2 ms·
I'll grant some small part of your response, as empirical evidence does show that people systematically mis-estimate values (risks, large sums of money, etc.) t
by CWuestefeld 15y ago
I'll grant some small part of your response, as empirical evidence does show that people systematically mis-estimate values (risks, large sums of money, etc.) that are either extremely small or extremely large. However...
monkeys that habitually make irrational choices that are not the best or even harmful to themselves and others around them
First, let's throw out the "monkeys" bit. Again, you're falling back to a style of argumentation designed to inflame emotions, but in fact adds no rational content to the discourse. If this were a debate competition, I'd ding you for it.
But more importantly, your assertion that the choices are not the best, etc., is unknowable by you -- yet you assert it as fact. These discussions always seem to assume that all actors ought to be working from the same set of values, yet that's clearly not the case. For example, if I choose a "live fast, die young" lifestyle, the choices I'll make -- BASE jumping, etc. -- may seem absurdly risky to you, but in fact, they really do bring to me a greater return than the alternative.
You can learn a lot more about this in Mises' Human Action. He shows how each person's actions can only be viewed as a black box, the rest of us have no way to gainsay them (nor right to do so, but that's a different discussion). Indeed, sometimes a person's motivations aren't even known to that person himself, but that does not prove that they're not there. Also, even when people are wrong in their weighing of the costs and benefits, that in itself is a rational action, because the cost of gaining greater knowledge or doing deeper analysis itself skews the computation (kinda like Heisenberg uncertainty, in Economics, I guess).
What's worse is that the idea that people do not act in their own best interest is generally attended by the conclusion that there needs to be some authority to watch over us. It's clearly bad to try to fit all of us into boxes of the same size and shape, but it's unavoidable from this approach. But more to the point, it doesn't actually provide a solution, because if we postulate that we're unable to correctly make our own decisions, then one must also conclude (in spades!) that nobody will be able to correctly make decisions for another person (or large groups of them).
And (in a bit of admitted snark -- I'll let myself get away with it because I'm labeling it as such) there's every reason to believe, judging by their own lives, that those people who our system has making these decisions for the masses are doing a worse job than the individuals would themselves.