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With this line of reasoning, no one does or decides anything. We are all simply running out the simulation that was predetermined long before we were born. Even
by Gigachad 4y ago
With this line of reasoning, no one does or decides anything. We are all simply running out the simulation that was predetermined long before we were born. Even if this is true, it's not exactly useful.
We punish people for doing the wrong things, even though they didn't chose to do them, but the act of punishing them makes them less likely to happen. In the same way, we give rewards to people who worked hard even if they didn't "decide" to work hard. Doesn't matter why they decided to work hard, if we just handed out money evenly to everyone, we wouldn't have these hard workers putting the extra effort in.
- gamegoblin 4y agoA few things to unpack here: - People still do things and decide things, they are just not the conscious author of those actions and decisions - This makes no claims about determinism, the universe could still have e.g. quantum randomness and nothing would change about this statement, as we have no conscious control over that randomness. - This also makes no claims about the morality of punishment/reward. My statement is an "is" statement, and, as I agree with Hume, you can't go from an "is" statement to an "ought" statement.
- Viliam1234 4y ago> you can't go from an "is" statement to an "ought" statement. It's funny when you apply this idea to itself. There may be no path from "is" to "ought", but that doesn't imply we shouldn't make it.
- xerxesaa 4y agoSounds like someone read Sam Harris' essay on free will.
- pdonis 4y agoWhich has been rebutted by a number of philosophers in the field. See, for example, this by Daniel Dennett: https://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/dennett/papers/reflections_on_free_will.pdf https://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/dennett/papers/reflections_on_...
- gamegoblin 4y agoDennett just redefines free will. He says: > The model of decision making I am proposing has the following feature: when we are faced with an important decision, a consideration-generator whose output is to some degree undetermined, produces a series of considerations, some of which may of course be immediately rejected as irrelevant by the agent (consciously or unconsciously). Those considerations that are selected by the agent as having a more than negligible bearing on the decision then figure in a reasoning process, and if the agent is in the main reasonable, those considerations ultimately serve as predictors and explicators of the agent's final decision. Sam Harris would say that having the "consideration-generator whose output is to some degree undetermined" is exactly what he means when he says we don't have free will. If you can consciously choose from a menu of thoughts, but you don't consciously choose the contents of the menu, is that free will in a meaningful sense? Furthermore, the act of selecting from the menu of decisions is itself another decision. This is the recursive "choosing to choose" I've referred to in comments in this thread. How do you choose to choose? How do you choose to choose to choose? At some point, the recursion must stop at some unconscious decision.
- pdonis 4y ago> Dennett just redefines free will. So what? The fact is that the "free will" you appear to want to talk about does not and cannot exist, whereas the "free will" Dennett is talking about does exist and has important real-world consequences. So, to be blunt, why should I care about your preferred definition? What's the point of going on and on about something that doesn't and can't exist? Who cares? There's a good footnote in Dennett's paper that speaks to this point: ''I'm writing a book on magic," I explain, and I'm asked, "Real magic?" By real magic people mean miracles, thaumaturgical, and supernatural powers. "No," I answer: "Conjuring tricks, not real magic." Real magic, in other words, refers to the magic that is not real, while the magic that is real, that can actually be done, is not real magic. (p42S) -Lee Siegel, Net of Magic I'd rather talk about free will that can actually exist, than complain about free will that doesn't and can't exist. > If you can consciously choose from a menu of thoughts, but you don't consciously choose the menu, is that free will in a meaningful sense? It's certainly better than not being able to choose anything--or worse, being forced to suffer the consequences of the bad choices of others. Dennett makes a comment in one of his books on this topic: "There are very real threats to our freedom, but they are not metaphysical." Telling people that they don't have free will, in real terms, amounts to telling them to suck it up while the evil, predatory people in the world, who know perfectly well that they do have free will and have no compunction about exercising it at others' expense, take all their goodies, instead of choosing to fight back. Sorry, not buying it.
- pdonis 4y ago> People still do things and decide things, they are just not the conscious author of those actions and decisions Nothing you have said supports this claim. It's perfectly possible for you, the way you are today, to be largely the result of processes you didn't choose and didn't control, and also for you to do things and decide things that you are the conscious author of.
- gamegoblin 4y agoIf you reflect closely enough on your own thinking process, you will realize that every thought you consciously observe seemingly comes from nowhere. You don't get choose your thoughts. Consider I give you the task "think of a color". You choose blue. How did you choose blue? Did you consider the color lavender? If there are some colors you considered, how did you choose what to consider? And why wasn't lavender one of them? Did you choose not to consider lavender? In reality, I give you the task "think of a color" and some thoughts of colors come into your consciousness via some unconscious process. I think "red, blue, orange, red, oh wait I already thought of red, green, purple, red, why do I keep thinking of red, yellow, hmmmm ok I pick blue I guess." I wasn't deciding which thoughts were going to come into my conscious view. They just appeared. When I had those thoughts of internal monologue about thinking of red so much, I wasn't choosing to have those thoughts either. I was just observing them as they appeared in consciousness. When I settled on blue, I knew I wanted to avoid red because I had thought about it so much. But when did I choose to have that want? I didn't. It just appeared.
- pdonis 4y ago> If you reflect closely enough on your own thinking process, you will realize that every thought you consciously observe seemingly comes from nowhere. You don't get choose your thoughts. Perhaps this matches your experience. It doesn't match mine. Some of my thoughts might work like this, but not all of them. More generally, the fact that none of us get to choose everything about our lives or our mental processes (which as a general claim I agree with, even if I disagree about a specific case as above) does not justify the claim that we choose nothing. You are simply focusing on particular cases and then making invalid generalizations from them.
- naasking 4y ago> as I agree with Hume, you can't go from an "is" statement to an "ought" statement. Nitpick: that's not what Hume said. He did not say that one cannot derive "ought" from "is", he merely pointed out that philosophers had this curious habit of starting arguments making reasonable factual "is" statements, and suddenly transitioning into "ought" statements as if the factual statements entailed these "oughts", but that this was a non-sequitur without justification.
- pcthrowaway 4y ago> but the act of punishing them makes them less likely to happen In general, yes. And that's the justifiable for reason for punishing people for crimes. Which is different from saying that they "deserve" it
- rcme 4y agoWhat is your definition of deserve? Google’s definition is: > do something or have or show qualities worthy of (reward or punishment). That seems to fit punishment for committing a crime.
- shiomiru 4y agoI think they mean that punishment's main purpose should not be retaliation but deterrence.
- Gigachad 4y agoIn this way of thinking, no one deserves anything.
- lazyasciiart 4y agoIn general, I think that’s not established to be true at all. Going to prison raises the risk of future crimes, compared to e.g community service.
- sokoloff 4y agoHave randomized controlled trials been held on this point? I think we can all imagine dozens of confounding factors among the people assigned to community service vs prison if the assignment is done via an element of human judgment.
- lazyasciiart 4y agoYes. Here's one, for example: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/229989870_Does_Community_Service_Rehabilitate_better_than_Short-term_Imprisonment_Results_of_a_Controlled_Experiment https://www.researchgate.net/publication/229989870_Does_Comm... This meta-study pulls together RCTs and experimental programs and covers non-custodial (which includes a range of options besides community service) v custodial, and finds them to be at worst equivalent for recidivism https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.4073/csr.2015.1 https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.4073/csr.2015.1
- retrac 4y ago> Even if this is true, it's not exactly useful. While you speak of utility in terms of behaviour, I also question its utility in a philosophical and spiritual sense. Strict determinism (and according lack of free will) has been around since at least the 1600s in more or less its current form. Though we tend to use computer rather than clockwork metaphors for it these days. Precursor concepts, like fates immutable and determined before birth, are truly ancient ideas. As is the notion of the lottery of birth, that any one of us could have been born as someone else. Many, maybe most people, for thousands of years, have been familiar with the idea. Many think it to be true. And yet, it doesn't feel true. I experience life under the delusion that I have free will, that I make my choices. Aside from a few Buddhist-inspired types who claim to free themself from this delusion from time to time, everyone suffers from it. (I am not very skeptical of such claims, but they only manage it as a side-effect of the even more unsettling realization that the self, with its thoughts and decisions, does not exist in the first place. That may be true too, but it sure doesn't feel true most of the time.) What can you actually do with a literally unbelievable truth?
- AstralStorm 4y agoStrict determinism is physically impossible. By physically, I mean you cannot reconcile it with quantum physics. However, the luck we're talking about is not random chance, it is comparable to a set of overlapping games with stacked odds. The result is still a chaotic system, that means it will typically tend to end up in one or more attractor states. This is how both inheritance and culture work. Going against the culture, physical or mental inheritance, or pushing to a different attractor state requires overcoming a vast amount of inertia. Within and without. And sometimes help too. Certain initial states have much more leeway in shaping the particular trajectory one would take than others. And yes, ultimate choice of free will is to roll the dice, try something new or create. Determinism is incompatible with that.
- retrac 4y agoI agree about strict determinism being false. It was more of a tangent off my point. There is a subjective experience of being. We think we have a mind, that acts on the world. Both dualists and monists, of all kinds, experience reality with this feeling, I think. The questions I have are: is this an illusion? Is there a mapping between the subjective being that experiences, the mind on the inside, and the apparent order of events in reality? Would our experienced slice of time and space be different, if we had chosen differently? Could we have? That's how I understand the problem of free will. It seems to be something no one has really figured out. There's all sorts of conjectures. Christians say something like that, through some divine process the soul which is related to our mind, is linked to our body and we are given the choice to act. Monadic materialists say the mind is part of reality through some physical or metaphysical process, and thus we, as in our minds, do at least effect changes on the world. About as convincing as the Christians, in my mind. We can say the mind itself is sort of an illusion, but that's even more irritating, isn't it? Because it doesn't feel like one, at least to me. Maybe I misunderstand the problem and the questions are not properly formed.
- csomar 4y ago> With this line of reasoning, no one does or decides anything. I mean yes. > We are all simply running out the simulation that was predetermined long before we were born. If you believe in Einstein theory, yes. QM is a bit more complicated since there is the possibility you took all the paths that are out there. But let's not get into that? > We punish people for doing the wrong things No, we don't. Most cultures and countries just put them in jail. In modern times, it can be a psychiatric institution. > even though they didn't chose to do them No one care. People also usually don't care much if it's "them" who did these things. > but the act of punishing them makes them less likely to happen No, it doesn't. Crime rates are not determined by the severity of your laws but rather the circumstances of the country, families and culture. See? > we give rewards to people who worked hard No we don't. Reward are distributed most randomly but sometimes through privilege. Few tech and other people make their money by merit. > if we just handed out money evenly to everyone That's communism. It did actually quite well until it collapsed. It seems some countries have a bias for it, while it doesn't work well in others.
- willis936 4y ago"The wrong thing" is not a crime. Society punishes any life move that does not maximize profit. Every little choice can reduce the chance buffer between food and a roof and falling off the cliff.
- username321321 4y agoOn the contrary, if luck decided everything, why shouldn't the luckier reap the rewards of their luck? Pagan religions put a great deal of emphasis on fortune and very little on one's own moral choices. They believed that the fortunate have a moral obligation to rule the unlucky. That's why new emperors were hailed with "Felicior Augusto". Does someone deserve a position of responsibility, say a military command, just because life has been unfair to them? What if you give him a command and his bad luck continues? It would doom not only him, but his soldiers as well. Similarly, why should a fortunate man share his wealth with the less fortunate? If life is just one big casino, would you share your chips with someone in the middle of a losing streak? It's interesting how most modern attempts to redefine morality, in order to supposedly screw it in the favor of the poor, so often end up resurrecting the ethical systems of times and places, where the poor would fight to the death for the entertainment of the rich.
- gamegoblin 4y agoI think the notion of "everything is luck" and "what should we do about that" are totally orthogonal. One is an "is" statement, the other is an "ought" statement, and it is entirely unclear how to go from one to the other (and I don't attempt to do so). Referring to https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Is%E2%80%93ought_problem https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Is%E2%80%93ought_problem
- vintermann 4y ago> They believed that the fortunate have a moral obligation to rule the unlucky. Hardly. It's just that they can, and it feels good to rule over others, so why shouldn't they? You aren't really a "bad pagan" if you decide to do otherwise. You're just possibly a foolish one. The only "pagan sin" is hubris, thinking that you're more powerful than you are and gaping over too much. I agree that there's a tendency to recreate all that stuff.
- mbfg 4y ago>> With this line of reasoning, no one does or decides anything. We are all simply running out the simulation that was predetermined long before we were born. Even if this is true, it's not exactly useful. I don't see any reason to believe what you say is wrong. Is there evidence we have free will? It's hard to find in physics. Could i have done differently that what i did? I don't think so. I don't control my thoughts, i don't think them before i think them. I'm not sure how i could do differently.
- LoganDark 4y agoI personally choose to believe that "free will" is actually just a desire to do what you want, and exercise change for that purpose. Maybe that was predetermined by the simulation (as all things are), but people have varying degrees of willingness to reach for their desires, especially if they would have to proactively create change in their lives in order to do so. Even if everything you do was predetermined by the simulation... the simulation is simulating you, so even inside it, you will do what you would have done otherwise. -Emily
- haswell 4y agoWhat is desire, and where does it come from?
- LoganDark 4y agoDesire is chemicals in the brain, I think. I would say the following argument proves too much: if desire is worthless because it's part of the simulation, and therefore any impression of "free will" is not even free because your ability to express said "free will" was decided upon by the simulation and not yourself... then nothing is worth anything and you have to back up (unless you want to become a nihilist). -Emily
- mbfg 4y agodesire is not at all worthless, it's very important, its just that i find it hard to claim that my conscious self is the cause of that desire.
- vintermann 4y agoIt is useful. Robert Owen said man cannot be a proper subject for praise and blame. If he was right then of course that has implications. Isn't it suspicious if you used to use a desert argument ("we pay this guy because he chose to work hard and so deserves it"), then you move to a utility argument ("we pay this guy because paying people like him more leads to good for all of us"), and miraculously the right payment works out to exactly the same?