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Am I alone in thinking even its Chrome implementation is a massive security risk? The fact that users can grant any webpage COMPLETE control of a USB attached d

Am I alone in thinking even its Chrome implementation is a massive security risk? The fact that users can grant any webpage COMPLETE control of a USB attached device is astonishing. Live webpages shouldn't be able to access this feature - can't wait for fake jailbreak and backup services to start cropping up.

ocdtrekkie 4y ago
It's an incredibly bad idea, at work for the one Chromium browser we permit (Edge), we have to use policies to block this and several dozen major security vulnerabilities that exist solely because they make cool Google I/O demos.
- taviso 4y ago
  Why is it a security vulnerability? I really want WebUSB to succeed, it could be a cross platform way to eliminate random executables from shady websites. The idea is that your browser can mediate and scope access to specific devices. There are some edge cases where Web USB is equally as dangerous as the status quo, but in the common case it is far better and never worse. The situation today is you buy a random USB gadget (e.g. a fitness tracker), but you can't use it without also installing the accompanying software/drivers. That effectively gives the manufacturer complete control of your computer. All you really wanted was for them to sync your step count, but you have no option but to give them complete remote access to your computer. With Web USB you can allow vendor.com to access device 1234:5678 only, and revoke that access whenever you like. Sure, maybe you could be tricked into clicking through all the confirmations and granting https://fakevendor.com https://fakevendor.com access to a device. That could be bad - but no worse (and probably a lot better) than being tricked into downloading and running fakedriver.exe. (disclaimer: I work for Google, have nothing to do with Chrome)
  - ocdtrekkie 4y ago
    I explain in a neighboring comment: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=34563795 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=34563795 It's crucially important that Googlers are divorced of the belief a permission popup on the top of the screen is adequate indication of intent/informed consent. People approve these all the time without understanding what it's for. Installing software is, at minimum, a very distinct action which users are aware of doing. Generally, they install a limited number of applications for specific purposes, whereas they may visit literally thousands of websites a month. Pretending these two things can be interchangeable is silly. I am not entirely opposed to being able to use a browser as the UI for an activity like this, but it should require a higher bar to activate it for a specific server to talk to a specific device. Even web extension installs remain far too easy to not be maliciously abused widely. (Chrome extensions remain the primary malware I see in the wild.) EDIT: The HN gods have me rate limited so hopefully you'll see my response here to the below comment: Installing software is a complex process. It entails navigating to the correct site, locating a download, fishing it out of the downloads bar (many seniors cannot find this, by the way, it absolutely baffles them), opening it, usually acknowledging that you know it's an executable program, and then navigating the install wizard. A software engineer would reasonably believe simplifying this is a good thing, but as noted, people regularly accept malware into their browser and do not even consciously realize they did it because it involves a single click. People absolutely get misled into installing bad software, but they always know they actually did it, it's impossible to follow that chain without having some idea you're doing something. Accepting malware isn't the answer, understanding people is. There is no technical solution for security, because it's a human problem.
    - taviso 4y ago
      Why is installing software a distinct action, but granting device access not? Malware is a huge ongoing problem, which suggests this distinction doesn't really exist. I think we have to accept that there is no way to perfectly eliminate social engineering without also locking down legitimate access to devices. There will be some percentage of users who will click through all the warnings and confirmation prompts, just like there is some percentage of users that will run malware. That's bad, but you're letting the perfect be the enemy of the good. Your argument could also apply to ssh, a small number of users could be socially engineered into sharing their id_rsa. This happens, we often find them checked into github, for example. Does this mean we should go back to telnet? No, for the vast majority of cases ssh is a huge imperfect improvement. Likewise, in the vast majority of cases, Web USB is a huge imperfect improvement over installing drivers.
      - ocdtrekkie 4y ago
        So the issue is we are talking about different dimensions of improvement. I concede that WebUSB is better sandboxed than executing a driver installer (likely running as admin or root) in terms of the blast radius. However, WebUSB is catastrophically worse than an installer in terms of the ability of the infection to occur in the first place. Both because of the aforementioned difficulty of user process of software installation, as well as the additional checks the OS and/or third party antivirus does, as opposed to Google's fairly limited abuse detection capabilities (just Safe Browsing in WebUSB's case, I imagine?). This is a problem I have talked about many times before regarding Google's security outlook. On Project Zero there's a ton of interesting and surely exciting work into novel ways to compromise systems. ...That work has basically no bearing on improving security for the billions of users who will never be targeted in such a niche technical way. Real world compromise tends to just be social engineering people into doing what Google explicitly permits websites to do. You could remove malicious activity from a billion users right now by simply... deleting the Notifications API from Chrome, which is principally used to spam ads. Because people mash that allow button all the time, every time. I'd best guess I see ten times the malware in Chrome (either hijacker extensions delivered by the Chrome Web Store, push notifications from random adult websites, or both) than actual installed malicious software on a given Windows machine. And this is fixable! Google could fix this with WebUSB and make a net positive all around! Likely by redesigning permission granting in the browser to require deeper user intent. But it would require a fundamental change in how Google understands and perceives security (and it'd likely reduce engagement stats for some features, which various teams would fight), and I've been beating this drum for several years and I don't really expect it to change. (In fact, one specific change I could recommend: I think APIs like WebUSB, as well as the Notifications API and similar, should probably be completely blocked unless you install a PWA. It's not as much process as a Windows software install, but it's a clear gate to allowing a site more ability, and installing and removing apps is a far easier concept to explain to users than navigating the site privacy settings.)
  - saagarjha 4y ago
    It depends on your threat model. “A trusted party ships high-quality drivers” is a good model but bundling it with the browser, where you run all sorts of code from third parties, can be difficult from the perspective of exposed attack surface. I would expect that someone in the position that ‘ocdtrekkie probably blocks installing random third-party drivers on those machines anyways, so now there’s new a way for websites to do funny things to connected devices at best and pwn your computer because the high-quality USB implementation wasn’t that high quality after all. (I’m putting aside the conversation about phishing people into granting those permissions, because that’s a completely different, difficult discussion.) Also, > disclaimer: I work for Google, have nothing to do with Chrome …depends on how you’re squinting.
    - taviso 4y ago
      > pwn your computer because the high-quality USB implementation wasn’t that high quality after all. You have to compare it to the options we have available today, not an implausibly perfect implementation that doesn't exist. Let's imagine there is some bug that means if I grant access to a device, then more access than intended is actually granted. That sounds bad, but let's compare that to the non-Web USB model, where you have no option but granting unlimited unrestricted access to everything... now it doesn't sound so bad :) Isn't "if you can find an 0day exploitable bug you can get access to everything" better than "You don't need a bug, because you already have access to everything"? > …depends on how you’re squinting. Umm, I know what I work on?
      - saagarjha 4y ago
        I think we're talking past each other. If the two alternatives are "I need to use a random native USB driver to talk to this" and "I can use WebUSB" then WebUSB is probably better. But in reality a lot of devices actually already have drivers for that class in the OS, or there's a way to write some sort of restricted driver on that platform doesn't require loading things into the kernel. In that case I'm now using a browser where random websites can either trick me into giving them access to my USB devices with a click, or forcefully access them via an exploit on a surface that is generally amenable to such things. Put another way, I see WebUSB as being an attempt at writing userspace USB drivers by doing it in Chrome instead of the OS, and considering the entire point of using Chrome is so people can run code on your device it might be better to actually not put this capability here. > Umm, I know what I work on? As do I, and it would probably be more accurate to write "I work for Google, but not on Chrome".
  - blooalien 4y ago
    Assuming security is a well implemented "first class citizen" and not an afterthought, yes…
    - taviso 4y ago
      Let's assume it's an absolute trash fire, the latest of all afterthoughts. That's still better than "just download and run this exe as Administrator".
CamperBob2 4y ago
So because a few bad actors might abuse it, and some users will fall into the traps laid for them, none of us get to use it. I reject this way of thinking. Letting bad guys dictate how you live your life and how you use your computer just doesn't scale that well.
- bobkazamakis 4y ago
  systems that allow such brazen exploitation cease to exist, so who cares about scalability?
  - CamperBob2 4y ago
    Do they cease to exist because of gatekeepers, criminals, or both?

ocdtrekkie 4y ago

It's an incredibly bad idea, at work for the one Chromium browser we permit (Edge), we have to use policies to block this and several dozen major security vulnerabilities that exist solely because they make cool Google I/O demos.

taviso 4y ago
Why is it a security vulnerability? I really want WebUSB to succeed, it could be a cross platform way to eliminate random executables from shady websites. The idea is that your browser can mediate and scope access to specific devices. There are some edge cases where Web USB is equally as dangerous as the status quo, but in the common case it is far better and never worse. The situation today is you buy a random USB gadget (e.g. a fitness tracker), but you can't use it without also installing the accompanying software/drivers. That effectively gives the manufacturer complete control of your computer. All you really wanted was for them to sync your step count, but you have no option but to give them complete remote access to your computer. With Web USB you can allow vendor.com to access device 1234:5678 only, and revoke that access whenever you like. Sure, maybe you could be tricked into clicking through all the confirmations and granting https://fakevendor.com https://fakevendor.com access to a device. That could be bad - but no worse (and probably a lot better) than being tricked into downloading and running fakedriver.exe. (disclaimer: I work for Google, have nothing to do with Chrome)
- ocdtrekkie 4y ago
  I explain in a neighboring comment: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=34563795 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=34563795 It's crucially important that Googlers are divorced of the belief a permission popup on the top of the screen is adequate indication of intent/informed consent. People approve these all the time without understanding what it's for. Installing software is, at minimum, a very distinct action which users are aware of doing. Generally, they install a limited number of applications for specific purposes, whereas they may visit literally thousands of websites a month. Pretending these two things can be interchangeable is silly. I am not entirely opposed to being able to use a browser as the UI for an activity like this, but it should require a higher bar to activate it for a specific server to talk to a specific device. Even web extension installs remain far too easy to not be maliciously abused widely. (Chrome extensions remain the primary malware I see in the wild.) EDIT: The HN gods have me rate limited so hopefully you'll see my response here to the below comment: Installing software is a complex process. It entails navigating to the correct site, locating a download, fishing it out of the downloads bar (many seniors cannot find this, by the way, it absolutely baffles them), opening it, usually acknowledging that you know it's an executable program, and then navigating the install wizard. A software engineer would reasonably believe simplifying this is a good thing, but as noted, people regularly accept malware into their browser and do not even consciously realize they did it because it involves a single click. People absolutely get misled into installing bad software, but they always know they actually did it, it's impossible to follow that chain without having some idea you're doing something. Accepting malware isn't the answer, understanding people is. There is no technical solution for security, because it's a human problem.
  - taviso 4y ago
    Why is installing software a distinct action, but granting device access not? Malware is a huge ongoing problem, which suggests this distinction doesn't really exist. I think we have to accept that there is no way to perfectly eliminate social engineering without also locking down legitimate access to devices. There will be some percentage of users who will click through all the warnings and confirmation prompts, just like there is some percentage of users that will run malware. That's bad, but you're letting the perfect be the enemy of the good. Your argument could also apply to ssh, a small number of users could be socially engineered into sharing their id_rsa. This happens, we often find them checked into github, for example. Does this mean we should go back to telnet? No, for the vast majority of cases ssh is a huge imperfect improvement. Likewise, in the vast majority of cases, Web USB is a huge imperfect improvement over installing drivers.
    - ocdtrekkie 4y ago
      So the issue is we are talking about different dimensions of improvement. I concede that WebUSB is better sandboxed than executing a driver installer (likely running as admin or root) in terms of the blast radius. However, WebUSB is catastrophically worse than an installer in terms of the ability of the infection to occur in the first place. Both because of the aforementioned difficulty of user process of software installation, as well as the additional checks the OS and/or third party antivirus does, as opposed to Google's fairly limited abuse detection capabilities (just Safe Browsing in WebUSB's case, I imagine?). This is a problem I have talked about many times before regarding Google's security outlook. On Project Zero there's a ton of interesting and surely exciting work into novel ways to compromise systems. ...That work has basically no bearing on improving security for the billions of users who will never be targeted in such a niche technical way. Real world compromise tends to just be social engineering people into doing what Google explicitly permits websites to do. You could remove malicious activity from a billion users right now by simply... deleting the Notifications API from Chrome, which is principally used to spam ads. Because people mash that allow button all the time, every time. I'd best guess I see ten times the malware in Chrome (either hijacker extensions delivered by the Chrome Web Store, push notifications from random adult websites, or both) than actual installed malicious software on a given Windows machine. And this is fixable! Google could fix this with WebUSB and make a net positive all around! Likely by redesigning permission granting in the browser to require deeper user intent. But it would require a fundamental change in how Google understands and perceives security (and it'd likely reduce engagement stats for some features, which various teams would fight), and I've been beating this drum for several years and I don't really expect it to change. (In fact, one specific change I could recommend: I think APIs like WebUSB, as well as the Notifications API and similar, should probably be completely blocked unless you install a PWA. It's not as much process as a Windows software install, but it's a clear gate to allowing a site more ability, and installing and removing apps is a far easier concept to explain to users than navigating the site privacy settings.)
- saagarjha 4y ago
  It depends on your threat model. “A trusted party ships high-quality drivers” is a good model but bundling it with the browser, where you run all sorts of code from third parties, can be difficult from the perspective of exposed attack surface. I would expect that someone in the position that ‘ocdtrekkie probably blocks installing random third-party drivers on those machines anyways, so now there’s new a way for websites to do funny things to connected devices at best and pwn your computer because the high-quality USB implementation wasn’t that high quality after all. (I’m putting aside the conversation about phishing people into granting those permissions, because that’s a completely different, difficult discussion.) Also, > disclaimer: I work for Google, have nothing to do with Chrome …depends on how you’re squinting.
  - taviso 4y ago
    > pwn your computer because the high-quality USB implementation wasn’t that high quality after all. You have to compare it to the options we have available today, not an implausibly perfect implementation that doesn't exist. Let's imagine there is some bug that means if I grant access to a device, then more access than intended is actually granted. That sounds bad, but let's compare that to the non-Web USB model, where you have no option but granting unlimited unrestricted access to everything... now it doesn't sound so bad :) Isn't "if you can find an 0day exploitable bug you can get access to everything" better than "You don't need a bug, because you already have access to everything"? > …depends on how you’re squinting. Umm, I know what I work on?
    - saagarjha 4y ago
      I think we're talking past each other. If the two alternatives are "I need to use a random native USB driver to talk to this" and "I can use WebUSB" then WebUSB is probably better. But in reality a lot of devices actually already have drivers for that class in the OS, or there's a way to write some sort of restricted driver on that platform doesn't require loading things into the kernel. In that case I'm now using a browser where random websites can either trick me into giving them access to my USB devices with a click, or forcefully access them via an exploit on a surface that is generally amenable to such things. Put another way, I see WebUSB as being an attempt at writing userspace USB drivers by doing it in Chrome instead of the OS, and considering the entire point of using Chrome is so people can run code on your device it might be better to actually not put this capability here. > Umm, I know what I work on? As do I, and it would probably be more accurate to write "I work for Google, but not on Chrome".
- blooalien 4y ago
  Assuming security is a well implemented "first class citizen" and not an afterthought, yes…
  - taviso 4y ago
    Let's assume it's an absolute trash fire, the latest of all afterthoughts. That's still better than "just download and run this exe as Administrator".

CamperBob2 4y ago

So because a few bad actors might abuse it, and some users will fall into the traps laid for them, none of us get to use it. I reject this way of thinking. Letting bad guys dictate how you live your life and how you use your computer just doesn't scale that well.

bobkazamakis 4y ago
systems that allow such brazen exploitation cease to exist, so who cares about scalability?
- CamperBob2 4y ago
  Do they cease to exist because of gatekeepers, criminals, or both?