Most mind-uploading futurism seems to be driven by the idea that we'll achieve digital immortality--at some point before or just after death, we'll transfer our

Most mind-uploading futurism seems to be driven by the idea that we'll achieve digital immortality--at some point before or just after death, we'll transfer our minds to a simulated being in a simulated world, or perhaps a robot in the real world. And in that light I completely agree with what you're saying--digi-me would not be the same consciousness as bio-me. There's a trivial proof of this--suppose bio-me doesn't conveniently die, and my consciousness is merely cloned. There are now two inarguably distinct beings who just happen to share the same mental history until the "fork". But we can take this thought experiment even further--how do I know that the me who woke up this morning is the same one who went to sleep last night? Perhaps my consciousness "dies" every night and a new "instance" inhabits my body when I wake up. My sense of personal continuity comes from my memories of always being me, not from uninterrupted consciousness. To take it even further, perhaps this happens from one moment to the next while I'm awake. How would I know? In light of that thought experiment, perhaps there's no such thing as a continuous me. That would mean that digi-me is just as legitimately "me" as bio-me, even if we exist at the same time and argue about which of us is the true me. This is not my personal belief--I share your gut feeling that there's an immutable "real me". But I have to acknowledge that perhaps this is only because my brain is arranged so that it's impossible for me to feel otherwise.