree about a specific case as above) does not justify the claim that we choose nothing. You are simply focusing on particular cases and then making invalid generalizations from them.

naasking 4y ago

> as I agree with Hume, you can't go from an "is" statement to an "ought" statement. Nitpick: that's not what Hume said. He did not say that one cannot derive "ought" from "is", he merely pointed out that philosophers had this curious habit of starting arguments making reasonable factual "is" statements, and suddenly transitioning into "ought" statements as if the factual statements entailed these "oughts", but that this was a non-sequitur without justification.