You say that, but human compilers would have caught the Mars Climate Orbiter units mismatch [1] or the Boeing 737 Max bug [2]. One of the more luminous story in

You say that, but human compilers would have caught the Mars Climate Orbiter units mismatch [1] or the Boeing 737 Max bug [2]. One of the more luminous story in the history of computers is how Margaret Hamilton predicted years before the moon landing the risk of her own "priority display" innovation [3], allowing her to mitigate accordingly and make the landing a success. There is a price to be paid for raising the abstraction level (even beyond the gigabytes of RAM that apparently I must use to render this textbox). Yes, we can automate systems, in certain aspects we can even externalize some decision-making: is this a good apple or a bad apple, should the car break or take a left, but when the chips are down, we are rather far from any externalization of reasoning, meta-reasoning, higher-order thinking, and so forth. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mars_Climate_Orbiter#Cause_of_failure https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mars_Climate_Orbiter#Cause_of_... [2] "One way to see the MCAS problem is that the system took too much control from the pilots, exacerbated by Boeing’s lack of communication about its behavior. But another way, McClellan suggests, is to say that the software relied too much on pilot action, and in that case, the problem is that the MCAS was not designed for triply redundant automatic operation." https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/03/boeing-737-max-8-safe-how-faa-tested-its-software/584848 https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/03/boein... [3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Margaret_Hamilton_(software_engineer)#Apollo_program https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Margaret_Hamilton_(software_en...