3 ms·
I'm just guessing here, but I'd assume this vulnerability does happen once the master password is input. So, the attacker modifies the config file, then the us
by adlpz 4y ago
I'm just guessing here, but I'd assume this vulnerability does happen once the master password is input.
So, the attacker modifies the config file, then the user eventually uses the password manager as usual, and then a file in disk with all plain text passwords is generated and subsequently read by the attacker.
I guess the point here is you don't need a memory read vulnerability.
Can someone more knowledgeable confirm?
- Ensorceled 4y agoThe point is that the file itself should be encrypted or at least signed with the master password.
- detaro 4y agoFor a general configuration file, there is not "the" master password, since it is independent of password database files.
- adlpz 4y agoI guess it's an issue of UI. Given that dumping a cleartext password list is a legitimate thing you might want to do, and being a plugin (or setting) a somewhat acceptable way of achieving this, the issue here is that, as it is, the user is not being unequivocally made aware of what happened. So yeah, I agree, in any case the feature, as it is implemented, is completely unacceptable.