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There needs to be some way to tell the device that the user is authorized, otherwise it can never do anything that could possibly be security sensitive - forget
by yjftsjthsd-h 4y ago
There needs to be some way to tell the device that the user is authorized, otherwise it can never do anything that could possibly be security sensitive - forget taking a backup; why should the 2FA app give you a one-time code if you could be an attacker?
Edit: Thinking about it more, I suppose it all comes down to a cost/benefit analysis. It's true that taking a backup of 2FA secrets does give an attacker more than a single code. But when that trade is leveraged against the legitimate user being unable to control their own device, I think it's a terrible trade, to the point that I'm not convinced it's ever worth taking. And of course my real objection is that the user is rarely if ever actually asked; rather, a company tells the user that they can't control their own device, which is unacceptable.
- charcircuit 4y ago>why should the 2FA app give you a one-time code if you could be an attacker? Because the app aims to prove that someone has possession of the device. If someone has the key instead they can give back the device and generate codes later without possession. They can also resell the key online without having to ship a physical device. They can sell the same key to multiple people.