4 ms·
Quite a few security experts in here that think being able to update a text file, one that this often shared across systems (rightly or wrongly), is of equivale
by Ensorceled 4y ago
Quite a few security experts in here that think being able to update a text file, one that this often shared across systems (rightly or wrongly), is of equivalent difficulty to stealth updating binaries or reading process memory.
It ludicrous that the relevant bits of this XML file are not protected by the master key.
- blincoln 4y agoIt's a little trickier than that, because a KeePass user may work with multiple password databases (e.g. one for themselves, a shared one for their team, etc.), and the user almost certainly wants one configuration that applies to all of them. Maybe something like the first time a particular database is opened, KeePass could ask the user to approve the settings in the config file, and if so, add a cryptographic signature based on the config file hash and the database's master key to a separate config file that stored a list of those signatures and the config settings that were present when they were generated.[1] The next time the same database is opened, KeePass would only re-prompt if the signature no longer matched. That way, if the config file changed separately, the user could get a warning popup highlighting what had changed. [1] Alternatively, have everything in one file, and strip the "existing signatures" block before generating the hash, but it seems safer to use a separate file.