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For the vast majority of threat models, having someone you have a little bit of rapport with watch your locked computer is perfectly adequate. Realistically the

For the vast majority of threat models, having someone you have a little bit of rapport with watch your locked computer is perfectly adequate. Realistically the bigger threat is someone stealing the laptop to sell, not as part of some targeted assault on your security. For that not to be adequate, your threat model needs to include field agents establishing a false sense of trust through some relationship, then leveraging that into an attack physical security. At some point you're getting really close to the "It's easier to bribe/blackmail/kidnap you" territory.

pixl97 4y ago
In some businesses the risk of being blackmailed is high, but it also comes at significant risk of the blackmailed working as a double agent. If the affected agent has no idea they've been compromised it is unlikely they will change their behaviors in any manner. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack I mean in the case of desktop hardware, it's exceptionally easy to inline a USB key capture dongle.