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And the US is incredibly vulnerable to having its 130 refineries destroyed by PRC conventional global strike - ultimately no better able to defend her energy an

And the US is incredibly vulnerable to having its 130 refineries destroyed by PRC conventional global strike - ultimately no better able to defend her energy and calorie inputs as PRC. The Malacca dilemma / PRC blockade was viable in an era where the US could unilaterally enforce with impunity. That game theory doesn't exist anymore, PRC can simply run blockade and threaten to take down comparable levels of US energy production that will reverberate down the chain into fertilizer and agriculture. Fortress America doesn't hold when an adversary like PRC can hit strategic targets on CONUS, hence US energy "security" is relegated to energy autonomy, the resources exist, but their processing cannot be secured in war. Think Saudi. Functionally, the CONUS is now as existentially vulnerable as the PRC in the event of war. The US knows this. In terms of sanctions, which energy producer is going to sanction PRC? We already see with RU war that bulk cargo will just get transshipped through various middle men. Or that PRC can always double down on coal conversion to make fertilizer - was previously curtailed to reduce emissions, but coal is making way back on the menu in the last few years. Projection of the PRC blockade scenario has PRC stretching out reserves and rationing for multiple years. Which TBH is longer than modern war will last, and by that time, in terms of attrition, US homefront would be as dire as PRC. Zeihan stans keep wanking about virtues of USN blue water projection and energy security as if PRC needs to match like for like to be able to challenge the US. PRC doesn't need to spend 30 years building 11 carriers to secure trade, it needs 5 years to build enough conventional global strike backed by ongoing nuke expansion to deter anyone from messing with her SLOCs in the first place.

Apocryphon 4y ago
When you’re talking about global strikes between nuclear powers and converting massive amounts of coal to fertilizer, you have already exceeded the optimal costs for a splendid little war. China blundering into more than it bargained for over Taiwan is one thing, are you really expecting it’s going to commit to a world war-level of production and economic transformation over one island, no matter how much it might believe it to be its patrimony? And as if the U.S. wouldn't retaliate with transpacific conventional strikes in kind? As we see in the reversal over zero COVID, even the Chinese government has to listen to the sentiments of its well-to-do urbanized population created by Dengist reforms, regardless of how objectionable it might find them. Can you not imagine those coastal elites and middle classes complaining about wartime austerity, the blow to the quality of life they're used to? At some point devising so many elaborate hypothetical war plans is just technothriller novelizing. Which is just fine with me, Tom Clancy left us no true heirs.
- dirtyid 4y ago
  >converting massive amounts of coal to fertilizer This isn’t anything new, IIRC PRC was converting ~50 million tons of fertilizer using coal gasification, which it has curtailed significantly under Xi to focus on emission goals by relying more on imports. But now that great power competition is back, security > environment. Combined with moving to better ag practices where net fertilizer use is decreasing while output increasing (PRC previously used a stupid amount of fertilizer / unit). Peak PRC fertilizer production was like 100M tons, current consumption is ~50M, down from high 60M. Circling back to ops point = PRC can indigenously supply their own fertilizer with domestic inputs which is enough for food security in terms of calories. >elaborate hypothetical war plans If by elaborate hypothetical war plans you mean establishing deterrence to mitigate world war levels of destruction by establishing more rungs of escalation than homeland strikes straight to nukes, I call that responsible planning. PRC pursuing a prompt global strike is part of the PLA's 2020 Science of Military Strategy, and acknowledged by the 2022 DoD report on PRC military. It’s no different than various US blob/warplanners plotting interventions on a TW scenario, replete with mainland strikes. If the US expects to escalate that far, of course the PRC is willing (and most importantly, increasingly able) to reciprocate. Ultimately, this is merely the flip side of US efforts of "integrated deterrence", US wants to deter PRC reclaiming TW, and PRC wants to deter US from "blundering" into greater conflict by showing existential cost is now mutual. Then it circles back to the question of who wants it more. I imagine US polity wondering if intervening in TW is worth it if war follows to the US homeland. Not just revolutionary skirmishes but existential destruction that the US has so far been isolated against. I can imagine that impacts actual US decision making regardless of propaganda layer. What I can also imagine is CCP telling coastal elites, as it has consistently, that peaceful reunification is preferable but military force is not out of the question, and in the event of military force, mutual vulnerability to deter homeland strikes means their QoL will not spiral out of control. If the US is deterred from intervening, PRC can prosecute TW like US conducted wars in the Middle East, with little impact on domestic affairs, even less with strict media controls.
  - Apocryphon 4y ago
    They may make plans, but when it comes time to actually wage a war against a fellow nuclear power that drops DEFCON levels, will they actually commit to a path such as striking American soil that will so inevitably wreck the very globalized interconnected system of political and economic ties that made modern China in the first place? Not to mention, it's all very well to build such intercontinental rockets, hard to say they will work as expected in an actual conflict. Perhaps the Pentagon will bring back Star Wars. Imperial Japan had such innovations as midget submarines and balloon bombs too, not all innovations work out in war, outside the imagination. > mutual vulnerability to deter homeland strikes means their QoL will not spiral out of control We are talking about a situation where the sheer disruption to world trade, never mind sanctions and the like, would drop quality of life. The sheer economic shocks and supply chain disruptions would be massive. You expect normal shipping to take place near a war zone, sanctions or no sanctions? The government can make all of the promises they'd like, things have a tendency to spiral out of control in war. > PRC can prosecute TW like US conducted wars in the Middle East, with little impact on domestic affairs, even less with strict media controls. On this I am of two minds. On one hand, it seems that inevitably, the Chinese public will lose the stomach for a protracted conflict that hurts their fellow Han people, especially those who they consider as fellow Chinese nationals, especially people whom they have not been at actual war with in seven decades, who they have shared plenty of trade, cultural, tourist ties with. On the other, I have read that often the contemporary popular sentiment is actually more raring for war than the actual current government is; perhaps in a way not dissimilar to U.S. public sentiment towards war in the Middle East after 9/11. So your guess is as good as mine as how the general population reacts to war. But I still believe that as modern China sees itself as a developed, advanced, optimistic society, there would be no shortage of people not wanting to commit to a brothers' war, at the very least because they consider it to be beneath the conduct of a civilized, stability-obsessed society.

Apocryphon 4y ago

When you’re talking about global strikes between nuclear powers and converting massive amounts of coal to fertilizer, you have already exceeded the optimal costs for a splendid little war. China blundering into more than it bargained for over Taiwan is one thing, are you really expecting it’s going to commit to a world war-level of production and economic transformation over one island, no matter how much it might believe it to be its patrimony? And as if the U.S. wouldn't retaliate with transpacific conventional strikes in kind? As we see in the reversal over zero COVID, even the Chinese government has to listen to the sentiments of its well-to-do urbanized population created by Dengist reforms, regardless of how objectionable it might find them. Can you not imagine those coastal elites and middle classes complaining about wartime austerity, the blow to the quality of life they're used to? At some point devising so many elaborate hypothetical war plans is just technothriller novelizing. Which is just fine with me, Tom Clancy left us no true heirs.

dirtyid 4y ago
>converting massive amounts of coal to fertilizer This isn’t anything new, IIRC PRC was converting ~50 million tons of fertilizer using coal gasification, which it has curtailed significantly under Xi to focus on emission goals by relying more on imports. But now that great power competition is back, security > environment. Combined with moving to better ag practices where net fertilizer use is decreasing while output increasing (PRC previously used a stupid amount of fertilizer / unit). Peak PRC fertilizer production was like 100M tons, current consumption is ~50M, down from high 60M. Circling back to ops point = PRC can indigenously supply their own fertilizer with domestic inputs which is enough for food security in terms of calories. >elaborate hypothetical war plans If by elaborate hypothetical war plans you mean establishing deterrence to mitigate world war levels of destruction by establishing more rungs of escalation than homeland strikes straight to nukes, I call that responsible planning. PRC pursuing a prompt global strike is part of the PLA's 2020 Science of Military Strategy, and acknowledged by the 2022 DoD report on PRC military. It’s no different than various US blob/warplanners plotting interventions on a TW scenario, replete with mainland strikes. If the US expects to escalate that far, of course the PRC is willing (and most importantly, increasingly able) to reciprocate. Ultimately, this is merely the flip side of US efforts of "integrated deterrence", US wants to deter PRC reclaiming TW, and PRC wants to deter US from "blundering" into greater conflict by showing existential cost is now mutual. Then it circles back to the question of who wants it more. I imagine US polity wondering if intervening in TW is worth it if war follows to the US homeland. Not just revolutionary skirmishes but existential destruction that the US has so far been isolated against. I can imagine that impacts actual US decision making regardless of propaganda layer. What I can also imagine is CCP telling coastal elites, as it has consistently, that peaceful reunification is preferable but military force is not out of the question, and in the event of military force, mutual vulnerability to deter homeland strikes means their QoL will not spiral out of control. If the US is deterred from intervening, PRC can prosecute TW like US conducted wars in the Middle East, with little impact on domestic affairs, even less with strict media controls.
- Apocryphon 4y ago
  They may make plans, but when it comes time to actually wage a war against a fellow nuclear power that drops DEFCON levels, will they actually commit to a path such as striking American soil that will so inevitably wreck the very globalized interconnected system of political and economic ties that made modern China in the first place? Not to mention, it's all very well to build such intercontinental rockets, hard to say they will work as expected in an actual conflict. Perhaps the Pentagon will bring back Star Wars. Imperial Japan had such innovations as midget submarines and balloon bombs too, not all innovations work out in war, outside the imagination. > mutual vulnerability to deter homeland strikes means their QoL will not spiral out of control We are talking about a situation where the sheer disruption to world trade, never mind sanctions and the like, would drop quality of life. The sheer economic shocks and supply chain disruptions would be massive. You expect normal shipping to take place near a war zone, sanctions or no sanctions? The government can make all of the promises they'd like, things have a tendency to spiral out of control in war. > PRC can prosecute TW like US conducted wars in the Middle East, with little impact on domestic affairs, even less with strict media controls. On this I am of two minds. On one hand, it seems that inevitably, the Chinese public will lose the stomach for a protracted conflict that hurts their fellow Han people, especially those who they consider as fellow Chinese nationals, especially people whom they have not been at actual war with in seven decades, who they have shared plenty of trade, cultural, tourist ties with. On the other, I have read that often the contemporary popular sentiment is actually more raring for war than the actual current government is; perhaps in a way not dissimilar to U.S. public sentiment towards war in the Middle East after 9/11. So your guess is as good as mine as how the general population reacts to war. But I still believe that as modern China sees itself as a developed, advanced, optimistic society, there would be no shortage of people not wanting to commit to a brothers' war, at the very least because they consider it to be beneath the conduct of a civilized, stability-obsessed society.