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From https://infosec.exchange/@epixoip/109585049354200263 https://infosec.exchange/@epixoip/109585049354200263 (found spelunking from OP): > consider the fact
by amarshall 4y ago
From https://infosec.exchange/@epixoip/109585049354200263 https://infosec.exchange/@epixoip/109585049354200263 (found spelunking from OP):
> consider the fact that the threat model for a cloud-based password management solution should start with the vault being compromised. In fact, if password management is done correctly, I should be able to host my vault anywhere, even openly downloadable (open S3 bucket, unauthenticated HTTPS, etc.) without concern. I wouldn't do that, of course, but the point is the vault should be just that -- a vault, not a lockbox.
- TillE 4y agoI keep making this same point in various HN threads. It should be trivially obvious to anyone who understands cryptography, but I guess lots of people really just don't. Pick a good password, pick good algorithms, and you should feel very comfortable about hosting an encrypted blob of data anywhere. Maybe you should worry a little if you're at risk of being specifically targeted by the NSA, but I doubt they've seriously broken any state-of-the-art crypto. At that point OS exploits and trojans are your real concern.