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My point is that "rationalistic" approach wielding probabilistic reasoning will get the cases in your examples right. It's precisely the rationalists who I'd ex
by TeMPOraL 4y ago
My point is that "rationalistic" approach wielding probabilistic reasoning will get the cases in your examples right. It's precisely the rationalists who I'd expect to point out that "gender" and "political affiliation" are ill-defined categories, which is why they resist useful formalization. "The willingness to recognize that definitions are not historically or socially static" is something I learned from reading rationalist pieces.
Meta-point: perhaps "rationalism" and "fluidity" are themselves ill-defined categories. Perhaps the authors only ever met rationalist groups that are extremely limited in their understanding and mostly just have a crush on mathy-sounding language - and so the authors invent "fluidity", which to the rationalist groups I interacted with would be just "basics of thinking straight, explained for 5 years old".
> But basically trying to set probabilistic distinctions is somewhat like trying to measure a coastline - things become almost infinitely detailed the more you investigate it, and the map looks less and less like the territory.
I know those examples, precisely because of the probability-wielding rationalists, who point at such cases as curiosities, and show how to put numbers on them correctly. "All models are wrong, but some are useful." I think the authors may be complaining about the people who forgot about the "all models are wrong" part, but they themselves seem to forget the "some are useful" part. Throwing hands up in the air and saying "it always depends" isn't a solution.
BTW. on a bit of a tangent, one of your examples:
> If that's not to your taste, then how the distinction between the political left and right seems obvious in aggregate, but (...)
I still can't imagine to whom this distinction seems "obvious in aggregate". I never found it obvious. Nor useful for anything other than cultivating hate and shutting your own thinking off. This is not a "look at me, I transcend boundaries" remark - it's just if anything is obvious, it's that political categories do not map well to how people think about issues, much less to any sort of correct or optimal beliefs. Rather, they work as attractors in the political spectacle.
(This has become painfully pronounced in recent times, as people are happy to round you off to "far-${otherside}" just because you disagree with them on something.)
- rjknight 4y agoIt's possibly that Chapman is arguing against a straw-man of Yudkowskian rationality, but it's also the case that many people really do seem to believe in something like that straw-man, and so it's necessary to argue against it anyway. It's true that in any attempt to orient oneself to the world, probabilities will be involved. Some of these are modelled implicitly and autonomously by your perceptual system, some are experienced as intuitions, and some are modelled explicitly as part of a problem-solving task, and some are considered reflectively. In the problem-solving scenario, we are taking a certain model of the situation as a given, and assigning probabilities based on that. Sometimes that's good: our model is accurate and gives us things that are relatively easy to assign probabilities to. In some situations, like casino gambling, the map/territory distinction is almost nil. We still have some problems, though: not all maps are accurate, and some accurate maps don't make it easy to assign probabilities. We can still do it - we can always assign some probability - but we might not be getting very good results any more. Changing our map requires, in Chapman's terms, changing our "stance": our idea about what the hell is going on in the situation, including our ideas about who we are in relation to it. Roughly speaking, stances are cached sets of techniques, assumptions and perspectives which make certain actions and perceptions available to us. They are associated with schools of practice, and have evolved for suitability for certain situations. We may have reason to believe that a given stance is correct for a situation, but our reason for thinking so is not that the stance gives us access to an explicit model of probabilities. A lot of this is actually pretty obvious, and we do it all the time. The feeling of "oh, this is one of those situations, I know what to do now" is familiar to most of us. To the extent that a stance gives us a probabilistic model to work with, it is by updating our perceptual and intuitive senses of what to do and what kind of result to expect. "Meta-rationality", in Chapman's terms, is the skill of maintaining a constant awareness of one's stance, the possibility of changing it, and some well-trained intuition about when to do so. Introspection on these stance-associated intuitions can be very valuable, but this is a reflective practice, requiring a much greater intensity of attention than merely acting on them (and this is generally not compatible with acting on them in real time, c.f "choking" in sports). It is more "computationally" (and hence metabolically) expensive, and is generally something one would do only after gaining familiarity with the practice. One cannot use a priori probabilistic reasoning to imagine what one would do in a situation if one were, say, skilled in the art of kung fu - one can only understand the implications of being good at kung fu by actually becoming good at it (see Agnes Callard's book Aspiration[1] on this point). After which point, it may or may not be good for your kung fu practice to examine it with the tools of probabilistic rationality. I imagine Chapman would argue that, for many stances and their associated practices, it isn't really worth it, but you'd have to ask him. Of course, we can certainly describe the entire process using probabilities: my decision to treat this as a kung fu problem rather than a diplomatic problem ultimately rests on some model I have of the likely outcomes. But this is merely descriptive: I am not "shutting up and calculating" in order to make the decision, merely rationalising it after the fact. Perhaps this does not seem particularly insightful to you, and I would agree that perhaps it should not - you may well have figured this out for yourself, and experienced rationalists may be familiar with all of it. Most of these ideas are within the grasp of thoughtful teenagers. And yet, at the same time, there really are people who act as if they believe that knowledge of probability theory will enable them to make, in near-real-time, optimal decisions even in unfamiliar domains. And most of us, if we're honest, forget just how much of a difference a change in stance can make to our perception of a situation. Many of us are naive realists who have trouble accepting that our very ideas of what is "real" in a situation is mentally constructed and dependent on our sense of what is relevant. It's not coincidental that Chapman's writings are often a re-working of certain Buddhist treatments of how our view constructs our reality. [1]: https://academic.oup.com/book/4936 https://academic.oup.com/book/4936
- lofatdairy 4y agoYeah, I mean I have nothing against rationalism (mostly because I haven't read much rationalist writings), so if these are concepts that have made it into rationalism then there's really not much to add. >Throwing hands up in the air and saying "it always depends" isn't a solution. Admittedly, postmodernism isn't really inclined towards engineering problems. It does provide frameworks and lines of criticism, but I also didn't see many new ideas being deployed in that sense. This was also a point that I struggled w/ in the OP. >I know those examples, precisely because of the probability-wielding rationalists, who point at such cases as curiosities, and show how to put numbers on them correctly. I'd argue there's no useful way to put numbers on, say, borders. Even in cases where the geographic location of a border was definite, if I were to stand across, say, the California-Oregon border, it's not as if 50% of my body would be subject to California's laws and 50% Oregon's. Thinking of everything numerically and engineering features to support that framework seems like a Macnamara fallacy. I would also agree that some models are useful, but the emphasis on utility would in turn be problematic in a vacuum. You could reasonably predict, say, housing prices by racial makeup of a neighborhood (recalling the Boston housing data set controversy), but to do so would invite structurally racist applications. There are probably rationalist ways of de-emphasizing utility and accuracy, but again that's less my point and more to just illustrate that the biases of a model do not inherently remove from its usefulness to some end, and that critical frameworks can allow us to articulate problems. A map could just as easily center the world on Great Britain, Jerusalem, Rome, or China - to a certain extent they're equally useful and justifiable - but even with this arbitrary decision you affect how the viewer will see what the map represents. >I still can't imagine to whom this distinction seems "obvious in aggregate". I never found it obvious. Probably the word obvious wasn't the right term, but "definable at all" would be closer to what I intended. There _is_ an idea of what is left and what is right, but the words themselves are deployed arbitrarily. Perhaps a better example of where postmodern thought would be deployed would be something like exploring/critiquing the American right's notion of "postmodern neo-Marxism". This would be where concepts of floating signifiers and performance might be useful to explore how speech informs identity (not just vice versa).